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Abstract 
In 1989, the United States Marine Corps published the document Fleet Marine 
Force Manual 1, Warfighting. Its appearance signaled the official adoption of maneuver 
warfare as the Corps’s organizational philosophy and the basis of its doctrine for 
preparing and conducting operations.  The decade of debate and experimentation that 
preceded the publication of Warfighting has not received detailed examination, but merits 
such for the insights it can provide to understanding intellectual change and military 
reform.  
 Beginning in 1979, Marine Corps officers engaged in an intraservice debate over 
the issue of maneuver warfare, a new concept that began to circulate among military 
reformers in the latter half of the 1970s.  A group of Marine officers known as 
“maneuverists” began meeting in unofficial seminars to study, refine, and promote the 
idea.  Maneuverists believed that maneuver warfare was a more fluid and dynamic way 
of fighting because it stressed flexibility, creativity, and a focus on enemy behavior.  
They also thought the new idea offered a more effective alternative for fighting war than 
contemporary practices, which they thought focused too much on rigid application of 
standardized procedures and methods of existing manuals.  The intellectual 
transformation of the Marine Corps involved three main mechanisms.  The first was a 
theoretical mechanism centered on public debate in the pages of Marine Corps Gazette to 
introduce and defend maneuver warfare to Marine audience.  The second was a 
functional/practical mechanism that involved educational and training initiatives at the 
Amphibious Warfare School and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.  The third mechanism 
was the use of institutional authority made possible with the appointment of General 
Alfred M. Gray, a senior and vocal maneuver warfare champion, to the position 
Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Using the authority of his office, Gray directed the 
writing of a doctrinal manual encapsulating the ideas of maneuver warfare to provide the 
Corps organizational focus and direction.  The resulting manual FMFM 1, Warfighting, 
 
  
officially adopted maneuver warfare as service doctrine and organizational warfighting 
philosophy.
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Dedication 
To my family, friends, teachers and mentors, and fellow Marines.   
 CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
On March 6, 1989, Marine Captain John Schmitt drove to the Marine Barracks, 
Washington D.C., the official residence of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), 
General Alfred M. Gray.  The purpose of Schmitt’s visit was to receive Gray’s final 
approval and signature on a document that the Commandant had personally 
commissioned, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting (FMFM 1).  Schmitt was a 
junior captain serving in the Doctrine Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Center 
located in Quantico, VA when he received the assignment to write the Commandant’s 
new doctrinal manual.  He was also a member of  a generation of post-Vietnam War 
Marine officers who had been exposed early in their careers to the ideas contained in the 
manual he was tasked to write, maneuver warfare.  Warfighting defined maneuver 
warfare as: “a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through 
a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly 
deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.” 1    
Gray’s foreword to the text communicated his intentions for the new document: 
This book describes my philosophy on warfighting.  It is the Marine Corps’s doctrine 
and, as such, provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. 
By design this is a small manual and easy to read.  It is not intended to be a reference 
manual, but is designed to be read from cover to cover …. 
… You will notice that this book does not contain specific techniques and procedures for 
conduct.  Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values [emphasis mine].  
It requires judgment in application. 
 I expect every officer to read--and reread—this book, understand it and take its message 
to heart.  The thoughts contained here represent not just guidance for actions in combat but a way 
of thinking in general .  This manual thus describes a philosophy for action which, in war and in 
peace, in the field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty (emphasis mine).2 
 
                                                 
1 John F. Schmitt, Unpublished telephone Interview by author, 10 October 2006.  Schmitt was the 
principal author of Warfighting.  Idem, E-mail to author, 20 September 2006. United States Marine Corps, 
Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting (Washington, D.C. 1989, reprinted as Warfighting: The U.S. 
Marine Corps Book of Strategy (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 1995), 75-76. 
  
2 General Alfred M. Gray, foreword to United States Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual-
1, Warfighting (Washington, D.C. 1989), reprinted in Warfighting: The U.S. Marine Corps Book of 
Strategy.   
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 The Marine Corps between the end of the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War 
of 1990-1991 was predominantly a peacetime organization and its operational activities 
consisting of limited interventions such as in Lebanon in 1982-1983 and in Grenada 
1983.  The absence of sustained conflict did not mean that war was far from the minds of 
Marines who were looking ahead to prepare for future battles.  It was during this interval 
between wars that the Marine Corps became involved in a heated organizational 
discussion over maneuver warfare. 
After a decade of internal debate and experimentation, maneuver warfare became 
in 1989 not only an official doctrine, but also the capstone doctrine for the Corps, the 
guiding principle of the organization.  Because of this, a study of the years between 
maneuver warfare’s introduction and adoption can offer one possible answer to the 
question: How do new ideas enter and gain subsequent adoption into a military 
organization?  An alternative way of stating this question: How do you change the way a 
military organization thinks? 
Any understanding of the Marine Corps as a peacetime and wartime organization 
since 1989 demands a basic understanding of Warfighting because it remains at present 
the capstone doctrine.  A revised edition re-titled Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, 
Warfighting (MCDP 1) appeared in 1997 at the direction of another CMC, General 
Charles C. Krulak. However, this new version did not fundamentally alter the underlying 
concepts outlined in the original.  In the nearly two decades since the manual appeared, 
the Marine Corps has participated in three major conflicts: the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf 
War and the ongoing Operations Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom.  
The Corps has also participated in numerous small-scale interventions.  In all of these 
actions, maneuver warfare has guided the actions of Marines from the rank of private to 
general.  Given the prominent role played by Marines in America’s wars and other 
military operations of the last twenty years, an understanding of the origins of its official 
doctrine merits close examination 
 There is much more to this case study though than a simple question of how the 
Marine Corps developed and adopted maneuver warfare.  Studying the Marine Corps and 
its relationship with maneuver war provides an opportunity to examine a relatively 
unstudied aspect of American military history, namely the years bounded by post-
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 Vietnam period and 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War.  By studying the intellectual aspects of 
a 1980s United States military organization, it also looks at American military history 
from a different perspective than the operational perspective that has traditionally 
dominated the field. Even as military history began to explore non-operational topics in 
recent decades, studies of the Marine Corps have remained predominantly operational.  
The intellectual changes that took place in the Marine Corps were only one aspect of a 
process of rebuilding and reconstituting American military power in the wake of 
Vietnam.  In this context, the publication of Warfighting had greater implications for the 
Corps and United States military history beyond the addition of a new doctrinal 
publication.   
 The popular stereotype of military organizations and the Marine Corps is that they 
are intellectually monolithic organizations that deemphasize new thing that challenges 
convention, a consequence of the dominance of the military virtues of obedience, 
discipline, and loyalty to established hierarchy in the public perception.  Within the 
service cultures of the United States military there is a strong tendency to play down the 
intellectual aspects of the military profession because of the association of scholarly 
pursuits as unmanly and unessential to the tasks of a warrior.  Intellectual pursuits, 
because they are predominantly mental in nature, seem inconsistent with the popular 
image of the military professional as a physically courageous man of action.   
What this study will show is a military organization can have a thriving dynamic 
intellectual culture.  Marines, and by extension, professional American military men, do 
participate in intellectual discourses, that are just as vibrant, exciting, and engaging as 
other environments usually associated intellectual activity such as the university.  The 
discussions within the Corps produced intense emotions and lively discussions, some of 
which bordered on the polemical, driven by disparate visions of what kind of 
organization the Corps should become following Vietnam.       
Maneuver warfare polarized the Marine Corps, producing two camps defined by 
their respective positions:  “maneuverists” and “attritionists.”  Who coined these terms 
and when they first entered into circulation is unknown, but within the specific context of 
the maneuver warfare debate between 1979 and 1989, there was some pejorative 
connotation applied to the use of either term.   Outside of these pejorative uses, these 
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 terms indicate two fundamentally opposed intellectual conceptions of warfighting and 
organizational behavior.3 
A maneuverist, for the purpose of this study, was in the broadest sense anyone 
openly in favor of the adoption and implementation of maneuver warfare by the Marine 
Corps.  Dissatisfaction and lack of confidence in the capability of the dominant doctrine, 
education, and training practices of the Marine Corps to prepare adequately for combat 
provided much of the motivation for maneuverists.  What the maneuverists saw in 
maneuver warfare a more viable alternative that corrected the perceived deficiencies of 
the Corps. 
This case study is an analysis of how the maneuverists intellectually transformed 
the Marine Corps and brought about the adoption of maneuver warfare.  The study will 
focus primarily on the actions of key maneuverists who were actively involved in 
maneuver warfare’s development, promotion, and defense that led to its eventual 
adoption, individuals such as Michael D. Wyly, G.I. Wilson, William Woods, William 
Lind, and Alfred M. Gray.  Identification of the key ideas of the maneuverists is a 
relatively easy proposition because they actively circulated their ideas for public debate, 
most notably in the pages of Marine Corps Gazette.  Ultimately, Warfighting’s 
publication meant the beginning of the formal institutionalization of the ideas that they 
had advocated and experimented with for over a decade.  This study will demonstrate that 
what transformed maneuver warfare from a fringe concept to organizational capstone 
doctrine was an active, multi-dimensional campaign by its maneuverist advocates.  These 
individuals explained, promoted and defended the concept to the Marine Corps; 
developed methods for educating and training Marines in the new concepts; and used 
institutional authority to effect an overall intellectual change to a military organization.  
The problem with identifying and defining attritionists is that the term attrition 
warfare and its interchangeable analogues firepower warfare and firepower-attrition 
warfare were the creations of the maneuverists.  William S. Lind, a civilian legislative 
                                                 
3 Kenneth McKenzie and Peter Cary have both identified the pejorative connotations associated 
with use of the term maneuverist.  McKenzie has also identified a negative tone attached to the term 
attritionist when used to identify maneuver warfare’s opponents.  When the terms maneuverist and 
attritionist appears in this text it is without the denunciatory intentions originally attached to either.  Peter 
Cary, “The Fight to Change How America Fights,” U.S. News and World Report, 6 May 1991, 31; Kenneth  
F.  McKenzie, Jr., Major, USMC, “On the Verge of a New Era: The Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare,” 
Marine Corps Gazette (July 1993): 64.   
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 aide and military reform advocate, popularized these terms and a purported dichotomy 
between them.  Under this framework Marines who did not adopt maneuver warfare or 
were unreceptive to it, those who remained wedded to the established and conventional, 
were attritionists.   
Another problem with this characterization is that it is too broad, encompassing a 
spectrum of attitudes that ranged from ambivalence to hostility.  The maneuverists faced 
the daunting task of gaining the adoption of their ideas in an organization made up of 
individuals who were unaware, ambivalent, had reservations, or openly opposed to them.  
Among the issues that this study will explore are the criticisms that emerged to maneuver 
warfare, and not all of these objections originated from an outright hostility to the 
concept.  In the narrowest sense, attritionists were those openly and vocally opposed to 
maneuver warfare, and in the broadest sense, anyone who simply had not embraced the 
new ideas.  The more extreme of the criticisms against attritionists, usually voiced by 
Lind, characterized them as hidebound conservatives resisting change due to their closed-
minded parochialism.  Yet opposition to maneuver warfare was more nuanced and 
included Marines whose professional experience had validated a conservative outlook 
towards new, untested ideas.  
This is a study without heroes or villains. It is unfortunate that the dialog that took 
place within the Corps resulted in statements that bordered on the polemical.  On the 
other hand, the intensity of the debate is understandable considering the stakes involved.  
What must remain in the forefront in studying the intellectual activity of a peacetime 
military organization is that the discussion ultimately centers on war and violence.  The 
discussion was more than academic because it concerned the life or death of Marines, 
operational success or failure, and battlefield victory or defeat.  This aspect of the 
discussion in many respects accounts for the intensity of the activity and emotions from 
1979 through 1989.  If the Corps rushed too quickly or failed to move fast enough in 
adopting maneuver warfare, the consequences these actions would be borne by Marines 
on the battlefield.  The Corps could not afford to “get it wrong” in deciding whether to 
reject or accept maneuver warfare.    
 Ultimately, the maneuverists achieved their goal of changing how Marines think.  
The process that led to maneuver warfare’s adoption was a multi-dimensional approach 
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 that took place over the course of a decade.  Maneuverists used three mechanisms to 
bring about the intellectual transformation of the Marine Corps.  First, they published 
their ideas and answered their critics in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette.  This 
constituted the theoretical component of the maneuver warfare movement, centered on 
increasing awareness, gaining acceptance, and defending maneuver warfare on its 
conceptual strengths and weaknesses.  Publishing these ideas allowed maneuver warfare 
to reach Marines who had not yet encountered the ideas, as well as offering a vehicle for 
addressing specific concerns of Marines who had reservations regarding the concept.  
Second, maneuverists used a functional/practical component.  Maneuver warfare needed 
to be not only words on paper but also a set of skills and abilities employable by Marines 
in operational units.  In addition to learning the new doctrine, Marines had to train to 
apply and execute it in the physical realm.  The final mechanism used was institutional 
authority.  No idea can become doctrine without the sanction of the organizational 
leadership.  The willingness to adopt maneuver warfare by a senior leader who possessed 
the necessary authority was what finally completed the process of intellectual 
transformation.   
Within the text of Warfighting are phrases that make an explicit connection 
between organizational doctrine and intellectual processes.  The manual defines doctrine 
as:  
a teaching advanced as the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of 
war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct.  Doctrine establishes a particular 
way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a 
mandate for professionalism, and a common language …. 
… Marine Corps doctrine is made official by the Commandant and is established in this 
manual.  Our doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much 
as it requires judgment in application.  Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive 
(emphasis mine).4 
 
The appearance of the terms “teaching,” “philosophy,” “fundamental beliefs,” and 
“judgment” clearly demonstrate that this new document was closely tied to organizational 
thinking and that Gray, in his position as Commandant, was making a statement that he 
was trying to institutionalize a change in this area by adopting maneuver warfare.   
 The challenge faced by the maneuverists in the 1980s was to convince Marines of 
the need to adopt a new philosophy and a new way of thinking.  Not all Marines agreed 
                                                 
4 Warfighting, 56-57.  
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 on the need for such a philosophy, nor did all Marines agree that maneuver warfare was 
necessarily the correct philosophy.   
A critical tenet of maneuver warfare and the cause of much of the disagreement 
between surrounding the concept posited the existence of two “distinct styles of warfare,” 
“attrition” and “maneuver.”  According to Warfighting, these styles of conflict could 
exist simultaneously at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.  What defined 
attrition was that it “seeks victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s 
material assets by superior firepower and technology.”  Warfighting defined an 
“attritionist” as someone who saw the enemy as “targets to be engaged and destroyed 
systematically.”  They focused on “efficiency,” which led to a “methodical, almost 
scientific approach to war.”  Attritionists looked to quantification to gauge progress: 
“battle damage assessments, ‘body counts,’ and terrain captured.”   From this emerged 
the belief that inflicting the highest degree of damage to an opponent required direct 
attacks against where the enemy was strongest.  The attritionists sought battle under any 
set of conditions and measured the results as proportional to effort expended, that is, 
more resources employed would inherently produce, greater destruction of the enemy, 
and with it, more success.  This mode of thinking led to a preference for “centralized 
control” to achieve the greatest possible concentration and quantity of fire, and an 
“emphasis on efficiency” produced an “inward focus on procedures and techniques.”  
The essence of success in attrition is not “military competence” “but sheer superiority of 
numbers in men and equipment.”5 
According to Warfighting, what distinguished a maneuver-based  based doctrine 
from attrition was that maneuver, involved the temporal and psychological components in 
addition to its counterpart’s single-minded focus on the physical dimension of the 
battlefield.  Instead of attacking an enemy head on as in attrition warfare, maneuver 
looked to apply “strength against selected enemy weakness” through the use of “speed 
and surprise.”  It used “tempo” as “a weapon.”  The emphasis on speed meant 
decentralized control in an organization.   While, attrition operated primarily in the 
physical dimension of war, maneuver also involved the moral, that is the psychological. 
The aim was not physical destruction but to “shatter the enemy’s cohesion, organization, 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 35-36.  Italics in original. 
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 command, and psychological balance.”  Instead of relying on numerical superiority in 
men and equipment, maneuver required the ability to identify and exploit enemy 
weakness.  The ability to exploit vulnerabilities that appeared in a timely fashion could 
result in success that could be disproportionate to the effort made. A small force, or a 
component of a force could bring about the defeat of the enemy, if could seize upon 
opportunities when they arose.  However, this required an increased reliance on the 
judgment of individual leaders who would be required to make decisions quickly in the 
face of the changing conditions of battle.  The drawback to this is while maneuver offered 
a chance for potential greater success, it also made the consequences of poor or ill-timed 
decisions more devastating. One of the great attractions of attrition was it involved less 
risk, through stringent controls by higher commanders, detailed planning, and emphasis 
on following procedures.6   
Warfighting outlined what it saw as the criteria for an organizational warfighting 
concept, one that was “consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war 
and the realities of the modern battlefield.”  First, the concept needed to function in the 
friction, uncertainty, chaos, and fluidity of war.  The concept also had to have 
applicability across the full spectrum of conflict.    Marines would need to employ the 
concept in both high-intensity conflicts between modern state armies and in limited, 
small-scale interventions.  It had to be useful in exploiting opportunities quickly before 
they disappeared.  The concept had to account for the moral and physical forces of war 
and recognize the greater importance of the former.  The concept also had to give a 
numerically outnumbered force the chance for success.  Finally, the concept had to make 
it possible to win quickly and with minimal expenditure of resources.  Warfighting 
explicitly rejected attrition and adopted maneuver as the basis for doctrine because the 
latter met the above criteria.7 
A key point of dispute for Marines during the maneuver warfare debate was 
whether maneuver warfare was even appropriate for the Marine Corps, because of its 
traditional role as an amphibious force.  Warfighting adopts the position that the 
maneuver warfare met the Corps needs, but Marines were far from unanimous in 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 36-38. 
7 Ibid., 73-74. 
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 agreeing with this assertion.  During the maneuver warfare debate, some Marines would 
argue that organizationally, the Marine Corps was incapable of executing the new 
doctrine because they did not see it as consonant with the traditional missions and 
organizational structure of the Corps.  The Marine Corps would not be the Marine Corps 
if it became a maneuver warfare organization, which would begin to bear a greater 
resemblance to the United States Army.  This issue was, and remains, of particularly 
sensitivity to Marines, who pride themselves on their distinctiveness from other service 
branches. This notion of uniqueness is more than a matter of pride. Many saw the very 
existence of the Corps as contingent upon its ability to perform functions that other 
service branches cannot do as well it can.  If those distinctions were lost, the Corps 
believed it risked possible elimination by a budget-conscious Congress. 
Maneuver warfare was more than a theoretical proposition of how to fight.  It also 
involved a corpus of associated skills necessary to execute the envisioned style of battle.     
Warfighting outlined five concepts needed to practice maneuver warfare.  The first was   
“Mission Tactics” where a senior commander assigned a mission to his subordinate, but 
allowed him the latitude to determine the actions necessary to accomplish that mission.  
The second was “Commander’s Intent.”  By clearly specifying intentions to his 
subordinates, a commander allowed his subordinates to exercise initiative without 
compromising the commander’s goals.  The third was “Focus of Effort” where a 
commander identified which elements of the mission was most critical to achieving his 
desired aim.  This harmonized the efforts of subordinates by guiding their decisions and 
actions in working towards the desired results.  The fourth concept was “Surfaces and 
Gaps.”  In battle, leaders needed to identify weaknesses to exploit, “the gaps” and enemy 
strengths to avoid, the “surfaces.”  If weaknesses could not be located or identified, a 
force would need to create them by some means.  Finally, “Combined Arms” looked to 
developing an officer’s ability to maximize combat power by using all available weapons 
assets and maximizing their value through close integration.  An enemy could not counter 
the threat posed by one asset without leaving him vulnerable to the threat posed by 
another.8      
                                                 
8 Ibid., 91-98. 
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 According to maneuverists, the Marine Corps of 1979--the starting point of this 
analysis--was an attritionist organization.  The move to maneuver warfare from attrition 
was part of a gradual evolution in warfighting first identified by John Boyd and expanded 
by his followers into the “Four Generations of War” paradigm.  The first generation 
began with the emergence of modern state militaries in 1648; its key traits are an 
emphasis on order and control, the tactics of line and column.  Attrition was the second 
generation of warfare that began in the American Civil War and culminated in World 
War I.  The emphasis on order and control continues into the second generation, but with 
the addition of an emphasis on the employment of overwhelming firepower and physical 
destruction on the battlefield.  Maneuver warfare is the third generation, which eschews 
the characteristics of the previous generations in favor of decentralized control, local 
initiative as a means of achieving the mental and morale collapse of the adversary, rather 
than his physical destruction.  The most notable examples of third generation warfare in 
the 20th century are the German blitzkrieg of World War II and guerilla warfare, 
employed by the likes of T.E. Lawrence in the Arab Revolt that occurred during World 
War I and Mao Zedong during the Chinese Civil War.  Maneuver warfare was not a new 
form of warfare, but the change the maneuverists advocated was the active adoption of 
this style of fighting by an American military that was strongly entrenched in the second 
generation.  Maneuver warfare itself was only a step in the eventual progression to the 
fourth generation of war.  The objective remained the same, the mental and moral 
collapse of an adversary. What had changed are the actors.  The closing years of the 
twentieth century has seen the emergence of non-state entities such as criminal syndicates 
and terrorist organization as threats to the monopoly of warfighting held by nation-states 
since 1648. 9    
The transition to the new way of thinking advocated by Warfighting took place 
over time and after considerable inter-organizational debate and discussion.  In the 
decade prior to Warfighting’s publication, the tension between attrition and maneuver 
was the cause of a heated public debate within the Marine Corps, especially within the 
                                                 
9 See John R. Boyd.  Colonel, USAF, Ret., “Patterns of Conflict,” Unpublished briefing, version 
dated December 1986 located at http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf.  Last accessed 12 April  2007 and  
William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, Colonel, USA, John F. Schmitt, Captain, USMC, Joseph W. Sutton, 
Col, USA,  and Gary I. Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, “The Changing Face of War : Into the Fourth 
Generation,” MCG (October 1989): 22-26. 
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 pages of the Marine Corps Gazette.  Marines also experimented with methods for 
training and educating necessary to execute the new doctrine.  The publication of 
Warfighting was the culmination of these efforts. 
 No single mechanism alone can account for the Corps’s move to a maneuver 
warfare doctrine.  The published arguments of maneuverists could only convince Marines 
to accept the new doctrine.  Convincing Marines to adopt the new ideas still required a 
system for educating and training with the new doctrine.  Published arguments also 
suffered from the stigma of being “academic discussions.”  Talking about maneuver 
warfare could not convince everyone, but seeing it employed during training exercises 
could assuage some of the concerns of the skeptics.  On the other hand, a new but 
unofficial concept could be popular, but if the senior echelons of an organization refuse 
to institutionalize it, its adoption is piecemeal and haphazard.  Long-term survival is also 
uncertain because it may encounter leadership  that is less than committed  to tolerating, 
let along advancing, the new thinking within the organization.  Without an adequate 
system for educating and training Marines in maneuver warfare, the concept could never 
make the transition from appealing concept to having practical operational value.  The 
unilateral declaration of a new doctrine without some confidence in the new ideas from 
the rank-and-file also has limitations. The personnel tasked with implementing the 
doctrine must believe in it in order to execute in any meaningful fashion.  A new doctrine 
carries with it the challenges of training and education to ensure that personnel can learn 
and execute it.         
Doctrinal and intellectual changes in this period were not limited to the Corps,   
The United States Army also underwent a significant intellectual transformation that was 
also embodied in the publication of new doctrinal manuals, the 1976 and 1982 editions of 
its capstone manual Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations.  Some comparison between 
what took place in the Corps and what happened in the Army is worth exploration.    
Major Paul H. Herbert, USA, chronicles the work of the General William E. 
DuPuy, Commanding General, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) and his role in its intellectual transformation.  DuPuy, according to Herbert, 
thought that the United States Army needed to reorient Army thinking away from 
Vietnam and towards a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe.  The 1973 Yom 
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 Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbors, who received arms from the United 
States and the Soviet Union respectively, also convinced DuPuy that doctrine needed to 
reflect the increased lethality of new weapons systems such as improved tanks, surface-
to-air missiles, and anti-tank guided munitions.  DuPuy was also convinced that 
mechanized operations would dominate the next conflict.  Herbert outlines how DuPuy 
used the full bureaucratic apparatus of TRADOC in a centralized process to create a new 
doctrine to reflect these conceptualizations.  The result was the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 
that promulgated a doctrine known as Active Defense that provoked a considerable 
amount of criticism and discussion, and another iteration of FM 100-5.10 
John L. Romjue’s From Active Defense to AirLand Battle continues the story of 
the Army’s doctrinal development by beginning with the criticisms of Active Defense 
that emerged after its adoption.  Intended for application in a conflict with a numerically 
superior Warsaw Pact, many within the Army criticized Active Defense for its defensive 
mindset, an overemphasis on battle with the enemy’s front-line forces, and overreliance 
on firepower.  To address these criticisms, General Donn Starry, DuPuy’s successor at 
TRADOC, employed the same centralized, bureaucratic development process used for 
Active Defense.  In the process Romjue outlines, creating the new doctrine involved 
subject matter experts from the Army’s combat and supporting arms and full use of 
intellectual capital available from Army schools such as the Command and General Staff 
College.  The result was AirLand Battle, a doctrine that emphasized combined arms, 
speed, flexibility, and mobility and deep penetration attacks into the rear of the enemy’s 
battlespace.11     
Soon after the publication of his version of FM 100-5, Starry outlined his vision 
for “effecting change” in a military organization during 1982 address to the US Army 
War College.  He described seven requirements that served as a framework that was 
                                                 
10 Paul H. Herbert, Major, USA, Deciding What Has to Be Done:  General William E. DuPuy and 
the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Papers Number 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Combat Studies Institute, 1988). 
 
11 John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 
1973-1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States Training and Doctrine Command, 1984); 
Idem, “The Evolution of the AirLand Battle Concept” Air University Review  (May-June 1984) located at 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/may-jun/romjue.html. Last Accessed 6 
July 2007. 
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 “necessary to bring to bear clearly focused intellectual activity in the matter of change, 
whether in concepts for fighting, equipment, training or manning the force.”  What 
particularly concerned Starry was that without an effective framework for systematizing 
the development and adoption of new ideas, a military organization risked the possible 
imposition of change by agents from outside the organization.  Starry’s criteria were:  
There must be an institution or mechanism to identify the need for change, to draw up 
parameters for change and to describe clearly what is to be done and how that differs from what 
has been done before. 
The educational background of the principal staff and command personalities responsible 
for change must be sufficiently rigorous, demanding, and relevant to bring a common cultural bias 
to the solution of problems. 
There must be a spokesman for change.  The spokesman can be a person one of the 
mavericks; and institution such as a staff college; or a staff agency. 
Whoever or whatever it may be, the spokesman must build a consensus that will give the 
new ideas, and the need to adopt them, a wider audience of converts and believers.   
There must be a continuity among the architects of change that consistency of effort is 
brought to bear on the process. 
Someone at or near the top of the institution must be willing to hear out arguments for 
change, agree to the need, embrace the new operational concepts and become at least a supporter, 
if  not a champion, of the cause for change. 
Changes proposed must be subjected to trials.  Their relevance must be convincingly 
demonstrated to a wide audience by experimentation and experience, and necessary modifications 
must be made as a result of such trial outcomes.12 
 
What this brief overview reveals is that while parallel intellectual transformation 
and doctrinal development can occur, the mechanisms through which they take place can 
be different.  The main point of difference between the independent developments of 
AirLand Battle and maneuver warfare was the role of official organizational apparatus in 
the process of change.  In the AirLand Battle example, a strong bureaucratic entity was 
present, the Army’s TRADOC, that served driving and controlling force for intellectual 
change and retained full control of the development process.  In contrast, much of 
maneuver warfare’s development took place external to the Corps’s formal doctrinal 
development apparatus, and centralized direction within the Marine Corps played a 
relatively minor role in the process.  The parallel developments by the Marine Corps and 
Army of maneuver warfare and AirLand Battle suggest that there are alternative paths to 
arriving at similar doctrines.  The Marine Corps and Army cases converge in one 
significant aspect; intellectual change eventually requires support from a person with 
substantive authority within the organization.  In the Army’s case that support was 
                                                 
12 Donn A. Starry, General, United States Army “To Change and Army,” Military Review (March 
1983): 20-27. 
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 present from the beginning, while in the Marine Corps, maneuver warfare lacked the 
support of such authority until the appointment of Gray to Commandant. 
A consensus has developed that the United States military underwent significant 
intellectual changes in the years between the Vietnam War and Gulf War, yet operational 
histories dominate studies of the post-Vietnam military. The most notable examples are 
works on the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War such as Rick Atkinson’s Crusade and Michael 
Gordon and Bernard Trainor’s The Generals’ War.  There is a growing body of 
operational literature dealing with the current situation in Iraq such as Gordon and 
Trainor’s Cobra II and John Keegan’s The Iraq War.  A Marine-specific example of this 
emphasis on post-Vietnam operational history is  Bing West and Ray Smith’s The March 
Up chronicling the 2003 invasion of Iraq and West’s No True Glory dealing with the 
2004 battle for Fallujah.13   .   
The problem with this emphasis on operational history is that it tends to minimize 
the significance of the peacetime years.  It is during these years that many the critical 
organizational decisions that will influence the prosecution of the next conflict are made.  
In the years of peace, services recruit troops and develop new weapons systems, units 
conduct training exercises, enlisted men and officers receive education and training, and 
organizations write the doctrinal manuals and publications that will guide the conduct of 
future operations.    
In his 1998 overview of the state of Marine Corps scholarship, Graham A. 
Cosmas has noted “[m]ost post-1980 Marine operations institutional developments need 
thorough study and analysis.”  Cosmas has also observed that what literature that does 
exist on the Marine Corps tends to be written by Marines or former Marines, and 
published by official house organs of the Corps.  No work comparable to those of Herbert 
and Romjue exists that examines intellectual developments within the Marine Corps in 
                                                 
13 Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Mariner Books, 1994); 
Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, General, USMC (Ret.), The General's War:   The Inside Story 
of the Conflict in the Gulf. (Boston, New York and London: Little, Brown, and Company, 1995.); Idem, 
Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York Pantheon Books, 2006); 
John Keegan, The Iraq War (New York: Knopf, 2004);  Francis J. “Bing” West and Ray L. Smith, The 
March Up: Taking Baghdad With the 1st Marine Division. (New York: Bantam Books, 2003); and West,  
No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle For Fallujah (New York: Bantam Books, 2005). 
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 the same period, let alone examinations of other critical organizational developments 
such as changes to recruitment and training policies, new weapons development and 
procurement.  Key social developments  with organizational implications such as the 
transition to an all-volunteer force, increased involvement of women, or the struggle to 
address the racial tensions and drug abuse problems that are generally agreed to have 
taken place in the post-Vietnam military also remain to be explored. 14      
The Marine Corps’s adoption of maneuver was only one aspect of greater trends 
and developments in the military history of the United States in the post-Vietnam era.  
There is general agreement among those who served in the military that the end of the 
Vietnam War marked a nadir for the American military plagued by racial tension, alcohol 
abuse, illegal drug use, sagging morale, reduced budgets, and the stigma of military 
defeat.  During the 1980s, conditions steadily improved through a combination of stricter 
recruitment policies, expedited discharges for disciplinary problems, and increased 
budgets for new weaponry and training.  The culmination of this period was military 
success during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, which highlighted the substantial 
resurgence in American military power.15 
In the current standard general history of the United States military, Allan Millett 
and Peter Maslowski’s For the Common Defense use the term “military renaissance” to 
describe the 1980s, since it produced in a military that once again constituted a credible 
                                                 
14 For an assessment of  Marine Corps historiography  since 1973 see Graham A. Cosmas  A 
Guide to the Sources of United States Military History: Supplement II, edited by Robin Higham and Donald 
J. Mrozek (Hamden, CT, 1986), 230-240; Idem, A Guide to the Sources of United States Military History: 
Supplement III, edited by Robin Higham and Donald J. Mrozek (Hamden, CT, 1993) 321-337; Idem, A 
Guide to the Sources of United States Military History: Supplement IV, edited by Robin Higham and 
Donald J. Mrozek (Hamden, CT, 1998), 391-410; Entries for the Army, Navy, and Air Force have also 
identified the same general opportunities  for new scholarship.   
 
15 No detailed historical analysis of this period exists.  James Kitfield’s Prodigal Soldiers: How 
the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War (Washington, D.C.: 
Brassey’s, 1997)  adopts a journalistic approach and  chronicles the careers of several officers during this 
period from their service as junior officers in Vietnam to general officer rank in the Gulf War,  Prodigal  
Soldiers  is inadequately documented and lacks critical analysis.  Al Santoli’s Leading the Way. How 
Vietnam Veterans Rebuilt the U.S. Military: An Oral History (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993) is a 
collection of oral interviews of officers who remained in service through the Gulf War.  Interviews with 
maneuverists such as Wyly and Wilson echo the sentiments that there was a period of significant 
intellectual development following in the interval between Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War.  
Contemporary media counts immediately following  the Persian Gulf War also observed a change in 
military service thinking in the Army and Marine Corps.  See Cary, Ibid., and Frederick Kaplan, “The 
Force was with them,”  Boston Globe 17 March 1991: A21.  
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 conventional military counterbalance to the Soviet Union.  Among the key developments 
they identify are the procurement of modern weapons systems such as the Abrams tank 
and Bradley fighting vehicle that began under the Carter administration, and increased 
defense spending under Reagan to improve conventional capabilities through equipment 
modernization and training improvements.  In terms of intellectual developments, Millett 
and Maslowski note that this period produced a “newly-assertive and rearmed U.S. Army 
and Air Force” which “pushed their European counterparts toward a concept of high-
technology deep battle in which all elements of the Warsaw Pact would be attacked 
simultaneously.”16 
Millett and Maslowski did not comment of the Marine Corps’s development of 
maneuver warfare, but contemporary independent accounts following the Persian Gulf 
War by historian Frederick Kagan and journalist Peter Cary noted the parallel 
development of Army AirLand Battle and the Marine Corps maneuver warfare.  Kagan 
and Cary both observed that the two services shifted their doctrine away from a reliance 
on firepower and direct assaults to greater emphasis on speed and mobility.  Both authors 
also noted that in either service, maneuver warfare began as an idea with its followers 
constituting a minority.  Both authors also observed that a key intellectual influence to 
these changes was the ideas of a retired Air Force colonel, John Boyd, but that Boyd’s 
ideas exerted a greater direct influence on the Corps.  
Maneuver warfare can be seen as an intellectual reaction by the military to the 
Vietnam War and its aftermath.  Within this context, maneuver warfare is an umbrella 
classification for military doctrine that eschews a methodical, firepower-intensive way of 
fighting focused on physical destruction of opponents in favor of speed, mobility, 
flexibility to achieve the collapse of an opponent to act cohesively.  What is apparent 
though is that there is no single way to practice a maneuver-based doctrine, the Army and 
the Marine Corps each have their own version.  To avoid confusion between the Army 
and Marine forms of maneuver doctrine, for the purposes of this text and unless 
otherwise identified, the appearance of the term maneuver warfare and maneuverist refers 
to the context of the Marine Corps 
                                                 
16 Allan R. Millett and Peter R. Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the 
United States of America, Revised and Expanded (New York: Free Press, 1994), 607-646. 
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 There has been one significant book-length attempt to study post-Vietnam 
intellectual developments of the United States military, Frederick Kagan’s Finding the 
Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy.  Kagan uses the post-Vietnam 
recovery as the starting point and main impetus for change in American military thought, 
noting developments such as AirLand Battle, as well as changes in Navy and Air Force 
thinking.  He dubs 1980s as the “Reagan Revolution” for the American military because 
increases in defense spending made physical reality the intellectual propositions of 
thinkers such as John Boyd.  Kagan then carries his study forward to the 1990-1991 
Persian Gulf War and the “Transformation” and “Network Centric Warfare” paradigm 
that came into vogue with the currently on-going Global War on Terror.17 
The most significant problem with Kagan is the timeframe of his work.  Events 
after the 1990-1991 Gulf War are simply too close to analyze.  What is more surprising 
his omission of intellectual developments in the Marine Corps that he himself identified 
in his 1991 Boston Globe article.  Another significant flaw is that while acknowledging 
some debt to Boyd in the development of AirLand Battle, he treats Boyd’s contributions 
as part of a “Revolution in Airpower Theory.”  Kagan’s placement of Boyd in this section 
limits his influence to the realm of air combat, while the reality is that  Boyd’s ideas also 
had a significant on influence on ground combat as well.  Much of how maneuverists 
conceived of ground combat, amphibious operations, training, and education was based 
on Boyd’s ideas and the maneuverists in their writings and interviews openly 
acknowledged their intellectual debt to the retired Air Force colonel.    
Another flaw in Kagan’s work is his neglect of the grass-roots nature of intellectual 
developments in favor of policy-makers, generals, and senior political figures.  Maneuver 
warfare in the Corps began through the individual initiatives of officers, many of whom 
were still in the junior grades of their careers.  Many of the developments needed in 
changing Marine Corps thinking took place independent of senior leadership, with the 
most notable exception being Gray’s direction to write a maneuver warfare manual.    
 John Boyd’s life and ideas have attracted some attention and have provided the 
subject of several publications.  Much of this literature on Boyd, such as Hammond’s The 
                                                 
17 Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: 
Encounter Books, 2006). 
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 Mind of War and Coram’s Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 
highlights his role as one of the intellectual leaders of a military reform movement that 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s.  Most of these works deal with the struggles of Boyd 
and his supporters to achieve reforms in U.S. defense policies based on his ideas.  While 
these works mention the influence of Boyd on the Marine Corps, these works generally 
lack a detailed explanation as to how Boyd-inspired individuals effected change within 
the Marine Corps, with Coram’s biography being the most notable exception.18 
 There is no doubt that events in the 1970s and 1980s produced a resurgent United 
States military.  The armed forces received new equipment and better quality personnel 
because of increased spending, but they also developed new ideas and ways of thinking.  
The similarities and differences between the Army and the Marine Corps in the 
development of their respective doctrines are worth a more detailed exploration.  An 
examination of inter-service budget competitions and its relationship to the intellectual 
developments of this period also deserves examination.  Since defense spending and 
policy-making is ultimately a political issue, the role of Congress and the Department of 
Defense as institutions promoting or impeding intellectual changes and military reform in 
the United States military should receive further attention.  There was a civilian-led and 
dominated military reform movement and a Congressional Military Reform Caucus 
active from the late-1970s through the late 1980s.  The role played by the reform 
movement and the Caucus  in effecting change in the United States military needs to be 
examined in greater detail.  The focus of this study though is the internal organizational 
trends and developments within the Marine Corps, an attempt to understand one limited, 
but significant component of much larger patterns and trends in United States military 
affairs following Vietnam.19 
                                                 
18 Robert Coram, Boyd: Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2002); John G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993); and Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American 
Security (Washington D.C: Smithsonian Books, 2001).   
 
19 Contemporary accounts of the major issues of the time do exist such as James G. Fallow’s 
National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981), a collection of conference papers presented at 1982 
military reform conference sponsored by the United States Military Academy edited by Asa. A Clark IV et. 
al entitled The Defense Reform Debate; Issues and Analysis (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1984)  and Gary S. Hart’s book co-authored with William S Lind, America Can Win: The Case for 
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 There are two earlier examples of doctrinal development within the Marine 
Corps’s organizational history that provide internal historical points of comparison to 
doctrinal development.  The first and best known was the development of amphibious 
warfare doctrine.  Between the two world wars, the Marine Corps committed itself to the 
development and refinement of the techniques, tactics, and procedures needed to conduct 
an opposed landing of forces from the sea on a hostile shore.  Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, Major General John Lejeune and his successors during the interval between the 
world wars committed the Corps as an institution to the development of amphibious 
warfare.20 
The second doctrinal development in Marine history originated in the experiences 
of the “Banana Wars” of the first half of the twentieth century and resulted in the 
publication of the Small Wars Manual in 1940.  Keith Bickel in Mars Learning argued 
that until 1940, small wars doctrine existed informally within the Corps.  What the 1940 
manual represented was the codification and institutionalization of twenty-five years of 
techniques and recommendations that had been developed and transmitted in an informal 
process that involved student coursework done at the Marine Corps’s professional 
military schools in Quantico, VA.  Students drew upon their operational experiences in 
the Caribbean and Central America in developing papers dealing with counter-insurgency 
and civil affairs, identifying methods they found successful and providing 
recommendations to other officers.  While some of these student papers saw publication 
in formal military journals, what created a continuity of ideas was that these papers 
remained on file for future students who encountered them while conducting own 
research for their own papers.  These future students then compared and analyzed the 
ideas of previous classes in relation to their own operational experiences and created 
recommendations of their own.21    
                                                                                                                                                 
Military Reform (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1986).  James G. Burton’s The Pentagon Wars  is his 
memoir of his involvement in the military reform movement and the internal politics of the Pentagon.   
 
20 Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War. Its Theory and Its 
Practice in the Pacific,. 2003 Paperback Edition, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1951). 
 
21 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning. The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 
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 The development of maneuver warfare does not entirely match either of these  
earlier experiences.  Unlike amphibious operations, maneuver warfare developed for 
nearly a decade without the centralized direction and active support of the central Marine 
leadership.  More significantly, the development of amphibious thinking did not produce 
a significant shift in Marines thinking, only the development of formal set of techniques 
and procedures related to a specific type of operation.  Maneuver warfare did share the 
informal nature of small wars doctrine, but the process Bickel identified was also 
primarily oriented towards transmission of techniques and methods, instead of trying to 
produce a radical shift in thinking on the scale the maneuverists were trying to achieve.  
The organizational influence of small wars was also significantly reduced because of 
World War II, which pushed amphibious operations to the forefront. 
    Allan Millett briefly mentioned the publication of Warfighting in his 
organizational history Semper Fidelis in a subsection chronicling General Alfred M. 
Gray’s tenure as the twenty-ninth Commandant of the Marine Corps (1987-1991).  In 
Semper Fidelis, the publication of Warfighting appears in the larger historical context of 
the Marine Corps rebuilding itself in the aftermath of Vietnam.  According to Millett, the 
Corps overcame the challenges of substandard recruits, substance abuse, racial tensions, 
and outdated equipment through stringent recruiting standards, disciplinary actions, and 
an equipment modernization program.  In Millett’s analysis, Gray’s immediate 
predecessors as Commandant achieved a material reconstitution of the Marine Corps, but 
Gray’s tenure completed the task by achieving its spiritual renewal, which was flagging 
when he assumed his post due to a series of scandals under his immediate predecessor, 
Paul X. Kelley.  Gray’s solution to revive organization morale was to emphasize the 
“warrior” ethos of the Corps through tougher training, educational reform, and 
reinforcement of the Marine identity.  Part of this warrior identity involved how Marines 
would train and fight.  According to Millett, Gray directed the creation of Warfighting to 
disseminate his own thoughts on “operational concepts” in published form to the Corps at 
large.22 
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 The main problem with Millett’s brief description of Warfighting’s publication is 
that he omits a decade of development, debate, and experimentation involving the ideas 
expressed in the text.  He also omits any mention of maneuver warfare.  While Gray’s 
endorsement of these ideas was crucial, he was not alone in this process and other 
individuals played crucial roles in spreading and teaching these ideas throughout the 
Corps.   
Terry C. Pierce uses Gray’s adoption of maneuver warfare as one of his case 
studies in Warfighting and Disruptive Technology, Disguising Innovation.  Pierce bases 
his analysis on the work of Stephen Rosen who had studied the introduction and 
sustaining of innovations in the intellectually conservative climate of military 
organizations.  Pierce classifies maneuver warfare as an example of a “disruptive 
innovation,” which is a change in how a service employs one of its combat arms or 
creates a new one that produces improved performance along lines never previously 
considered as effective.  According to Pierce, the key to Gray’s successful introduction of 
maneuver warfare was that he disguised its innovative nature.  Gray accomplished this by 
emphasizing maneuver warfare’s links to earlier Marine Corps practices, namely 
amphibious warfare in World War II.23 
Pierce’s model, while useful for describing what military change is, is inadequate 
to describe why and how the specific example of maneuver warfare took place.  While 
Pierce is correct that Gray tried to tie maneuver warfare to Marine history as a means of 
building a consensus within the Corps, maneuver warfare had circulated and gained some 
acceptance in the years before Gray became Commandant.  As this study will show, Gray 
could not have made the adoption of maneuver warfare possible without the efforts of the 
ten preceding years that prepared the Corps to accept maneuver warfare as a theoretical 
and functional premise. 
There has been an attempt provide a brief history of maneuver warfare’s 
relationship with the Marine Corps.  Major Kenneth Mackenzie’s “On the Verge of a 
New Era: The Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare,” describes three distinct periods in 
that relationship.  The first is “Experimentation” where “Marines tried, adopted, and 
                                                 
23 Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting And Disruptive Technologies.  Disguising Innovation (London and 
New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 1, 85-103, 110-115; Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War. Technology 
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 discarded tactics and techniques seeking to find a measure of equilibrium between fire 
and maneuver on the battlefield” took place in 1980-1989.  The second, “Acceptance and 
Employment,” took place in 1989-1993.  This phase began institutionalization of 
maneuver warfare began with the publication of FMFM-1 and ended with the recognition 
that maneuver warfare never fully worked out the problems of aviation integration.  The 
third period, “A Mature Doctrine,” began in 1993 where “maneuver warfare doctrine … 
has moved beyond the partially formed visions of its founding enthusiasts to becoming a 
workable nuts and bolts doctrine.” 
The boundaries of this study fit within Mackenzie’s “Experimentation” period.  
He is correct that significant work was required to develop and integrate the doctrine 
within the Corps once Gray began the process of institutionalization.  What this study 
does is to examine the process that led to maneuver warfare’s adoption and understand 
how and why it happened.   
 Mackenzie’s “Experimentation” period was analogous to what Thomas Kuhn 
described in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as a paradigm shift.  Throughout 
scientific history, certain scientific achievements known as paradigms tended to gain a 
significant number of adherents and attract them away from competing alternatives, while 
at the same time leaving sufficient room for exploration and development.  Over time 
though, the process of addressing the unresolved issues of the dominant paradigm leads 
to what Kuhn has called a “crisis.”  The older paradigm is no longer able to answer 
questions that arise and leads to dissatisfaction and doubt over the paradigm’s validity.  
Scientists who are less willing to limit themselves to the established confines of the older 
paradigm begin to push past the boundaries and by re-conceptualizing the parameters of 
the problem, create a new paradigm that subsequently replaces the older model.24   
 What happened in the Marine Corps was conceptually similar Kuhn’s model, 
with the military thinking substituting for scientific thinking. Before the adoption of 
maneuver warfare, attrition was the dominant paradigm in the Marine Corps. In the 
period after the Vietnam war, an intellectual crisis emerged as doubts emerged over the 
attrition model’s validity.  Marine who were unsatisfied with attrition warfare began to 
                                                 
24   Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  3rd edition (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago, 1996). 
 
 22
 look elsewhere and saw in maneuver warfare a new paradigm, which they believed would 
more adequately address the needs of the organization.  The years 1979-1989 were the 
years of the paradigm shift from attrition to maneuver.   
There are other models in military history, but they fail to address completely 
what took place in the Marine Corps.  Barry Posen’s Sources of Military Doctrine is a 
comparative analysis of the development of French, German, and British doctrines of 
Maginot Line, blitzkrieg, and air defense respectively during the years between world 
wars.  Posen's model of analysis incorporated balance of power theory and organizational 
theory.  Balance of power theory posits that the recognizable patterns of behavior in 
states, combined with geopolitical context, explain the development of military policy.  
Organizational theory, on the other hand, looks to recognizable patterns of behavior 
common to military organizations, namely their relationship with external agencies such 
as civil government, for the explanation of doctrinal developments.  Posen’s conclusion 
was that balance of power provides a better vehicle than organizational theory to 
understanding doctrinal developments between the two World Wars.25 
Posen’s model describes doctrine as an organizational reaction to geopolitical 
considerations.  His model is correct in that geopolitical considerations do have an effect 
on doctrine.  Concern over a possible conflict with the Warsaw Pact definitely influenced 
the maneuverists.  There was also significant discussion in the Corps over the potential 
effects maneuver warfare would have in the ability to execute is strategic mission as an 
amphibious force.  Because of these concerns, there were geopolitical considerations that 
factored into the maneuver warfare discussion.  What Posen’s model does not deal with 
though, is the process involved in adopting and institutionalizing doctrine.   
 There is a model that more closely fits the Marine Corps case, the example of the 
Prussian military reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst discussed by Charles White in The 
Enlightened Soldier.  The Scharnhorst example demonstrates how and why military 
change can begin at the lower levels of an organizational hierarchy.  The seminar group 
during which maneuverists developed most of their ideas bears similarity with 
Scharnhorst’s creation, Militärische Gesellschaft, which was active in Prussia from 1801 
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 to 1805.  Many of the reforms following the defeat of the Prussian Army at Jena-
Auerstadt had their origins in ideas developed by the society.26    
 Like Scharnhorst and the members of the Militärische Gessellschaft, the 
maneuverists were a reform movement trying to initiate changes to how their respective 
organizations trained and fought that allowed for greater individual judgment and 
initiative. Both groups encountered resistance from militarily conservative elements in 
their organization who resisted changes to established practices.  They shared similarities 
in the types of reforms they advocated such as a more rigorous education for officers.  
They also shared many similar ideas, such as stressing the use of individual judgment and 
initiative by lower-level commands.  The methodology of both groups was similar, both 
relied on the use of professional military journals to increase exposure for their ideas. 
The key difference though between the two is that Scharnhorst and his associates 
began making the case for reform before a substantial military disaster, while the 
maneuverists began pressing their case for reform after Vietnam.  More important though 
were differences in the size and scope of the reforms. The stakes involved for 
Scharnhorst included the survival of the Prussian state itself. What Scharnhorst and his 
associates advocated had implications not only for the Prussian army, but Prussian 
society as well, such as the practice of universal conscription.  While the maneuverists 
argued for reform in the context of Cold War struggle for survival and were connected 
through Lind and Boyd to civilian and political reformers advocating larger changes to 
the Department of Defense, the scope of their proposed reforms was principally internal 
to the Marine Corps and of limited scope. 
Another model of reform that bears similarity to the Marine example is the case of 
British General Sir John T. Burnett-Stuart in as described in Harold Winton’s To Change 
an Army.  Winton uses Burnett-Stuart as an example to highlight the crucial role played 
by institutional patrons in military reform.  Burnett-Stuart encouraged the 
experimentation with mechanized and armored doctrine in units he commanded.  Winton 
notes that Burnett-Stuart had to tread carefully a middle ground between the conservative 
elements of the British army and the proponents of armored warfare who advocated more 
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 ambitious changes.  Burnett-Stuart provided protection for Britain’s armored warfare 
visionaries, allowing them to write and experiment and shielding them from 
organizational retaliation.  Winton’s work demonstrates the value of support from 
individuals with significant organizational authority in fostering intellectual development 
and doctrinal reform. 27   
  Burnett-Stuart has a parallel in the maneuver warfare case study, General Alfred 
M. Gray. Both generals fostered innovation and experimentation in the formations they 
commanded.  Unlike Gray, Burnett-Stuart did not reach a position in the British Army 
comparable to that reached by Gray, who as Commandant of the Marine Corps ascended 
to the highest statutory position within his organization and used his authority to foster 
innovation throughout the Corps.  Burnett-Stuart’s example also reveals the limitations 
faced by an organizational patron of reform.  Reform and innovation existed only where 
Burnett-Stuart exerted direct control, but his authority to do so in the British army at large 
was ultimately quite restricted. 
 Gray’s institutional authority to adopt maneuver warfare would have been moot 
if maneuver warfare was a mature and viable concept by the time of his ascendance to 
Commandant.  A reform-minded authority figure like Gray needs not only a developed 
idea, but also one acceptable to his organization.  In Gray's case, the work of the 
maneuverists eased his path somewhat since maneuver warfare had been circulating and 
gaining converts among the Corps’s officers for a decade before he initiated its official 
adoption.  If the ideas had been altogether to unfamiliar, Gray’s ability to institutionalize 
maneuver warfare might have been diminished.  In this specific case though, Gray used 
his authority to overcome the last obstacles to maneuver warfare’s official adoption. 
The principal sources for this study of maneuver warfare were the writings of the 
maneuverists, combined with interviews and correspondence.  This is only one side of the 
story, but it deals with the side that ultimately succeeded.  The perspective of the 
attritionist side of the story is undoubtedly different and deserves future exploration.  
What the sources do tell us is that how Marines thought about and trained for war was the 
subject of significant discussion within the Corps.  What the sources also tell us is that 
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 proponents of maneuver warfare devoted significant time and effort to developing and 
promoting the concept.   
Within the larger question of how the intellectual change came about in the 
Marine Corps are a number of smaller questions.  How did maneuver warfare come into 
the Marine Corps?  How did conditions in the Marine Corps contribute to or hinder 
maneuver warfare’s reception. Who were the Marines that tended to favor maneuver 
warfare as the best course of action for reform? How did a viable maneuver warfare 
movement come about?  How did the reformers develop and refine their ideas?  How did 
they promote their ideas?  What were maneuverist criticisms of contemporary doctrine?  
What did non-maneuverists think of the concept?  Which Marines tended to oppose 
maneuver warfare?  How did maneuverists rebut these criticisms?   What was different 
about the Marine Corps of 1989 from that of 1979 that made adoption of maneuver 
warfare possible? The answers to these questions as well as the overall question of how 
the Marine Corps became a maneuver warfare organization enhance the overall 
understanding of the process of military reform and intellectual transformation. 
Chapter one of this study will look at the maneuver warfare seminar where many 
of the key maneuverists met regularly in the early-1980s to develop and refine maneuver 
warfare for the Marine Corps.  In this chapter, we will see how emerging trends within 
the Corps contributed to maneuver warfare’s reception by the Corps.  Chapter two of this 
study will look at the theoretical aspect of the intellectual transformation by studying the 
public debate between maneuverists and attritionists in the pages of the Marine Corps 
Gazette.  Chapter three will look at the functional/practical component of the maneuver 
warfare movement and the initiatives to educate and train Marines to execute a 
maneuver-based doctrine. Chapter four will look at how Alfred Gray used his authority in 
his position as Commandant of the Marine Corps to complete the process.    
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CHAPTER 2 - Genesis of a Movement 
In 1979 maneuver warfare was a concept on the periphery of the Marine Corps.  
An identifiable movement of Marines would soon emerge that was devoted to the 
promotion of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps, initiating a process that moved it 
from the fringes to official acceptance.  The appearance of maneuver warfare was the 
consequence of several emerging trends within the Corps of the late 1970s.  First, new 
ideas on war began to permeate the Corps from the outside.  Second, within the Corps 
there was dissatisfaction with Vietnam War veterans over how Marines fought and 
prepared to fight in that conflict.  Third, an organizational vacuum existed within the 
Corps that left it without an organizational mechanism for innovative doctrinal 
development.  Fourth, there was a discussion in the years prior to the maneuver warfare 
debate over the Corps future direction as an organization.  The emergence of a movement 
in support of a new doctrinal formulation cannot be understood without taking into 
account this context. All of these trends came together in the early 1980s and found 
expression in the form of the maneuver warfare movement.    
The Marine Corps in 1979 was in the midst of a Kuhnian crisis that emerged from 
dissatisfaction with the attrition paradigm.  Many Marines had questions regarding how 
their organization would fight in the future, yet were questioning the old doctrines ability 
to supply the necessary answers. There were some Marines who developed concerns over 
whether what they were teaching and how they were training were adequate for the needs 
of the battlefield.  Other Marines had doubts over the future direction of the organization 
emerged, while some Marines grew concerned whether the Corps even had a future.   The 
organization’s official hierarchy proved unable to provide answers to these questions.  As 
a result, some Marines began to look elsewhere to find answers for themselves.  A 
movement emerged centered on an idea that these Marines believed successfully 
answered the questions which the Corps faced, maneuver warfare. 
Some officers who began seeking answers for themselves began meeting and 
discussing their ideas with each other. Students at the United States Marine Corps 
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 Amphibious Warfare School located at Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA organized a 
maneuver warfare seminar from which emerged the maneuver warfare movement.  This 
seminar was critical to the overall development of maneuver warfare.  Several of the key 
figures to the development of maneuver warfare, such as Michael Wyly, G.I. Wilson, 
William Woods, and William Lind, were regular participants.  These individuals were 
among maneuver warfare’s most active promoters and defenders in the Corps, especially 
in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette.  In addition to publishing articles, these 
Marines developed the techniques and methods for training and educating a maneuver-
based doctrine at the individual and unit-level.  
What brought these men together was a shared interest in the ideas of a retired Air 
Force colonel, John R. Boyd, dubbed the “Godfather of Maneuver Warfare” by Jeffery 
Cowan.  Boyd’s area of interest was in the relationship between human mental processes 
and their relationship to war.  Boyd presented his ideas in a briefing that he began giving 
in the mid-1970s called “Patterns of Conflict” in which he analyzed 2,500 years of 
human conflict.  The conclusion he reached was that the key to defeating an opponent 
was to disrupt his capability for cohesive action by achieving mental and morale collapse.  
Central to a military force’s ability to act cohesively was the ability to “Observe-Orient-
Decide-Act.”  Boyd argued that at all levels of conflict both combatants observe their 
opponent’s actions, they process the information and orient themselves to make a 
decision based on filters such as training, education, culture, personality, they make a 
decision, and then act on the decision.  The process then begins anew.  Using this model, 
Boyd posited that the combatant who completes their Observe-Orient-Decide-Act process 
faster and disrupted the ability of his opponent to complete his own process developed an 
advantage by compelling him to react to a rapidly changing environment with which he is 
increasingly unable to cope so that he becomes increasingly isolated.28       
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 Boyd identified a general progression in human conflict from warfare based on 
attrition to one based on maneuver.  His discussion included topics as diverse as hoplite 
warfare, the Mongols, Sun Tzu, Guibert, Napoleon, Clausewitz, Jomini, Mao, the 
German 1918 Operation Michael, T.E. Lawrence, the German blitzkrieg  and 
demonstrated the methods employed by one side to triumph over their opponent.  Boyd’s 
work also introduced many of maneuver warfare’s key concepts: focus of main effort, 
mission-tactics, commander’s intent, objective, reconnaissance-pull versus command 
push.29 
Boyd’s ideas were especially influential for one individual who actively promoted 
the retired colonel’s ideas through talks and publications, William S. Lind.  Lind was a 
civilian legislative aide to Senator Gary S. Hart, as well as an extremely vocal critic of 
the military services and an advocate of military reform.  While he had no personal 
military experience, Lind did have a strong interest in military history, particularly 
German military history.  Before becoming a legislative aide, Lind was a student in a 
doctoral program at Princeton University.30   
 In early 1976, Lind’s “Some Doctrinal Questions For the United States Army” in 
Military Review. Lind criticized the concept of Active Defense in the forthcoming 1976 
revision to the United States Army’s Field Manual 100-5, Operations.  In the article, 
Lind divided doctrine for “mechanized and armored forces” into two “basic types”: 
“attrition/firepower” and “maneuver.”   
Both doctrines employ fire and maneuver.  However, in the attrition/firepower doctrine, maneuver 
is primarily for the purpose of bringing firepower to bear on the opponent to cause attrition.  The 
objective of military action is the physical reduction of the opposing force.  In the maneuver 
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 doctrine, maneuver is the ultimate tactical, operational and strategic goal while firepower is used 
primarily to create opportunities for maneuver.  The primary objective is to break the spirit and 
will of the opposing high command by creating unexpected and unfavorable operational or 
strategic situations, not to kill the enemy troops or destroy enemy equipment. 
 
The traditional American military model, he argued, fit into the attrition/firepower 
category. 31   
The basic dichotomy Lind identified in this article between attrition/firepower and 
maneuver doctrine would remain at the heart of the maneuver warfare debate in the 
Marine Corps, especially in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette.  Lind used attrition 
and maneuver to describe behavioral characteristics associated with how an organization 
used the physical actions of fire and maneuver.  Attrition doctrine uses the act of 
maneuver to enable the “physical reduction” of the enemy.  On the other hand, maneuver 
warfare as a mindset makes fire the subordinate to  maneuver of maneuver, where the 
goal was not to just to kill the enemy, but to achieve a psychological collapse.  
Lind’s position as a legislative aide allowed him access to military installations.  
He periodically traveled to different commands to observe training and promote a move 
to a   maneuver based doctrine.  According to Lind, the Army was generally unreceptive 
to his calls for a shift to maneuver doctrine, but the Marine Corps in the late 1970s 
appeared to offer a more receptive climate.  Lind attributes this responsiveness to the 
political sensitivity of the Marine Corps to Congress.  Maneuver warfare was appearing 
in a climate of increased political attention to the sphere of military affairs and there was 
a growing bipartisan military reform caucus in the latter half of the 1970s that was 
questioning the doctrinal practices of the armed forces.32 
Maneuver warfare made its first documented appearance in the Marine Corps as a 
featured concept in a two-article series entitled “Winning Through Maneuver Warfare” 
published in the Marine Corps Gazette in October and December of 1979.  The author, 
Captain Stephen Miller, was clearly familiar with the work of Boyd and cited the 
dichotomy between attrition and maneuver styles of battle.  Miller argued in favor of 
decentralized, high-tempo offensive and defensive operations that maximized the 
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 initiative of lower-echelon commanders in a potential conflict against the Warsaw Pact.  
Miller specifically mentions the Boyd OODA cycle as the cause of maneuver warfare’s 
superiority.  Curiously, after the publication of these two-articles, Miller disappeared 
from the scene.33     
Although how Miller encountered the work of Boyd is unknown, it was more than 
likely he heard Boyd deliver one of his presentations.    His work is significant in that it 
was the first mention of the concept by a Marine who was trying to urge its adoption by 
other Marines.  Boyd’s ideas would prove especially appealing to Marines who were 
dissatisfied with training and education in the Marine Corps due to their personal 
experiences in Vietnam. 
 Just as Boyd and his ideas were beginning to filter into the Marine Corps in the 
autumn of 1979, Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Wyly, another key figure to the 
development of maneuver warfare in the Corps, began teaching tactics at the Marine 
Corps Amphibious Warfare center located at Quantico, VA.  In August 1979, Wyly had 
assumed the post of Head, Tactics Division, Amphibious Warfare School (AWS).  A 
veteran of two tours in Vietnam, first as a psychological operations officer in 1965-66 
and as a rifle company commander in 1968-69,  he observed firsthand what he perceived 
to be the deficiencies to the Marine Corps’s approach to war.  Marine officers were good 
at the technical and procedural aspects of war such as the proper emplacement and 
employment of machine gun and mortar positions, but what they lacked where the 
tactical skills necessary to defeat the enemy in battle.  Rather than focusing outward 
towards the enemy and his actions, Wyly instead observed that Marine actions focused on 
inward procedures and processes; the most important consideration in planning and 
executing operations was ensuring that they were in accordance to doctrinal manuals and 
proper procedures employed.  He observed that across all ranks, but especially among 
senior officers, there was insufficient attention paid to the study of war and military 
history.  Many of the challenges of Vietnam could have been anticipated had there been 
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 more time and effort devoted to the study of warfare.  Wyly’s tour as a company 
commander also left an impression on his thinking.  He observed his Marines using their 
formal training as the foundations to developing their own tactics that deviated from the 
manuals and proved generally successful for dealing with the opponent.34 
  In assessing Wyly’s personal experiences, it is clear that he was an individual 
whose thinking approached maneuver warfare before it existed as an articulated concept.  
One of his most significant contributions to the overall development of maneuver warfare 
was that his combat experience lent credibility to the maneuverist cause.  Another 
significant contribution he made was in developing an educational curriculum for 
maneuver warfare.  For Wyly, Vietnam served as irrefutable evidence that military 
success depended on more than technical or procedural proficiency, and he was 
determined to teach his students differently.  What Wyly lacked though was a clearly 
articulated alternative model to teach to his students and it was in that search for an 
alternative model that he encountered Boyd and his ideas. 
Wyly was not alone in his assessment of the tactical deficiencies he observed in 
Vietnam.  Anthony Zinni shared is recollections of the 1970s Marine Corps with Tom 
Clancy in Battle Ready.  In 1971, Zinni as a captain was assigned to the 2d Marine 
Division.  Zinni noted that among officers he observed and interacted with it was captains 
with Vietnam experience who “were more interested in war fighting than the senior 
officers.”   Zinni recalls that he and his peers “loved talking about operational issues … 
coming up with new ideas.”  What supplied the motivation to these discussions was that 
they “suffered through all the lousy tactics, the poor policies, and the shitty things that 
went on in the field” during the Vietnam War.35 
Zinni sharply criticized senior officers because he expected more from them.  He 
had hoped that these officers with extensive prior experience in World War II, Korea, and 
Vietnam would have passed their knowledge down to junior officers. What Zinni 
observed  instead was that for these more senior officers “war fighting was pretty far 
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 down their agenda.  Operational competence was simply not as valued or demanded as 
much as administrative competence.”  Senior officers valued “management” not “tactical 
skills.”  According to Zinni, it was “rare, in fact, to find anyone above the rank of captain 
who talked about tactics and war fighting.”36    
We cannot determine the precise numbers of officers discontented by the conduct 
of the Vietnam.  What we can infer is that one of the possible reasons why maneuver 
warfare gained traction in the Corps is that it resonated with at least some of the Marines 
of Wyly and Zinni’s generation.  Maneuver warfare offered a possible solution to 
rectifying the deficiencies in tactical abilities that some relatively junior officers felt that 
the senior leadership was neglecting.   
 During a training exercise at AWS during the fall of 1979, Wyly first met Lind, 
who was present as an observer.  It was through his contact with Lind that Wyly heard of 
John Boyd and his ideas.  Based on Lind’s recommendation, Wyly invited Boyd to 
Quantico to speak to his students at AWS, informing him that he had two hours available 
for the presentation.  Boyd responded that he required five hours.  Wyly then went to 
Major General Bernard Trainor, the Director of the Marine Corps Education Center, 
which oversaw AWS, for authorization to change the schedule.  Trainor expressed some 
concern over changing the schedule to accommodate a speaker with whose subject matter 
neither he nor Wyly was familiar, but he gave his consent on the premise that the students 
would be able to exercise their own judgment to decide whether they agreed with Boyd’s 
ideas.  According to Wyly, the general reaction from the students was positive.  Several 
students were so intrigued by Boyd’s ideas they remained after class to continue their 
discussion with him well into the evening.37   
Boyd’s initial visit to Wyly’s tactics class sparked an interest among his students, 
but it was students from his second class in 1980-1981 who would play a key role in 
developing and spreading the new maneuver warfare ideas to the rest of the Marine 
Corps.  During that academic year, Wyly invited Lind to deliver a maneuver warfare 
lecture to his AWS tactics class, despite some resistance from the rest of faculty to having 
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 Lind address the school due to his vocal criticism of the armed forces.  After Lind spoke, 
several students became interested in maneuver warfare and wanted to pursue their study 
of it further.  With Wyly’s encouragement, Captain William Woods along with a few 
others of Wyly’s students who heard Lind’s presentation approached him and asked if he 
would lead an off-duty discussion group on maneuver warfare, which he did.38 
Because of the formation of this study group, the 1980-1981 academic year was a 
watershed for maneuver warfare’s evolution within the Corps.  While officers like Miller 
were calling for the adoption of maneuver warfare as early as December 1979, several 
factors inhibited its adoption.  First, it was a new concept whose main intellectual 
developer and its key promoter was an Air Force colonel and a civilian with no military 
experience.  For maneuver warfare to succeed within the Corps, Marines would need to 
become involved in developing and promoting it.  Miller’s articles were the first step in 
that direction.  Second, maneuver warfare’s earliest supporters tended to come from the 
junior grades.  Although, Wyly was a colonel, for maneuver warfare to have any success 
it would eventually need more supporters within the Corps from the senior grades, 
especially from the general officer ranks.  While company- and field-grade officers are 
generally allotted a great deal of responsibility within the Corps, the influence they can 
exert pales in comparison to that of a general officer.  Third, while Miller introduced the 
term in print in the Gazette, more Marines would need to become aware of maneuver 
warfare, understand it, and come to support it.  Increased support would only be possible 
from increased awareness and understanding and by successfully addressing the 
objections to it that would arise.  Maneuver warfare itself required more development in 
order for Marines to understand and execute its tenets.  Boyd had introduced a substantial 
amount of new terminology in his work such as schwerpunkt, auftstragtaktik, and 
commander’s intent.  More Marines would need to understand the meaning of these terms 
and learn how to apply them in an operational context.  This could only be possible 
through the existence of a developed system of education and training.  Fourth, maneuver 
warfare needed to be more than an appealing idea; maneuverists would need to 
demonstrate that it was a practical and viable operational concept.  Maneuver warfare had 
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 to be more than an academic discussion and its supporters had to demonstrate that 
Marines could learn it and, more importantly, employ it.  Maneuverists needed to develop 
some mechanism for demonstrating that Marines could employ the new doctrine. 
  With the formation of the maneuver warfare study group, the process that would 
address these issues began.   Wyly, several of his students, other interested Marines, and 
Lind constituted the core membership of this group, which met over the course of the 
1980-81, 1981-82, and 1982-83 academic years at AWS.  The number of regular 
participants was small, ranging at times between a half-dozen and a dozen individuals, 
the fluctuating numbers reflecting the informal nature of the group.  Personnel fluctuated 
as AWS classes graduated, Marines received new duty assignments, and new students 
arrived.  One of the key figures in this group, Captain William Woods, continued to 
participate even after he graduated in the summer of 1981 and received orders assigning 
him to the Second Marine Division based at Camp Lejeune North Carolina.  Woods 
drove regularly to Virginia, accompanied by a close friend, G.I. Wilson, who although 
not one of Wyly’s AWS students, had also became interested in maneuver warfare.  Of 
the participants of this study group during its most productive period between 1980-1982, 
the key intellectual contributors were Wyly, Wilson, Woods, and Lind.39    
The maneuverists held their meetings during weekends at Lind’s home in 
Arlington or at Wyly’s base quarters in Quantico.  These meetings were not random or 
haphazard, but serious weekly gatherings with a general set of expectations for its 
attendees.  Among the requirements for participants was preparatory reading and weekly 
papers on maneuver warfare for submission to the rest of the group.  A requirement for 
attendees was that they actively participate in the discussions.  On certain occasions, Lind 
arranged for guest speakers for their expertise in military affairs.   During the seminar, 
the maneuverists developed maneuver warfare increased their knowledge of the concept 
by studying in closer detail many of the historical cases presented by Boyd in Patterns of 
Conflict.  They paid close attention to twentieth-century German military history: the 
development of stormtrooper tactics and Operation Michael of 1918.   The seminar 
participants also studied the development of blitzkrieg in the interwar years, its initial 
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 triumphs during the early years of World War II, and the battles of the Russian front.  
Among other examples they looked at were the tactics of the Mongols under Genghis 
Khan, the 1939-1940 Russo-Finnish War. 40     
These seminars were the genesis of the maneuver warfare movement within the 
Corps.   The officers who participated were the first committed maneuverists.  With the 
exception of Wyly, maneuver warfare in its early phase was a junior officer movement.  
Maneuverists were captains with no direct experience with Vietnam, most having entered 
active service after the period of the Marine Corps’s greatest involvement.  This is 
understandable given the fact that the attendees of these meetings drew from Wyly’s 
AWS students.  According the Wyly, the fact that they were captains was fortuitous to 
the movement, for while lieutenants often lack the personal experience to make an 
informed decision, captains on the other hand have more professional experience that 
they could use to assess the practicality of what they learned in the classroom.  Captains 
were also much more confident about thinking for themselves than lieutenants were.  
While they were more senior than lieutenants, captains have not progressed so far in their 
careers that they are resistant to new ideas.  As Lind observed, officers above the grade of 
captain, specifically those in the field grades, are often less open to supporting new ideas.  
Field officers, having progressed further along in their careers, tend to have a greater 
vested interest in continuing the existing system they understand.  Lind commented that 
field grade officers are much more hesitant to adopt change because new ideas 
“invalidate their experience.”  
The Marines participating in these groups had a number of motives.  As Wyly 
recalled, there was a sense of duty and professionalism motivating the participants.  
Wilson identified the scarce financial resources of the Marine Corps during the 1970s as 
also influencing the development of their ideas.  What the Corps lacked in material 
assets, the maneuverists hoped to overcome in the development of innovative ideas and 
development of individual skills.  Woods noted that participants came out of a desire 
wanted to improve their sense of understanding of war itself and to study it in a serious, 
professional manner.  Wyly also noted an underlying sense of urgency in their activities, 
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 believing that if they did not work hard enough, they would be unprepared for the next 
conflict.  Wyly also noted that attendees tended to not be career-oriented.  For these 
Marines promotions and management of their careers were secondary to their achieving a 
greater understanding of war.  Wyly also observed that their sense of commitment, duty, 
and shared belief the value of their work also added to the productivity of these meetings, 
and their minority status in the Marine Corps only increased their resolve to work harder.  
They understood that they were promoting ideas not part of the mainstream in the Marine 
Corps.  They knew they would have critics and answering them required well-articulated 
defense.41    
The initial maneuver warfare seminar in Quantico produced satellite groups 
throughout the Marine Corps.  According to Woods, as AWS graduation approached in 
1981, the seminar participants agreed that they would work to promote maneuver warfare 
in their future duty assignments.  At least two groups for the promotion of maneuver 
warfare existed outside of the Washington, D.C area.  Woods and Wilson were among 
the founders of one group located at Camp Lejeune.  Their group gained official 
sponsorship from their commanding general, Alfred M. Gray,  and became the Second 
Marine Division Maneuver Warfare Board.  A second group made up of First Marine 
Division officers known as the Junior Officers Tactical Symposium emerged at Camp 
Pendleton, CA.42 
The Marines who were developing the ideas that would become the Corps future 
doctrine were doing so absent from any centralized direction or guidance from the 
organizational hierarchy  This is in stark comparison to the Army, which would publish 
its own doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, Operations to promulgate its own 
capstone doctrine, AirLand Battle.  The development of AirLand Battle used the full 
resources of TRADOC in a centrally directed, bureaucratic process.  Unlike the parallel 
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 developments in the Army that produced FM 100-5, there were no Marine equivalents to 
a General Starry or TRADOC guiding the development of the new doctrine.43    
 One possible reason why these two doctrines developed along such fundamentally 
different lines can be deduced from a 1983 article establishing the Doctrine Center at 
Marine Corps Development and Education Center in Quantico (MCDEC).  Prior to 
January 1983,  doctrinal development did not have a separate and coequal subcomponent 
of the MCDEC  which in addition to overseeing the fielding on new systems and the 
education of Marines, had responsibility for doctrine development  The creation of the  
Doctrine Center was based on a 
recognition that doctrinal development has not been a dynamic activity in the Corps in recent 
years.  Many believe that the effort has not been well coordinated, and has not kept pace with the 
rapidly changing demands of the modern battlefield.  Instead of providing basic concepts that 
guide development, education, and training, it has tended to follow these activities.  Part of the 
reason for this has been a basic organizational deficiency. 
 
The new Doctrine Center would serve as the central organ responsible for the 
development of new doctrinal concepts, the revision and updating of all publications, 
ensuring standardization throughout the Corps.44 
New doctrine for the Corps emerged from outside of the formal bureaucracy in 
large part because the Corps lacked an entity capable of developing new concepts.  The 
lack of a Doctrine Center suggests that such development had not been a high priority for 
the Marine Corps since it did not merit its own separate and coequal section.  It is telling 
though that Headquarters Marine Corps established the doctrine center after the 
maneuver warfare movement had begun to gain momentum and support in the Corps.  
There is a strong possibility that the move to gain institutional control over doctrinal 
conception and development may have been a reaction to the activities of the 
maneuverists, who by the time of the development of the Doctrine Center had been 
writing articles for a few years promoting their ideas.  Another possibility for why the 
Corps established the Center was to replicate the success enjoyed by Army and its 
TRADOC in developing AirLand Battle, which appeared the previous year.  The Army 
model may have influenced the Marine Corps to develop its own doctrinal development 
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 apparatus in order to remain competitive in the development of innovative thinking in the 
1980s. 
The Corps lacked an effective apparatus for the developing innovative doctrinal 
concepts at a time there was growing concern over its organizational future.  In 1976, the 
Washington, D.C. based-policy think-tank the Brookings Institution published its analysis 
of the Marine Corps’s post-Vietnam organizational future in Where the Does the Marine 
Corps Go From Here?   The study proceeded on the premise that the Corps’ 
organizational emphasis World War II-style amphibious operations threatened its 
relevance in prospective conflict.  The study argued that for the Corps to remain relevant 
as a service it had to “shift its principal focus from seaborne assault … the gold age of 
amphibious warfare is now the domain of historians, and the Marine Corps no longer 
needs a unique mission to justify its existence.”45   
 This is not an easy choice for an organization like the Marine Corps to make.  The 
Corps prides itself on its distinctive character, that it is different from the Army, the 
Navy, and the Air Force.  If the Corps departed from its traditional amphibious role, the 
distinctions between it and the Army begin to disappear, and with it the rationale for 
maintaining its existence as a separate service.  The Corps found itself in an 
organizational dilemma: it could do nothing and risk elimination due to irrelevance or 
change and risk elimination by losing the unique identity that has preserved the 
organization’s existence. 
Terry Terriff’s “Innovate or Die” argues that maneuver warfare was born in this 
climate.  Terriff examines two possible choices the Corps faced: maintain an emphasis on 
its amphibious character or adopting a more mechanized posture for a potential European 
conflict.  According to Terriff, the appearance of maneuver warfare as a new tactical and 
operational concept offered a possible solution to this internal tension by offering the 
Corps a means to increase its relevance in a war involving an extended ground campaign, 
yet without compromising its amphibious character.46 
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The Corps of the late-1970s was ready for a Kuhnian paradigm shift.  An 
intellectual crisis was emerging, as Marines began to question the validity of the old 
model for a number of reasons. The extent of the doubt cannot be precisely measured, but 
given the volume of publication and intensity the maneuver warfare debate would 
generate, it is safe to infer that it was sufficient to produce an intellectual crisis within the 
Corps. Some Marines from the Vietnam generation with combat experience and junior 
officers who joined afterwards, who were both looking ahead to future battlefield,  were 
beginning to identify deficiencies in the existing model which produced doubt regarding 
its battlefield efficacy.  Other Marines questions also emerged over the future of the 
Corps.  Would it remain amphibious or would it become mechanized?   In addition, the 
official hierarchy appeared to lack the means to supply answers to these questions 
through innovative ideas, a void that the maneuverists were able to fill.  
Maneuver warfare and AWS emerged at an opportune time as Marines were in 
search of new ideas.   Boyd and his ideas offered a resolution to the intellectual crisis by 
offering a new paradigm of the battlefield.  In the absence of centralized direction from 
the higher echelons of the organizational hierarchy, new doctrine would emerge in a 
decentralized manner from the lower echelons of the organization. The Marines who 
participated in the AWS seminar and its satellites who became maneuverists believed 
they had found an answer to the questions posed by the major issues of the 1970s Marine 
Corps.  Not all Marines were ready to change their way of thinking or thought that 
maneuver warfare was the answer.    As will be shown in the next chapter, they 
articulated ideas of their own that challenged the maneuverist way of thinking.  The 
maneuverists faced three critical challenges.  First, in order to resolve the intellectual 
crisis and advance the paradigm shift, maneuverists would need to convince fellow 
Marines that the older model was no longer valid to the organization’s needs and that 
maneuver warfare could successfully replace attrition.  Second,  in order to advance the 
paradigm maneuverists would need to move maneuver warfare from the conceptual to the 
practical level.   Maneuverists would need to develop a methodology to teach maneuver 
warfare to other Marines demonstrate its efficacy in training exercises.   In the pages of 
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 the Marine Corps Gazette, the maneuverists began to make their case for maneuver 
warfare, while they simultaneously developed the techniques for educating and training 
for maneuver warfare at Quantico and Camp Lejeune.   Third, in order to complete the 
paradigm shift the Marine Corps would need to find someone in the organizational 
leadership willing to make the transition to a maneuver doctrine official.   Fortunately for 
the maneuverists there was a general officer, Alfred M. Gray who was receptive to new 
ideas and willing to make changes to the organization. 
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CHAPTER 3 - The Maneuver Warfare Debate 
  Although maneuverists thought they had the solution to intellectual crisis of the 
late-1970s Marine Corps, there were still those who were less eager to accept their 
solution.  In the early part of the 1980s, maneuver warfare was the subject of heated 
public debate in the pages of the Marine Corps’s professional journal, the Marine Corps 
Gazette.  In 1993, the editors of the Gazette commented, “Few topics” in its publishing 
history “have engendered such a lively debate.”  According to one estimate, fifty articles 
appeared between 1979 and 1989 on the topic.47    
 The Gazette was only one component of the maneuver warfare movement.  
Concurrent with the debate in the pages of the Gazette, maneuverists were also devising 
training and education methods for maneuver warfare.   Colonel Michael Wyly was 
refining a curriculum to teach maneuver warfare to Marine officers at Amphibious 
Warfare School.  At the Second Marine Division commanded by Major General Alfred 
M. Gray, two participants of the AWS seminar, Captains William Woods and G.I. 
Wilson, were teaching the division’s commands the tenets of maneuver warfare, devising 
training exercises, and integrating maneuver warfare with division’s operating 
procedures.   
The Gazette played a different role in effecting an intellectual transformation in 
the Corps.  The central issue of the debate in the Gazette was to convince fellow Marines 
to accept maneuver warfare and to abandon attrition warfare; a goal only partially 
achieved by mid-decade.  In its pages, maneuverists had to convince fellow Marines that 
the old model of attrition was invalid and inadequate to the Corps’ needs.  With the old 
model invalidated, the next step was to convince others that maneuver warfare was a 
viable replacement. 
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 The Gazette provided the maneuverists a forum to present their case for a move to 
maneuver doctrine and to rebut the arguments of critics. The first articles that appeared 
from late 1979 through 1981 identified the dichotomy between attrition warfare and 
maneuver warfare, demonstrated why maneuver was superior to attrition, and made the 
case that the Corps could adopt maneuver warfare.  The arguments of maneuverists 
produced a series of counter-arguments in 1982-1983 from attritionists as to why the 
Corps should not adopt a maneuver-based doctrine, followed by a series of rebuttal 
articles from maneuverists.  It was clear though that some Marines were willing to accept 
some aspects of maneuver warfare, but were also hesitant to adopt it wholesale and by the 
end of 1983, it appears that the debate had stalled with neither side gaining a clear upper 
hand.  
 The Gazette was crucial to the process of intellectual transformation because it 
exposed readers to the new concept and allowed readers to develop their own informed 
opinions.  The maneuverists and the attritionists were able to make their respective cases 
on the merits and defects of maneuver warfare in a public forum.  It was clear from the 
repeated appearances of maneuver warfare articles in the pages of the Gazette that  the 
subject was engendering a great deal of attention and interest in Marines, whether they  
viewed the concept favorably or not.. It is also clear that over time, the readers of the 
Gazette and Marines in general were gradually accepting at least some aspects of 
maneuver warfare.  The journal was also significant in preparing the Corps for the 
eventual move to a maneuver-based doctrine by gradually introducing Marines to the idea 
and accustoming readers to its terminology and key tenets.  By the time the Marine Corps 
published Warfighting, maneuver warfare was not a new and controversial topic, but a an 
idea that had achieved some general acceptance within the Corps. 
The Gazette was the best venue for a public professional debate over doctrine and 
the Corps’s future.  One reason was it was the only forum solely devoted to discussing 
Marine professional issues.  Unlike the Army, which had multiple professional journals 
such as Parameters and Military Review published by the U.S. Army’s War College and 
the Command and General Staff College, the only publication devoted to Marine Corps 
issues capable of reaching large numbers of Marines was the Gazette.  While it has a 
sister publication, Leatherneck, this latter publication devoted its pages to reporting on 
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 contemporary news and events and was not intended as a forum for professional 
discussions.  The journal Proceedings, published by the United States Naval Institute, 
while it occasionally featured material devoted to Marine Corps concerns, was devoted 
predominantly to issues concerning the United States Navy.   
Although it is a private publication of the Marine Corps Association, the Gazette 
has always been the acknowledged professional journal of the Corps, serving as an outlet 
for the discussion of relevant issues and topics.  Its readership has tended to consist of 
Marines who thought seriously about professional issues, from “former Commandants 
and long-retired senior officers through the commissioned and noncommissioned ranks, 
both regular and reserve, to brand new officer candidates and to many faithful outside 
these wide parameters.”  Readers could turn to the Gazette and remain abreast of new 
trends and developments as well as offer a forum for those seeking to promote or defend 
new ideas.48 
The maneuverists began submitting their articles just as retired Marine Colonel 
John Greenwood, became the Gazette’s editor.  Several of the key maneuverists credit 
Greenwood’s willingness to provide a forum for their controversial topic as instrumental 
to their eventual success.  As the editor of the Gazette, Greenwood could have simply 
refused to publish the articles of the maneuverists or insisted in changes in content as 
conditions for publication.  The fact that he did not is also of critical importance.  Wyly 
recalls that for the most part, Greenwood did not exercise this editorial prerogative.49   
 Greenwood justifiably deserves the credit ascribed to him for his willingness to 
publish new and controversial material, but he was also continuing the policies of his 
predecessor, Robert W. Smith.  When he assumed the editorial responsibilities in March 
1980, Greenwood informed Gazette readership that he would continue Smith’s stance 
that the publication’s “raison d’être” was to “provide a forum for open discussion and a 
free exchange of professional ideas.”  According to Greenwood, the “success of the 
publication was contingent on the actions of its readership, to ‘share their ideas, report 
their successes and failures, offer comments and suggestion, call attention to problems, 
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 propose new approaches … on the willingness of readers to contribute to the professional 
dialogue.”  While the Gazette’s editorial board would try to publish articles that would 
appeal to the diverse scope of its readership, the readership would determine what “the 
priority interests” for the publication.  These priorities would be what the readership saw 
as “fit to raise” in “articles, letters and calls; the subjects you think are affecting the well-
being of the Corps.”50   
In a June 1980 article, Smith identified the challenges associated with serving as 
the editor of a military professional journal.  Before Greenwood assumed control of the 
Gazette, its editorial committee had struggled for “more than a year” over editorial 
policy.  Smith noted that the Gazette faced criticism from two sides.  Some criticized for 
being “merely a house organ” that shied away from controversial material that deviated 
from  the Marine Corps’s official positions.  Others criticized the Gazette for publishing 
controversial material because it undermined Headquarters Marine Corps by providing 
too much space to “those who accent the Corps’ shortcomings.”  Smith and the editorial 
board reached the conclusion that “If the Gazette  pronounces itself an open forum and 
then published nothing critical of the Corps when all things are not ‘right’ with the Corps, 
then it has not fulfilled that purpose honestly.”  Smith believed that senior Marine 
leadership was “strong enough to swallow an occasional article that presents hard and 
unpleasant criticism” and sufficient favorable material appeared to offset the criticism.  
He also concluded that motives behind critical articles “came from highly motivated 
individuals whose only purpose was to make the Corps better.”  There was a long-term 
institutional benefit to an open editorial policy because “critical articles often surfaces 
information previously unknown in high places and offer suggestions for improvement in 
the Corps.”51 
Greenwood’s willingness to continue the work of his predecessor and publish 
controversial material highlights what is possibly an underappreciated aspect of an 
intellectual debate, the role of editors.  Greenwood had control over what work saw print 
in his publication and what ideas would reach his readers.  Moreover, while Greenwood 
may or may not have agreed with the maneuverists, his willingness to publish the work 
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 aided the movement by providing their ideas public exposure.  The Gazette exposed 
maneuver warfare to readers who may have been unfamiliar with the concept or to some 
who were interested, but did not have access to information on the subject.  Publication 
also meant that the ideas of the maneuverists were subject to peer review and comment.  
This allowed maneuverists to address readers’ specific concerns and doubts by crafting 
specific responses to issues raised.  Without Greenwood’s willingness to provide them a 
forum, maneuverists might have had little means to spread their ideas.     
Why did Greenwood provide the maneuverists a forum?  One reason may have 
been simply in keeping with his stated belief that the purpose of the Gazette was to serve 
as an open forum for the exchange of new ideas. He may have not agreed entirely with 
the maneuverists, but to deny them a forum would have betrayed the purpose of the 
publication.  Another possibility is  Greenwood could have been reader reaction to the 
maneuver warfare articles.  Whether favorable or unfavorable, maneuver warfare was 
creating a response among Gazette readers and spurring discussion within its paged.   As 
an editor, Greenwood could not have ignored the interest the maneuver warfare articles 
and the responses were creating. While his exact motives in relation to maneuver warfare 
may never be known, what remains undisputed is the contribution he made to the 
intellectual transformation of the Corps by providing maneuverists a forum to 
disseminate and defend their ideas. 
Over the course of the doctrinal debate, the polarization between maneuverists 
and attritionists became readily observable.  Kenneth McKenzie noted that the debate 
was “personalized and emotional” and that the rhetoric used by both sides reflected their 
deep investment: 
Who wanted to be labeled an attritionist with all the bloody baggage of Passchendaele, static  
warfare, and heavy casualties?  Conversely, to be called a “maneuverist” implied a giddy, carefree 
vision of flitting about the battlefield—moving for the sake of movement alone.  The 
overexuberant and confrontational arguments advance by proponents of maneuver warfare tended 
to further polarize the issue. 52 
  
 On the surface, the debate appears appeared decidedly one-sided.  The number of 
articles published by the maneuverists far exceeded those produced by their opponents.  
The attritionists, however, had the advantage of being the established model and 
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 champions of the naturally conservative mindset associated with the military 
professional.  The challenge faced by the maneuverists was to argue convincingly that 
there was a need for change and that adoption maneuver warfare represented the future 
direction for the Corps.    
These first identifiable maneuver warfare articles appeared in the Gazette in 
October and December of 1979.  The author, Captain Steven Miller, argued that 
maneuver would allow a materially inferior force such as the Marine Corps to defeat 
Warsaw Pact formations.  Miller analyzed Soviet doctrine and demonstrated how 
Marines could apply the concepts of maneuver in defensive and offensive roles to 
achieve victory.  He noted an established record in military history of commanders from 
Alexander the Great to Nathan Bedford Forrest who were able to defeat opponents while 
outnumbered because they were able to disrupt the cohesion of their opponents.53 
 Miller’s second article argued that maneuver warfare itself was not conceptually 
new, elements of it having existed in the campaigns of ancient military commanders and 
the writings of military thinkers dating to the Enlightenment.  Miller then noted the 
versatile nature of maneuver that made it applicable in a variety of operation, and 
suggested that it had applications to amphibious warfare.  Miller concluded that in the 
face of numerically superior opponents armed with weapons of increasing technological 
sophistication, maneuver warfare offered the best hope for the Corps.  A new doctrine 
would “propel the Marine Corps into the 21st century where it will again, as in World 
War II, provide the leadership to this revolution in warfare”54   
While Miller championed the adoption of maneuver warfare as a course of action 
for the Corps, the organization in 1979 was in no position to accept the concept.  The 
term maneuver warfare itself was still relatively unknown to most Marines.  Few Marines 
had heard the term, and an even smaller number fully understood what it was.   
On the other hand, Miller’s articles contained elements that resonated with his fellow 
Marines.  The Marine Corps in the post-Vietnam period had doubts over its future and its 
ability to remain viable on the modern battlefield beyond a strictly amphibious role. 
Maneuver warfare offered an operational concept that would allow the Corps to have a 
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 NATO role, a means to offset the fact that the Corps would be outnumbered tactically 
and operationally.  Maneuver warfare could offset the technological advantages of 
opponents through tactical and operational ingenuity, an important consideration for a 
fiscally conscious service.  Maneuver warfare was also a flexible operational concept, 
one that the Corps could employ in a spectrum of possible uses worldwide, without 
compromising the unique amphibious nature of the service.  
   In March 1980, William S. Lind’s “Defining Maneuver Warfare” appeared.  
Lind’s article highlighted the dichotomy between maneuver warfare and attrition: 
Firepower-attrition is warfare on the model of Verdun in World War I, a mutual casualty 
inflicting and absorbing contest where the goal is a favorable exchange rate.  The conflict is more 
physical than mental.  Efforts focus on the tactical level with goals set in terms of terrain.  
Defenses tend to be linear (“forward defense”), attacks frontal, battles set-piece and movement 
preplanned and slow. 
In contrast, maneuver warfare is warfare on the model of Genghis Khans, the German 
blitzkrieg and almost all Israeli campaigns.  The goal is destruction of the enemy’s vital 
cohesion—disruption--not piece-by-piece physical destruction.  The objective is the enemy’s mind 
not his body.  The principal tool is moving forces into unexpected places at surprisingly high 
speeds.  Firepower is a servant of maneuver, used to create openings in enemy defenses and, when 
necessary, to annihilate the remnants of his forces after their cohesion has been shattered. 
 
Lind then pointed out that maneuver warfare was more than a system for conducting 
battle, but represented a different way of thinking about war. Maneuver warfare was 
more than just physical movement on the battlefield.  He then urged the Corps continue 
its tradition as a forward thinking service by adopting maneuver warfare.55 
    The Gazette printed a single response to Lind’s article by Colonel John C. Studt 
in June 1980.  Studt praised the piece as “brilliant and thought-provoking.”  He also 
noted that Lind’s proposals entailed more than shifting from attrition to maneuver 
warfare, but involved the “dramatic reeducation of our officer corps to develop a much 
higher level of self-reliance, individual initiative, and creative thinking which will result 
in flexible command on the battlefield.”  Studt was also impressed with Lind’s use of 
history and was not surprised that it took a “military historian, rather than a military 
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 practitioner, who is proposing a radical change in tactics.”  Finally, Studt urged the 
Marine Corps to “rise to the challenge” posed by Lind. 56   
 Studt’s response highlighted one of the difficulties the maneuverists faced.  
Employing maneuver warfare required more than just changing the battlefield actions of 
Marines to include more movement on the battlefield. It also required that Corps 
fundamentally change how its officers thought.  In addition to convincing Marines to 
change their thinking, another challenge maneuverists faced was convincing them to 
accept the dichotomy between maneuver and attrition-based styles of fighting.  
 In 1981, articles from the participants of the AWS maneuver warfare seminar 
began appearing in Gazette that continuing the theme that what defined maneuver 
warfare were not the physical actions, but the mental processes and mindsets behind 
them. The first such article was “The Maneuver Warfare Concept,” a collection of 
smaller articles by Wilson, Wyly, Lind, and General B.E. Trainor grouped under a single 
editorially appended title.  Wilson reiterated several points raised in earlier articles--
dichotomy between maneuver and attrition, the psychological aspects of maneuver 
warfare, its relationship to Boyd’s ideas--but Wilson also identified several deficiencies 
in the Corps which needed addressing before it could adopt maneuver warfare.   
First, Wilson identified the Marine Corps as risk averse and unwilling to take 
chances--what he called a “bureaucratic mindset.”  Second, he questioned the privileging 
of managerial ability over combat ability in officers.  Third, he called for increased 
flexibility and responsiveness in two areas--logistics and command--as necessary for the 
rapidly changing conditions of maneuver warfare.  Fourth, Marines needed to show more 
initiative on the battlefield.57     
Wilson then reminded readers of the wide applicability of maneuver warfare and 
that it offered “the only substantial hope for success” in combat situations where Marines 
would most likely be outnumbered.  He then reminded readers that maneuver warfare 
was not just synonym for armored or mechanized warfare. Technology was not central to 
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 the definition of maneuver warfare. Instead, it was the ability to move and act more 
“consistently and rapidly than the opponent,” quoting an earlier piece by Lind.  Wilson 
warned his fellow officers that the exigencies of the global situation were such that the 
“the time is now for actively accepting, teaching, and training for maneuver warfare.”  
What the Corps lacked to make maneuver warfare a reality was a manual outlining how 
the Corps would practice a maneuver-based doctrine. The Corps “could no longer wait to 
develop an effective maneuver warfare capability,” and it “desperately needed … a 
doctrinal publication on maneuver warfare, a manual of maneuver war!” 58     
 Wilson’s call for a maneuver warfare manual was prompted by a recently released 
publication Operational Handbook 9-3(Rev. A), Mechanized Combined Arms Task 
Forces (MCATF).  Although document did include maneuver warfare concepts, Wilson 
contended, “the treatment … is extremely brief, inadequate, and isolated from the rest of 
the text.”  According to the Wilson, the handbook accomplished its task of detailing how 
to organize MCATF, but “fails … in its handling of the maneuver concept itself.”  While 
maneuver appeared in the OH 9-3 (Rev. A), Wilson’s criticism was that it appeared 
“isolated” in the text, which suggested that maneuver warfare was not originally organic 
to the text and inserted afterwards.  The result was “one ends up with only half the 
equation.”  The solution Wilson advocated was that “a complete doctrine of maneuver 
warfare must be developed.”59   
 The appearance of OH 9-3 (Rev. A) indicated maneuver warfare concepts were 
gaining traction within the Corps.  Maneuver warfare was appearing in Marine Corps 
Development and Education Command publications, but the nature of the publication it 
appeared in reflected its status as unofficial.  The OH series were “publications 
promulgating information and instructions relating to doctrine, tactics, techniques, and 
organizational structure” but they were not authoritative.  The publications in the OH 
series circulated to Marine Corps units and schools for “field and academic use, 
evaluation, and refinement,” which meant they were effectively trial versions of new 
ideas and concepts.  After a period of evaluation and comment by the Corps and 
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 “resultant modification,”   the concepts contained in an OH publication would eventually 
find incorporation into the Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) series of publications.60 
 OH 9-3A was not the only Marine Corps publication to begin to incorporate 
maneuver warfare concepts.  It was joined in January 1981 by   Educational Center 
Publication 9-5, Marine Amphibious Brigade Mechanized and Counter-mechanized 
Operations.  Excerpts of its passages addressing maneuver warfare appeared as part of 
the “The Maneuver Warfare Concept.”  Among the concepts ECP 9-5 promulgated was 
that “the primary objective of the force employed should be the force’s cohesiveness,” 
“stereotyped operations” should be avoided, commanders should be able to rapidly mass 
or disperse forces as necessary, command and control should be decentralized and 
mission orders used, and all components of a force needed to be as mobile as the assault 
elements.61    
ECP 9-5 represented a minor advancement for maneuver warfare, but was far 
from an authoritative organizational adoption of the concept.  The editorial comment 
accompanying the short excerpt of ECP 9-5 noted that it was only an instructional 
publication “for student use and field consideration,” which meant that like, OH 9-3A, it 
was not authoritative doctrine for Marines.  Another flaw of ECP 9-5 was it provided 
little explanation or elaboration on how to enact the document’s recommendations.  A 
final flaw was the context of the document.  Appearing in an educational publication on 
mechanized and counter-mechanized warfare seemed to suggest that maneuver warfare 
was simply synonymous with those terms and not a drastic reorientation in thinking.62   
The perceived defects of in the treatment of maneuver in OH 9-3A and ECP 9-5 
ultimately centered on two differing perceptions of what maneuver warfare was.  These 
publications defined maneuver warfare in terms of physical actions.  They contained 
recommendations for how a force should be organized and employed but ultimately 
failed to defined maneuver warfare.  For maneuverists, it was not actions that were at the 
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 heart of maneuver warfare. Instead, it was the thought processes that underlay those 
actions.  The same could be said of attrition.  What defined the attrition type of fighting 
was ultimately not the preference for firepower or static warfare, but the thinking that 
formed the subtext of those actions. 
 In his contribution to the “Maneuver Warfare Concept,” Wyly articulately 
criticized the attrition mentality based on his observations of training exercises that used 
a simulation computer called the Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation and Analysis 
System (TWSEAS).  The TWSEAS function was to determine the relative casualties for 
both sides during training exercises based on the actions of the participants.  For Wyly, 
the use of the computer created a false impression that winning was simply a matter of 
creating a favorable exchange with the enemy in casualties and destruction of assets.  It 
was how Marines conceived of defeating that enemy that disturbed Wyly, especially the 
use of the phrase of “attriting the enemy” when Marines explained their plans and actions 
during the exercise.  According to Wyly, the phrase itself was not only poor use of the 
English language, but more importantly, it reflected a defect in the tactical mindset of 
Marine officers who practiced attrition warfare.  Wyly observed that since these exercises 
determined winners and losers based on quantitative criteria, exercise participants began 
to see this as the goal of the exercise.  Wyly proposed that as an alternative “war games 
should focus on meaningful things such as destruction, not attrition.  We destroy the 
enemy when we destroy his will to resist, unless he is woefully short on resolve.”  Wyly 
then cited the examples of the Soviet Union in World War II and the North Vietnamese 
as two cases where the victorious side in the conflict sustained higher casualties than their 
opponents, but whose will to resist remained strong despite the losses.63     
At the heart of Wyly’s observations was that these simulations failed to account 
for the fact war was as much an art as it was a science.  Simulations and wargames had 
no value if they failed to account for the “value of surprise, deception, attacking the flank 
as contrasted against the front, striking weak points compared to strong.”  What Wyly 
called for were computer simulations that did not just count the casualties, but taught 
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 participants to “discover where the decisive point is, what disarms the opponent when 
denied him, and what dilemma can put him on its horns.”64    
 Lind’s September 1981 article “Tactics in Maneuver Warfare” continued the 
theme that a reassessment in thinking was necessary to practice maneuver warfare, 
because they misunderstanding what tactics meant in a maneuver context.  They 
perceived maneuver doctrine as just change in physical actions, a different way of 
attacking or defending, and not the shift in thinking required.  Lind also observed that 
Marines were looking in vain for a formula or checklist to guide them in execution in 
maneuver tactics.  He reemphasized to Marines maneuver warfare is “not a new formula, 
but a replacement for formulas.”65    
      Lind reminded Marines that the key to tactics in maneuver warfare was a mindset-
-“not just a way of moving, but a way of thinking.”  Lind  then defined what constituted 
the maneuver mindset: “A process of combining two elements, techniques and education, 
through three mental “filters” or reference points—mission-type orders, the search for 
enemy surfaces and gaps, and the focus of our own main effort—with the object of 
producing a unique approach for the specific enemy, time, and place.  To cultivate these 
skills, Lind called for institutional and doctrinal changes: “We must give officers time to 
read, think, and reflect.  We must devote our schools to educating officers in the art of 
war, not just more training in techniques.  And we must rewrite FMFMs so they cannot 
be read as recipe books.”66   
 Wilson’s January 1982 article, “Maneuver/Fluid Warfare: A Review of the 
Concepts,” recapitulated many of the ideas and themes of earlier articles but treated two 
issues in particular which had not received significant attention in the earlier pieces: 
logistics and artillery.  He argued that would need to change how it employed both to be 
effective maneuver warfare.  Artillery would need to become more mobile, capable of 
rapid displacement, and located as close as possible to forward elements.  Logistics 
would need to become more mobile and flexible in maneuver warfare.  Wilson went as 
far as to say, “The successful execution of maneuver warfare will hinge in a great part on 
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 logistics … though not glamorous, logistical planning is the foundation of maneuver 
warfare.”67 
In that same month, Captain P.J. Klepper II published an article “Food Service 
and Maneuver Warfare,” which dealt with the issue of feeding a military force in the 
rapid, high-tempo environment of maneuver warfare.  Klepper argued that the Marine 
Corps lacked “a food service concept that can meet the flexibility” needed for maneuver 
warfare.  Klepper noted that most discussions on maneuver warfare failed to account for 
the challenges of feeding a force while on the move.  According to Klepper, Marine food 
service assets were too wedded to a static mentality and incapable of providing mobile 
food service. The training of line and food service units alike would need to adjust to 
reflect the challenges of feeding troops in a maneuver warfare environment.68 
 The narrower focus of subject matter continued in Chief Warrant Officer-2 Bryan 
Lavender’s April 1982 article “Current Training and Maneuver Warfare.”  Lavender 
observed an inconsistency between how Marines trained and how they were expected to 
fight.  He warned Gazette readers, “You fight the way you train.  If you train with 
misconceptions those misconceptions will follow you into combat, where reality will 
disabuse you of them at a severe price.”  He noted that training scenarios were unrealistic 
because Marines rarely lost against their opponent, and were heavily scripted, which 
negated their value. 
Lavender drew from his observations of three types Marine Corps training 
exercises, the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX), the Marine Corp Combat Readiness 
Evaluation System (MCCRES), and Command Post Exercises (CPXs).  Lavender 
criticized all three for being “scenario-driven” since success in these exercises depended 
on the ability of participants to follow procedures or successfully accomplish tasks on a 
checklist.  He argued that while the Corps was talking maneuver warfare, it was actually 
training attrition.  Lavender recommended many of solutions identified in earlier 
maneuver warfare articles such as cultivating an organization willingness to take greater 
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 risks and increased study of military history.  He also requested the development of 
exercises where outcomes were not predetermined.69    
What must not become lost in this analysis of the maneuverists and the debate in 
the Marine Corps Gazette were their parallel activities to advance the intellectual 
transformation of the Marine Corps.  Wyly was continuing to implement a maneuver 
warfare tactics curriculum at the Amphibious Warfare School.   In the summer of 1981 
Woods and Wilson were beginning to disseminate maneuver warfare in the Second 
Marine Division.  What is noteworthy is that these Marines were continuing to promote 
maneuver warfare in other venues, all the while publishing print articles, in addition to 
their professional responsibilities.  Even more noteworthy is the willingness of these 
Marines continued to champion maneuver warfare and participate in the public debate 
despite the attacks they and their ideas would receive. 
 The debate did not begin in full earnest until 1982 when letters and articles critical 
of maneuver warfare began to appear.  Over two years had gone by without any 
meaningful criticism of maneuver warfare appearing.  Why no criticisms appeared for so 
long is puzzling.  The editorial policies of the Gazette were such that they would have 
most likely printed any that they received.  On the other hand, this was highly beneficial 
to the maneuverists who were able to discuss their views in print without rebuttal.  
The fact that it was the maneuverists that initiated the discussion gave them an 
advantage in the progression of the overall debate.  Publishing first gave them the 
advantage of framing the discussion.  Gazette readers were discussing the advantages and 
limitations of the concepts the manueverists advanced.   Critics who wished to enter into 
the dialog were in a position of reaction, which meant that they would have to rebut the 
maneuverist arguments.   
 The critics, primarily field grade officers, tended to be outright dismissive of 
maneuver warfare as an untenable concept that lacked solid grounding in reality.  These 
critics first began to use the term “maneuverist” to describe maneuver warfare advocates.  
Their work can be seen as representative of the “attritionist” arguments against maneuver 
warfare.  One of the charges laid by attritionists is that none of the ideas maneuverists 
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 advocated were particularly innovative and that their work was derivative from that of 
other military thinkers   There was a tone of condescension when they discussed 
maneuver warfare concepts.  Another common theme in their criticism of maneuver 
warfare was that maneuverists had unrealistic expectations.  These critics hoped to 
counter the maneuverist criticisms of contemporary doctrinal procedures and methods 
and that adoption of maneuver warfare would result in greater combat effectiveness.  The 
attritionists countered with their own assertions that maneuverists were unrealistically 
optimistic in their predictions that they could bring about the enemy’s collapse.  They 
also thought that maneuverists underestimated the skill levels and resolve of opponents. 
Major C.J. Gregor criticized maneuver warfare for being unoriginal in a January 
1982 Gazette letter.  In particular, Gregor singled out the work of Lind, describing his 
work as “hardly original.”  The ideas Lind advanced were “rewordings of classic Liddell 
Hart, von Mellinthin, Balck, von Manstein and Guderian whom he doesn’t even credit for 
their origins.”70   
However, Gregor, never criticized the merits of maneuver warfare, directing his 
anger primarily at the lack of historical study and analysis among Marine officers.  For 
Gregor, :the deference and praise heaped on Mr. Lind as some modern master of military 
thought and analysis” only revealed the intellectual deficiencies of the Corps.  The fact 
that an outsider was a key intellectual contributor only “goes to show what intellectual 
and historical cripples we are, bordering on professional incompetence” because Marine 
officers “don’t study war and history” and “let some congressional, civilian staffer tell us 
about it.”  Gregor closed with a warning that unless the Corps did more internally to 
foster intellectual activity, “civilians” would “do it for us and make decisions by 
default.”71 
 While not a direct attack on maneuver warfare itself. Gregor’s letter reveals some 
of the criticisms held by Marine officers.  Its concepts were not especially original.  More 
importantly, Gregor’s letter reveals some of the discomfort that Marines felt that 
organizational outsiders were involving themselves in Corps’ affairs and risked increased 
intrusion. 
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Lieutenant Colonel R.H. Voigt’s “Comments on Maneuver Warfare” provided a 
clearly defined summation of the criticisms against maneuver warfare.  Voigt referred to 
a Gazette editorial comment that the discussions of maneuver warfare “are naïve (and) 
divorced from the realities of the battlefield.”  He concurred with this assessment and 
noted that: 
Most discussions fail to give the professionals on the enemy side their due.  It should not be 
assumed that enemy commanders will lose control of the situation and their forces disintegrate 
when faced with rapidly changing situations.  I might suggest that our commanders will be as 
affected by rapidly changing situations as the enemy commander in spite of the fact that the fluid 
situation is self-imposed.” 72 
 
Also problematic for Voigt was the psychological emphasis of maneuver warfare.  
Voigt pointed out that “all American attempts at this strategy have met with failure and at 
a minimum have prolonged the conflict and increased our casualties, perhaps 
unnecessarily.”  He then cited Stalingrad, Tobruk, Dresden, Chosin, and Khe Sanh as 
examples of military forces continuing to fight on despite the near hopelessness of the 
situation, noting that a “professional and determined enemy will continue to fight in spite 
of being faced with a disastrous logistics or command and control situation.”73    
Voigt also argued that maneuver warfare also appeared to produce a “gross 
overemphasis on mission-type orders.”  He believed that this emphasis “well-intentioned 
“but thought it “fails to grasp the true confusion that will exist on any moderate (or 
greater) intensity battlefield.”  Given this uncertainty, Voigt did not “believe that any 
relaxation of command and control will be appropriate.”  Uncertainty mandated increased 
control:   “Without a ‘big picture’ planning and control apparatus, subordinate units will 
attack low priority targets, will be easily misled by enemy deception tactics, will outrun 
logistics and supporting arms capabilities, and perhaps will not be available to the 
commander when a high priority objective presents itself.”74    
Voigt also doubted the predictions of maneuverists that they could achieve 
battlefield penetrations.  For Voigt, maneuverists were presuming that the enemy lacked 
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 any skill or ability of his own to would leave vulnerabilities open, allowing the type of 
battlefield exploitation that maneuverists claimed was possible.  According to Voigt, this 
perceived ability to achieve a deep penetration was also inconsistent with the argument 
that potential opponents would outnumber American forces numerically on the 
battlefield.  Given this projected superiority, Voigt argued that the enemy would have 
ample resources to secure his vulnerable areas and prevent meaningful penetrations. 75     
Voigt did agree that the empowering of subordinates advocated by maneuverists 
was worth further pursuing, but with a caveat: 
Those authors whose FMF experience is limited might benefit from an onsite observation 
of a battalion or regimental exercise including our much vaunted combined arms exercises.  A 
realistic appraisal of the tactical proficiency of the average small unit leader will show deficiencies 
in many basic areas of expertise required to command successfully in fast-moving, fluid 
situations.  Let’s start dealing reality and not with an ideal. 76     
 
Voigt concluded, “I feel that many maneuver warfare concepts are valid to some 
degree.  We must, however, base our future discussions on this topic on reality—on battle 
as it had proven to be and not on the battle as we would like it to be.”77 
Another criticism of maneuver warfare, “Reexamining Maneuver Warfare,” 
appeared in the Gazette’s April 1982 issue.  The author, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon 
Batcheller, felt “uneasy” about all the attention devoted to the subject in the pages of the 
Gazette.  Batcheller was uncertain about how maneuver warfare “proponents conceive of 
its application to a given body of troops.”  What Batcheller wanted “to hear more about is 
how this technique or doctrine is superimposed upon an entire division, or in our case, a 
MAF without a certain amount of chaos resulting.  Somewhere in the organization, 
training, and employing of forces, all the trappings of ‘cookbook recipes’ so lightly 
dismissed by the maneuverists are required.”  If the maneuverists opposition to “cook 
book recipe” meant “good-old flexibility” and “boldness,” Batcheller was left 
“bewildered by the all the fuss over something so obvious.”  On the other hand, 
Batcheller was concerned that maneuverists “are advocating some dramatic new doctrine 
that rejects fire team, squad, platoon, company, and battalion formations, or recognizable 
patterns of maneuver.”  The issue was for him was exercising control over troops on the 
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 battlefield.  “Genius,” he pointed out, was a rarity in military history usually appeared 
only in the highest command echelons.  Batcheller had “difficulty with a concept that 
appears to presume this level of competence down to and including the small unit level.”  
Given the rarity of genius in military organizations, the old doctrine would have to 
suffice as a means of providing some order and control to the battlefield. 78 
A second problem that Batcheller identified with maneuver warfare was the type 
of command and control maneuverists promoted was inconsistent with a force’s ability to 
coordinate all its assets effectively.  Batcheller identified an apparent inconsistency in 
maneuverists’ arguments to employ “’mission order tactics’” and relaxed control, on the 
one hand, with calls for “’completely integrated logistical and tactical considerations’” on 
the other. In his opinion, the type of command and control advocated by the maneuverists 
limited a force’s ability to integrate logistics and tactics.  He also thought that 
maneuverists failed to consider the level of detail needed to ensure proper coordination 
with supporting arms and between adjacent units.  For Batcheller it was difficult to see 
how to coordinate tactical units and these other arms without the traditional control 
measures.  The Marine Corps did not have many logisticians and “very few of them were 
mind readers.”  The only way to ensure the close integration between maneuver units and 
supporting arms was through, “unfortunately, detailed control of all elements of the 
MAGTF, and all its subordinate units.”   Maneuverists also failed to account for the 
“demands placed on communicators by the freewheeling approach.”79 
Batcheller conceded that the current system in place in the Marine Corps had 
limitations: “the need to command, control, and support certainly inhibits flexibility, but 
need not destroy it, nor render imagination and genius ineffective.”  On the other hand, he 
felt that maneuverists had not adequately thought through the implications of their 
proposals, noting that he had yet to see a “thoughtful examination of the ramifications of 
the ‘turn them loose’ approach.”80 
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 Batcheller’s third concern was the maneuver warfare would compromise the 
Corps amphibious identity.  He was concerned that maneuver warfare could lead to a 
“fascination for land vehicles and tactical ‘mobility’ for sustained land warfare that is 
inconsistent with our primary mission and statutory area of responsibility.”  Instead of 
Marines looking to increase their mobility, they should have devoted their efforts to 
finding a light, effective, and reliable way or ways to decrease the enemy’s mobility.”81 
His final concern was that the move to a maneuver doctrine to promote mobility 
at the tactical level could potentially compromise it at the Corps’s strategic level.  He 
noted that insufficient attention had been paid to the examining “relevancy” of maneuver 
at either level to the Corps’s “primary mission.”  Batcheller cautioned that the “simplistic 
embrace of maneuver warfare leads inevitably to more mechanization as a means of 
tactical mobility,” but with inadequate consideration of its effects on “strategic 
mobility”.  Maneuver warfare he felt was incompatible to the Marine Corps because of its 
strategic mission:  “What the relevance of all this tactical mobility is to a Service 
structured for violent assault, short operations, and stubborn defense is not clear.”  
Batcheller questioned the ability of Marine combat service support units to provide the 
“flexible” and “responsive support” called for by the maneuverists given the strategic role 
of the Marine Corps as an amphibious expeditionary force.82     
Another criticism of maneuver warfare appeared in April 1982.  Lieutenant 
Colonel J.P. Glasgow, Jr. wrote a letter to editor critical of Wilson’s January 1982 article 
“Maneuver/Fluid Warfare: A Review of the Concepts.”  Glasgow spoke derisively of 
Wilson’s work as a “regurgitation of Messrs. Boyd and Lind.”  Glasgow’s main criticism 
of maneuver warfare itself was that he did not think it was “germane to every conceivable 
combat environment.”  He also criticized maneuver warfare for paying insufficient 
attention to the defense, inquiring whether “is maneuver warfare symbolic for always 
being on attack?”  He echoed Batcheller’s concerns that maneuverists had not fully 
thought through the implications of maneuver warfare for supply and the proper 
employment artillery.83   
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 What these criticisms of maneuver warfare shared in common was that they 
conceived of maneuver warfare not as a way of thinking as the maneuverists did, but as 
only a method or technique.  This was ultimately the major point of departure between 
maneuverists and attritionists in the maneuver warfare debate.  In their arguments in 
favor of maneuver warfare, the maneuverists conceived of maneuver warfare as a way of 
thinking which informed and guided actions on the battlefield, and as physical actions 
and methods.  On the other hand, attritionists defined maneuver warfare solely in terms of 
actions, but omitted the line of thinking which governed those actions.  
    The criticisms against maneuver warfare prompted a series of rebuttal articles 
from maneuverists.  The Gazette’s June 1982 issue printed letter from Michael Wyly 
under the heading “Defending the ‘Maneuverists” in which he responded to criticisms 
which he felt were “way off the mark.”  First, he rebutted the contention that the 
maneuverists had paid insufficient attention to the issues of artillery fire control and 
supply.  Wyly noted that the “officers who devote the extra time studying the history of 
how man has out-maneuvered man are the same whom I see being most conscientious in 
studying how to control fire and ensure optimum combat service support.”  Wyly also 
countered the notion that maneuver warfare had only offensive applications, and noted 
that “some of maneuver warfare’s best applications are in the defense.”  Another charge 
he rebutted was that maneuverists were not taking into consideration that combat 
involved casualties on both sides and that maneuverists were overly one-sided and 
optimistic in their predictions.  Wyly responded that maneuver warfare required 
“boldness and acceptance of risk.  Clearly, this means acceptance of casualties when 
necessary.”  The final charge that Wyly countered was Batcheller’s April 1982 argument 
that maneuverists had unrealistically high expectations for Marine proficiency at all 
levels of command down to the small unit.  Wyly responded: “Should not we set out 
standards at the highest level and work up to them?”84 
Wyly closed by saying that both maneuver warfare’s critics and its advocates 
needed to “study more” and urged maneuverists to keep writing despite the increasing 
criticism.  He also came to the defense of Wilson against the Glasgow’s criticism that 
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 Wilsons’ work was nothing more than the “regurgitation” of Boyd and Lind’s ideas.  He 
countered that an “interpretative article” and that its purpose was to spark discussion.  
Wyly took issue with Glasgow’s personally directed comments against Wilson saying 
that he “did not deserve to be insulted.”85   
Wilson and Woods’ rebuttal to Batcheller appeared in August 1982.  They 
attributed much of Batcheller’s criticism to a “too casual reading” of the maneuver 
warfare articles appearing in the Gazette.  A full understanding of maneuver warfare 
required “careful, thoughtful reading and reflection.”  To counter Batcheller’s charge that 
maneuver warfare was inapplicable to the small-unit level, they called attention to the 
fact that the conceptual basis of maneuver warfare in the twentieth century originated in 
German infiltration tactics for trench assaults during World War I.  As a concept, 
maneuver warfare was employable by Marine units as small as the fire-team and as large 
as a Marine Amphibious Force.86    
 Wilson and Woods also made it a point to draw clear distinction between 
techniques and tactics: “Techniques are those things that all armies must learn to do well 
to succeed, e.g., movement to contact, assault on a fortified position, and weapons 
proficiency.”  Tactics were different, “the imaginative combination of those techniques 
allowing forces to move into unexpected places at unexpected times, with unexpected 
speed, deception, and surprise.”  What Wilson, Woods, and their fellow maneuverists 
opposed was the repeated use of same technique, “because stereotype tactics lead to 
predictability and defeat.”  Wilson and Woods also countered Batcheller’s contention that 
maneuver warfare negatively affected the ability of units to perform their basic battlefield 
skills effectively.  Wilson and Woods’s response was that were not opposed to battle 
drills only the “combining of such drills into dull, repetitious, and rote tactics.”87 
 Wilson and Woods countered the charged that mission tactics compromised the 
ability for units to act together as part of a coordinated plan, lacking any effective 
command and control by pointing to features in maneuver warfare that enabled units to 
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 act cohesively.  They agreed that effective command and control was necessary.  The 
lack of it would “lead to total chaos and a possibility of defeat in detail.”  Maneuver 
warfare allowed for “Maximum flexibility and initiative” for subordinates without 
compromising effective command and control.  What maneuver warfare required of a 
senior commander was: “clearly expressing his overall tactical intent, by tailoring the 
mission-type orders  to support that intent, and by designating a point of main effort, for 
combat, combat service, and combat service support units.  These mechanisms ensured 
that “the senior commander can retain enough control to ensure a cohesive, coherent 
effort from his force.”88    
Finally, Wilson and Woods rebutted charges that maneuver meant a move away 
from the Corps historic role as an amphibious force and increased mechanization.  They 
argued that amphibious operations were not “an end in themselves” and ultimately were 
“merely a means of arriving on the battlefield.”  Marines would still need to fight once 
ashore, commenting, “We do not fight decisive battles in the surf.”  Maneuver warfare 
advocates never called for increased mechanization as the sole means to increased 
maneuver.  What they advocated was “maneuver in relationship to our enemy, and this is 
something that is not dependent on mechanization or tied to machines.”89 
  Wilson and Woods concluded that what “maneuver warfare advocates are 
attempting to institutionalize fighting smart.”  When the next war came, it would be too 
late for the Marine Corps to reconsider its tactical doctrine.  Maneuver warfare was much 
more than Batcheller’s dismissive characterization as just “good old flexibility and 
boldness.”90    
 What Wilson and Woods in effect had argued was that critics of maneuver 
warfare had achieved only a superficial understanding of the concept.  The use of the 
phrase “institutionalize fighting smart” again highlights that central to maneuver warfare 
was particular way of thinking that informed decision-making and actions and not the 
decisions or the actions themselves.  The phrase also pointed to the scope of the change 
that was necessary to adopt maneuver warfare, the Corps as an institution would need to 
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 undergo a fundamental change in thinking at all levels to execute maneuver doctrine 
properly.  
  This exchange of articles and letters highlighted the increasing polarization that 
maneuver warfare was causing in the Corps.  The language used only increased the 
divide.  When maneuverists said their objective was to “institutionalize fighting smart,” 
one could interpret that as implicitly saying that the Corps and any Marine who thought 
differently was doing the opposite.  Attritionists, in some respects, were dismissive of 
maneuver warfare because junior advocates made up most of the maneuverists.  While 
both sides raised valid issues and concerns, the issue would continue to polarize Marines 
because both camps had thought of maneuver warfare in conceptually different terms. 
 One of the strongest arguments against maneuver warfare was Major J.D Burke’s 
“Maneuver Warfare & the MAGTF” which appeared in September 1982.  Burke’s 
argument was that while maneuver was applicable to the conduct of amphibious 
operations, once ashore Marines would need to employ an attrition style of fighting.  As a 
service, the Marine Corps was not suited for maneuver warfare because of how it 
organized itself for operations.  According to Burke: 
The MAGTF is organized and equipped to fight firepower attrition warfare, not maneuver warfare.  
This is not really surprising because (as) the MAGTF will be committed as a limited, defensive 
response to the threat, and, (b) since the MAGTF builds its combat power from zero, it is logical 
to look to the tactical defense as a probable solution. 
 
Burke was not claiming that attrition was “inherently superior to maneuver warfare … or 
vice-versa,” but that as an organization the Marine Corps lacked the assets to fight a 
maneuver style of battle once it was ashore, but the organic assets available to an infantry 
battalion were well suited for a defensive style battle and should be augmented.  Burke 
closed his article:  “Marines can talk maneuver warfare all they like.  However, MAGTFs 
are not structured to fight maneuver warfare and are unlikely to be given an offensive 
combat mission while employed before the outbreak of general war.”91 
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 Burke’s contention that the MAGTF was best suited for the defensive along 
attrition lines “inspired considerable discussion” according to Gazette, which published 
several of the responses in December 1982 under the heading “Mission and ‘The 
Offensive Spirit.’”  Major Edward J. Robeson IV concurred with Burke that the MAGTF 
was not suited for maneuver warfare on land.  Maneuver warfare was only applicable at 
the “amphibious task force level.”  By this, he meant at the operational and strategic 
level.  At the tactical or landing force level, the Marine Corps should be their “traditional 
selves… assault troops trained and equipped to seize and defend advanced naval and air 
bases.”  One critic, Captain R.S. Moore, pointed out that the “real weakness in Major 
Burke’s analysis rests in the idea that doctrine must conform to organization.”  Burke’s 
contention that the MAGTF was not suited for offensive operations as the basis for his 
argument of a defense posture based on attrition was “a bureaucratic argument.”  Moore 
urged fellow Marines to continue to develop new doctrine concepts.  Wyly responded by 
asserting that once ashore Marines should not maintain the defensive stance Burke urged.  
Wyly contended that the Soviets stood a good chance of countering a static, 
firepower/attrition-based defensive posture.  Wyly also noted the Marine Corps’s history 
of amphibious assaults followed by a swift push inland citing World War II and Korean 
War campaigns as examples of Marines pushing inland, instead of assuming defensive 
postures once ashore.92 
The Gazette printed Burke’s response in the same issue.  Burke reiterated that the 
Marine Corps “was not organized and equipped to fight a protracted ground campaign.”  
It did not make sense to devote time and effort to a concept that the Marine Corps was 
inadequately organized to employ.  He countered the historical arguments by noting that 
successful campaigns of the past offered no guarantee that future campaigns would be 
equally successful.  Burke cautioned his fellow Marines that a “mismatch between 
doctrine (strategy) and force planning” was equivalent to bringing “the wrong team to a 
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 game we knew we had to win.”  He closed by reiterating that the Marine Corps was 
capable of executing a tactical defense and should improve on its capabilities to do so.93  
 Wyly published a detailed response to Burk in January 1983 titled “Thinking 
Beyond the Beachhead.”  According to Wyly, Burke’s argument of the assumption of a 
tactical defensive following an amphibious landing failed to achieve any decisive results, 
which were only possible with a rapid advance inland.  He invoked the Anzio Campaign 
of 1944 as an example of the dangers of an amphibious assault that failed to push inland 
quickly and rapidly once ashore.  Wyly disputed Burke’s claim that organizationally a 
MAGTF was incapable of executing maneuver warfare at the tactical level.  While it was 
in need of “streamlining and improvement,” the MAGTF “should be and can be the most 
maneuverable force in the world.”  The reason Wyly gave was that the MAGTF 
employed combined arms, placing ground and air assets under a single commander.  
Because of this the MAGTF “is easily well ahead of other military forces in 
maneuverability.”  The challenge according to Wyly was “to make the MAGTF 
maneuverable.”  The solution to this Wyly proposed was to be found through a synthesis 
of the ideas posited in “MAGTF& Maneuver Warfare” and “Mission & the Offensive 
Spirit.”94    
Wyly concluded his article by noting that the ability to conduct amphibious 
operations was not a capability unique to Marines, Army units were equally as capable of 
conducting landings.  The value of the Marine amphibious capability he argued was its 
ability to land from the sea and move inland, immediately, with our own all arms team.  We can 
do far more than get on the beach.  We can get off it and go beyond it  We are an intervention 
force than can do what was not done at Anzio we can keep the battle flowing and destroy the 
enemy.  That is the essence of our being-our raison d’être. 95   
 
Amidst the exchange of criticisms between maneuverists and attritionists, there 
were Marines who were attempting to build a consensus among Marines with respect to 
maneuver warfare.  One such work was Colonel Bruce Brown’s two-part series 
“Maneuver Warfare Roadmap.”  Among Brown’s suggestions was to deemphasize the 
“psychological aspects.”  What Brown meant was, to build consensus, the Corps needed 
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 to downplay the maneuverist emphasis that maneuver warfare was in the end a particular 
way of thinking about war.  The reason Brown cited was that it was “very difficult for 
most Marines to embrace that aspect at the tactical level.”  It was more important to 
Brown that Marines focus on aspects about which they could agree:  a focus on the defeat 
of an enemy, being unpredictable, an offensive orientation, and mission orders.  Brown 
most likely meant that it was easier for Marines to understand and agree with maneuver 
warfare it they treated it as tangible actions.  Brown also noted that for the Corps to 
accept and implement maneuver warfare it would need to be “built by Marines, for 
Marines—a style that will fit Marines.”  What he effectively said was that, ultimately, 
maneuver warfare would need to conform and adapt itself to the Corps as an 
organization, rather than forcing the Corps to change to adopt maneuver warfare.96     
 Brown then surveyed Marine Landing Force Manuals and Fleet Marine Force 
Manuals   to identify aspects that were inconsistent with maneuver warfare.  Brown 
concluded that the inconsistency between Marine Corps doctrine and maneuver warfare 
meant that the Corps would have to rewrite its entire doctrine.  He noted that disparity 
between maneuver warfare and preexisting doctrinal publications “suggests that it is 
foolish to expect an immediate, or ‘miracle’ LFM on maneuver warfare.”  In comparison 
to Wilson’s April 1981 article from April calling for maneuver warfare doctrinal manual, 
Brown concluded that more work was needed beyond a single manual.  He agreed in 
principle with Wilson, but the scope of the task required “a deliberate and comprehensive 
approach to the challenge.”  Anything beyond that Brown argued would be detrimental.  
“A rapid, frontal assault on the doctrine will only result in inconsistency at best, and 
chaos at worst.”97 
 Brown’s arguments shared a similarity with those of maneuver warfare’s critics in 
that he thought that organizational characteristics of the Corps incompatible with all 
aspects maneuver warfare.  His solution was to focus on what the Corps could adapt to 
suit its purposes and deemphasize the drastic reorientation of organizational thinking 
urged by the maneuverists.  Brown’s paper was in effect a compromise between attrition 
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 and maneuver, by identifying what parts of maneuver were compatible with attrition 
warfare. 
 Brown was not the only author trying to build consensus around ideas with which 
Marines could agree.  As a follow-on to “Thinking Beyond the Beachhead,” Wyly 
published “War Without Firepower” in March 1983.  Unlike Brown who thought the 
“psychological aspect” of maneuver inhibited acceptance of maneuver warfare, Wyly 
made the case for why he accepted the maneuver as the basis for an organizational way of 
thinking and hoped to find common ground between maneuverists and attritionists by 
showing that firepower was a central aspect of maneuver warfare.  The maneuver warfare 
debate, he noted, had been a beneficial experience for the Corps: “Losses of temper, 
perceived insults, hare-brained arguments notwithstanding, Marines are concerned about 
how we are going to fight the next time around.”  He also reaffirmed his affiliation with 
the maneuverists, saying that he “willingly allowed myself to be categorized with the 
‘maneuverists’ because I have seen in their ideas, refreshing ways of thinking by which 
we can profit.  I have accepted the ideas because I have found them to be validated in 
history and logical in the context of my combat experience.”  Wyly attributed much of 
the disagreement surrounding maneuver warfare to a misunderstanding over the role of 
firepower.  Many in the Corps, has mistakenly believed that maneuver warfare neglected 
or dismissed the importance of firepower on the battlefield.   This misunderstanding “has 
stirred emotions and prevented those who have gravitated to one camp from learning 
from the other.”  Wyly argued that fire and maneuver were both important on the 
battlefield and that maneuver warfare recognized this relationship.   He hoped his 
invocation of his combat experience would grant credibility to the case for a move to 
maneuver warfare.98    
Wyly then proceeded to outline why he opposed attrition.  He observed in his 
experiences that fire and movement had taken place in an attrition context, which proved 
“too expensive and indecisive.”  Wyly then cited his tour as a company commander in 
Vietnam where he “saw maneuver work.”  His Marines “completely baffled the enemy 
by applying our brains:” surprising and ambushing them.  He then urged Marines to study 
history and learn from past practitioners of maneuver such as the Mongols, the Germans 
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 of World War II, and the Israelis.  The maneuver he spoke of was much more than the 
physical dimension; it was again a mindset, a way of thinking and acting.  Wyly closed 
with a call for reform “Old ways of doing things will not do.  ‘We’ve always done 
maneuver’ is a hollow phrase.  Major changes are called for.  Resistance to new and 
foreign concepts must be overcome.”99 
What Wyly was attempting to do was to draw clear distinctions between 
maneuver and firepower as battlefield actions, and maneuver and firepower as mindsets 
(firepower being synonymous with attrition). Unlike the arguments advanced by Lind, 
Wyly was less willing to pronounce a clear-cut dichotomy between firepower and 
attrition as ways of fighting.  He hoped to bring Marines to a consensus by agreeing that a 
move to maneuver doctrine did not mean the adoption of an unrealistic vision of war that 
hoped to defeat an enemy by exclusively using physical maneuver to achieve his 
surrender.100    
What is clear from the pages of the Gazette was that the situation that emerged by 
1984 was a compromise between maneuver and attrition.  That did not mean that 
maneuverists ceased to make the case for the institutionalization of maneuver warfare, 
nor did attritionists cease to publish critical articles.  What the print debate did 
demonstrate were the limitations of what publishing in the Gazette could accomplish.  
The Gazette was a forum for discussing ideas, but what the maneuverists were proposing 
was to change how Marines fought.  This meant that more was necessary than talking 
about maneuver warfare. Mechanisms were necessary to educate and train Marines in the 
new doctrine. 
In June 1984, Lind published “Preparing for Maneuver Warfare.”  He noted that 
“It seems to be about time take the next step: to discuss how the Marine Corps must 
change” in order to execute a maneuver based doctrine.  Lind noted that there was a 
difference between accepting and understanding an idea and the ability to implement it.  
Lind cautioned about the dangers of becoming an organization with an “academic” 
understanding, but “entirely incapable of doing it in combat.” Lind was warning against 
an organization developing a false notion that it could execute maneuver warfare just by 
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 understanding its concepts.  Understanding a concept was not enough, the Corps needed 
to adopt practices conducive to assimilating maneuver warfare into the organization.  
Among several reforms that he recommended on subjects ranging from NCO promotions 
criteria to personnel policies, Lind also outlined a program to institutionalize maneuver 
warfare based on reforms to officer education.  In his assessment, Marine officer 
education was inadequate to the task of teaching the skills relevant to modern warfare.  
Lind proposed a more prominent role for military history in the curriculum, modifications 
to training exercises that made them less scripted and predictable, and a reading program 
to increase the breadth of officer’s knowledge.101 
The Gazette printed several of the responses to Lind’s article in September 1984 
under the heading “Preparing for Maneuver Warfare.” The responses were, for the most 
part, favorable.  One reader, Major C.J. Gregor, called Lind’s piece “well-thought out, 
well-written, and perceptive of some of our problems and possible solutions.”  Another 
respondent, Captain S.G Duke, was “incensed” with Lind’s generalizations on the state of 
Marine officer education but “did agree with many points,” he raised.  The comments 
made in the September 1984 Gazette suggest that for the most part, Marines were 
receptive to many of the institutional changes that Lind and other maneuverists had 
recommended.102 
One response in particular, by fellow maneuverist William Woods, stood out 
because it pointed to a significant obstacle to the institutionalization of maneuver 
warfare.  Woods described the reforms in officer education that Lind proposed as 
“substantial and far reaching” and said that “to institute even the minimal would require a 
monumental redirection of our thoughts on war.”  The key to make the sweeping changes 
was senior leadership: “Those seniors who possess the power to make such changes will 
have to be of exceptional character—officers who can struggle through the suffocating 
muck of bureaucracy and break free into the clear brilliant light of reason.”103   
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 While Michael Wyly had implemented an educational program for tactical 
instruction at AWS along the lines recommended by the maneuverists, Woods was 
correct in his assessment that the support of senior officer leadership was needed to create 
wholesale organizational change.  Woods was fortunate to have served in the Second 
Marine Division under Alfred M. Gray, a general who was not only receptive to 
maneuver warfare, but had taken the significant step of adopting it as doctrine for his 
division.  Gray was at the time serving as Commanding General, Marine Force Atlantic, 
but in 1987  he became Commandant of the Marine Corps and used his authority to deal 
with Woods’s “suffocating muck of bureaucracy” to institutionalize maneuver warfare.   
The need to build a Marine consensus on maneuver warfare reflected its new 
position in the Marine Corps.  Maneuver warfare was no longer the fringe doctrine it was 
in 1979. Many in the Corps were now familiar with terms maneuver warfare, even if 
there was not a complete understanding of it. Marines were employing maneuver warfare 
in training exercises, most notably the Second Marine Division, whose Commanding 
General adopted it as the basis for division doctrine in 1981. Maneuverists such as Wyly, 
Wilson, and Lind were regular contributors to the pages of the Gazette. Coincidentally, 
this attempt build an organizational consensus in the Gazette paralleled the ebbing of 
maneuver warfare in other parts of the Marine Corps.   By February of 1982, Wyly has 
been removed from his position as the head of the tactics department of AWS.   
Maneuver warfare had a place in the Marine Corps, albeit one that was not completely 
defined. 
In order for the paradigm shift to take place, the rest of the Corps needed to 
accept, either voluntarily or through compulsion, that maneuver warfare satisfied the 
organizational needs.  By 1983, the progression of the debate in the Gazette suggests that 
it was accepted by Marines, but with certain limitations.  Some Marines had accepted 
maneuver warfare because they were convinced that maneuver warfare was the Marine 
Corps’s future.   Others were willing to accept maneuver warfare, but with certain 
caveats.  Some needed reassurances that maneuver warfare would not compromise 
Marine identity. Some needed convincing that maneuver warfare was practical on the 
battlefield.  By the middle years of the decade, the Marine Corps was in the midst of an 
Kuhnian paradigm shift, but it is clear that the transition was far from complete.  Whether 
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 this shift would continue was a point of uncertainty.   A successful paradigm shift was 
impossible without the involvement of senior leadership. Support from the highest 
echelons of the Marine Corps was necessary to effect  greater change to entire 
organization.  Outright hostility could possibly result in the undoing in the gains made by 
the maneuverists. Maneuver warfare would have been nothing more than an appealing 
idea that had attracted some support, but subsequently fading form the scene. 
 In a 1984 interview with John Scharfen, Gray commented that the “controversy 
that has been generated on the pages of our professional journals like the Marine Corps 
Gazette over the value and feasibility of maneuver war has been one of the healthiest 
things that could have possibly happened in the evolution of Marine Corps tactical 
doctrine.  It has stimulated some controversy and some potent thought on how we should 
fight our forces.”  The Gazette alone did not bring about the organizational adoption of 
maneuver warfare, but it did play a key role in laying down the foundation. Because of 
the Gazette, the tenets and the terminology of maneuver warfare were no longer foreign 
concepts to the Corps.  More importantly, as Gray observed, maneuver warfare spurred 
serious discussion in the Corps on the current state of its tactical doctrine and on its 
overall organizational health.    
In their articles, maneuverists were able to address some of the concerns that 
hindered the adoption maneuver warfare.  Much of the attritionist criticism of maneuver 
warfare hinged doubts of the ability of Marines to learn and implement a maneuver based 
doctrine.  Maneuverists such as Wyly, Wilson, and Woods were able to develop methods 
and techniques that demonstrated that Marines could learn and implement the new 
doctrine.104 
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CHAPTER 4 - Educating and Training for Maneuver Warfare 
The maneuverists were incapable of achieving an intellectual transformation of 
the Corps solely through the public debate in the pages of the Gazette.  The attritionist 
critics of maneuver warfare were right to bring attention to the organizational challenges 
of having to train the Corps to execute a maneuver doctrine.  The maneuverists were also  
aware from the beginning that organizational changes were necessary to execute a 
maneuver-based doctrine.  It would require Marines capable of functioning in the 
operational environment it was seeking to create.    
The intellectual transformation of the Marine Corps and of any military 
organization in general requires more than acceptance of a new idea. Maneuverists had to 
perform the detailed work of taking maneuver warfare from the level of the abstract to 
the functional, from a concept to a practical set of skills and capabilities.  For the Corps 
to execute maneuver warfare they would have to develop a curriculum for educating 
Marines as well as a program for training operational units to execute the new doctrine. 
Members of the maneuver warfare seminar group were again crucial to this process,   the 
very same individuals who published articles and defending maneuver warfare in the 
Gazette.  The key figure in developing a maneuver warfare curriculum was Michael D. 
Wyly.  G.I. Wilson and William Woods, through the sponsorship of their division 
commander, Alfred Gray, would bring maneuver warfare to an operational unit.  
Any understanding of Wyly and his educational reforms requires returning to the 
beginning of the 1979-80 academic year at AWS, his first year as Head of Tactics.  Prior 
to his assignment to AWS, Wyly, he served as junior lieutenant colonel on the support 
staff of the Marine Corps Education Center at Quantico.  He concurrently enrolled in a 
master’s program in history at George Washington University.  Wyly’s reassignment to 
AWS was the result of his sharing some of his coursework with the Director of the 
Education Center, Major General Bernard Trainor, who shared Wyly’s interest in military 
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 history.  Wyly’s paper analyzing the tactics employed at the Battle of Tarawa sufficiently 
impressed Trainor that the general placed him in charge of tactics instruction at AWS.105 
Trainor reassigned Wyly with a mandate to “fix tactics” at AWS.  Its tactics 
curriculum had been suffering from lackluster instruction in recent years and the student 
evaluations consistently remarked that this component of the overall curriculum was 
“boring.”  Trainor told Wyly to be creative and to “not hide behind doctrine” in his 
instruction.106 
Several details can be inferred from this sequence of events that resulted in 
Wyly’s assignment.  First, Trainor had reached the conclusion that tactics instruction at 
AWS was not adequate to the needs of the Corps in preparing these officers for their 
duties.   Second, Wyly demonstrated to Trainor through his Tarawa paper that he had an 
approach to tactics that the general responded favorably to.  Trainor must have seen in the 
paper that Wyly had an intellectual approach to tactics that junior Marine officers could 
have benefited from.  Fourth, Trainor must have also had some dissatisfaction with 
contemporary doctrine, or at the bare minimum, disapproved of how it was being taught 
to AWS students..   
Trainor and Colonel Frederick Vanous, Wyly’s immediate supervisor, granted 
him leeway to teach as he saw fit, allowing for deviation from what was traditionally 
taught in Marine Corps schools.  Wyly himself was a product of that system, and had 
graduated from The Basic School (TBS) as lieutenant, AWS as a captain, and Command 
and Staff as a major.  Wyly’s assessment of the instruction he received from these 
institutions was that it was not particularly challenging for him intellectually.  Instructors 
taught material coming primarily from the doctrinal manuals, and the curriculum stressed 
the knowledge and use of proper terminology and procedures.  Testing assessed the 
ability of the students to recall the contents of the pertinent manuals.  The schools were 
lacking in teaching students skills needed in actual operations.  Wyly’s criticism of the 
curriculum was that, while it purported to prepare Marine officers for combat, it did so 
without any analysis of actual battles or study of military history.  Wyly recalled that the 
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 lack of intellectual rigor in the schools left him with more than sufficient spare time to 
study military history on his own.107    
Wyly’s Vietnam tours significantly influenced his attitudes toward training and 
education.  He observed firsthand the consequences of following doctrinal manuals too 
rigidly without consideration for the enemy and the situation at hand.  The results were 
inevitably disastrous for American forces that were too slow to adapt and create new 
methods not found in the doctrinal manuals as the enemy learned to develop counter-
tactics of their own.  Wyly also had another set of observations as a rifle company 
commander seeing his Marines learning to deviate from rigid doctrinal manual practices 
and adapting what they learned as necessary to meet local conditions.  His Marines were 
successful against their opponents because of their instinctive ability to adapt and their 
intuitive understanding that war was not just about following a set formula or process 
outlined in a doctrinal publication, but required focusing on the enemy and his actions as 
well.108   
  Elements of a paradigm crisis were clearly in place when Wyly assumed his 
instructor responsibilities at AWS. As noted in an earlier chapter, Wyly was already 
dissatisfied himself with contemporary Marine doctrine and educational practices.  Wyly 
had turned to the ideas of Boyd to resolve his own intellectual dissatisfaction.   Trainor to 
some degree was also dissatisfied and believed some form of change was necessary  
Wyly’s critique of the training and education system was essentially based on the 
perception that the instructional systems methods turned the manuals and the doctrine 
into ends of themselves rather than means. In the old attrition paradigm, following the 
text of the manual as though it were entirely prescriptive was seen as a viable way of war 
on its own right.  Since students were required to demonstrate their knowledge of the 
doctrinal manuals, the consequence was they would execute what they learned in schools, 
but losing sight of why they employed a particular procedure or tactic.  This becomes 
especially problematic though when an enemy learns which tactics and procedures are 
normally used in a given situation and devises methods and tactics to exploit his 
knowledge of doctrine.  Wyly was, in effect, in a personal paradigm crisis.  The old way 
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 of training and preparing for war was no longer valid for him.  His observations of the 
educational system preceded his introduction to maneuver warfare and his critique 
predated his acquaintance with the maneuverist critique of the attrition model.  Until his 
contact with John Boyd, Wyly lacked a new paradigm to replace the old one that longer 
intellectually satisfied him. 
Inviting Boyd to speak was only part of Wyly’s attempts to revitalize the tactics 
curriculum during his first academic year as the head of the Tactics Department 1979-
1980.  One of his predecessor’s plans for an offensive tactics lesson contained a 
recommendation to follow the example set by Napoleon during the Battle of Austerlitz 
without any further elaboration.  Wyly modified the lesson into a case study of 
Napoleon’s actions and decisions during the battle with discussion of how his actions 
during the battle illustrated the tactical lessons that Wyly wanted to convey.  Another 
change Wyly made to exercises was to require students to use their own powers of 
decision-making.  He first attempted this approach with a student exercise entitled 
Battalion Tactical Planning.  As the title indicated, the exercise emphasized planning, but 
lacked any real test of the students’ ability to execute their plans.  Wyly renamed the 
lesson Battalion Tactical Execution and transformed it into a free-play radio 
communications exercise where Wyly and his instructors served as the opposing force.  
His final major innovation was what he called the “Red/Green Exercise.”  In this lesson, 
another free-play exercise, Wyly separated his students into two teams, with Wyly and 
his staff serving as the umpires.  Conceptually, the game was similar the children’s game 
“Battleship.”  Each side would inform the umpires of their course of action, the umpires 
would then decide the outcome of those actions.109   
A practice that Wyly especially opposed was the use of the “yellows.”  The 
yellows were solutions devised in advanced by AWS instructors to tactical exercises 
given to students and distributed at the end of the problem.  The benefit of having a 
yellow was that the instructor had answer on hand to give to his students.  Wyly 
disapproved of the practice because it sent a false message to the students: that the 
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 instructor’s predetermined solution was the only one, since any solution that deviated 
from the yellows was implicitly treated as incorrect.110 
Wyly’s changes to the curriculum during his first year can be seen as the 
beginnings of the paradigm shift away from attrition towards maneuver, though they 
predate the existence of an identifiable maneuver warfare movement.  Attrition warfare 
placed a premium on efficiency brought about through detailed planning, strict adherence 
procedures, and centralized decision-making at the expense of individual initiative and 
flexibility.  On the other hand, maneuver warfare conceptualized the tradeoff differently, 
seeing the potential gains of decentralized control, individual initiative, and flexibility as 
more beneficial than the possible loss of efficiency. Striking a balance in a military 
organization between the advantages gained through the efficiency provided by 
uniformity in thought and action with those that result from flexibility and use of 
individual creativity is a difficult task.  
Wyly’s actions can be seen as an attempt to redress an imbalance that favored 
efficiency too much to the detriment of flexibility.  The extent to which the practices he 
introduced were truly innovative or original is of secondary concern to the intentions 
behind them.  Wyly’s first year was dominated by his efforts to inculcate the skills he felt 
the educational system had failed to produce.  Success in war for him required more than 
mastery of doctrinal publications.  His experiences taught him that officers needed to do 
more than to master the procedures and processes found in the doctrinal manuals; they 
needed to use their own intellect and judgment as well.  Mastering the terminology and 
symbols of planning used in the planning could only go so far.  The students were 
learning the process involved planning, but at they were not learning that situations arise 
when deviation from a plan is necessary.  
Wyly continued to develop his curriculum during his second year as a department 
head.  During that year, acting on the suggestion of a British Royal Marine attached to 
Marine Corps Education Command, Wyly deviated from normal AWS practices and took 
his students outside of the classroom into the field.  In the Virginia countryside, Wyly 
and his students conducted Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTS) to discuss 
operations by using actual pieces of terrain rather than an abstract discussion conducted 
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 using only maps.  Another innovation Wyly implemented was to develop a reading list of 
books that he considered worthwhile for an officer’s professional development as a 
supplement to the field manuals.  Wyly determined that students and Marines in general, 
should read books relevant to their profession, just as serious students of any other 
discipline.  The initial list grew and expanded over Wyly’s tenure through 
recommendations from students and colleagues and was the precursor to Commandant’s 
Reading List initiated by General Alfred M Gray in 1989.  Wyly’s final innovation to the 
curriculum was a series of tactical “lecture-exercises” he designed to teach the principles 
of maneuver warfare, the conceptual precursors of the Tactical Decision Games that 
appear regularly in today’s Marine Corps Gazette.111 
While these modifications to the curriculum were not particularly original and had 
been in common use in institutions such as the Prussian Kriegsacademie, they were 
absent from AWS at the time.  Even when removed from the context of Wyly’s 
increasing involvement at the time with maneuver warfare, these curriculum changes 
were still in line with Wyly’s own ideas that the education of an officer required skills 
that could not be acquired through mastery of publications alone.  The second year’s 
changes, like those of the first, integrated well with maneuver warfare because they 
inculcated skills necessary to conduct maneuver warfare--the ability to adapt and 
improvise to changing conditions, to let actual conditions dictate actions, and reliance on 
individual judgment to make decisions.    
In the fall of 1981, Wyly was about to begin his third year as the head instructor 
for tactics at AWS.  He had also begun his involvement with the emerging maneuver 
warfare movement in the Corps.  Wyly had begun his involvement with the AWS 
maneuver warfare seminar and the first Gazette articles had made their appearance.  As 
identified in an earlier chapter Wyly and his fellow maneuverists had taken the ideas of 
John Boyd as their starting point and refined them further through their study of military 
history.  A significant transition had been made in moving the Marine Corps from an 
attrition to maneuver-based paradigm. Wyly and others like him who were dissatisfied 
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 with the old model, now had an alternative that they could now work towards. Through 
his interaction with Boyd and the other maneuverists, Wyly had worked out a tactics 
instructional program designed to teach maneuver warfare to his students.  The situation 
had moved by dissatisfaction and crisis, and a genuine shift had to maneuver had begun. 
Wyly collected and reprinted his fall 1981 lectures designed to specifically to 
teach maneuver warfare concepts as the appendix to Lind’s Maneuver Warfare 
Handbook.  These lectures were based on the ideas that had been formed and developed 
through Wyly’s involvement with the maneuver warfare seminar group.  These five 
lessons: “Surfaces and Gaps,”  “Mission Tactics,” “The Main Effort,” and “The Concept 
of the Objective,” he collectively titled “Fundamentals of Tactics,” and they represent the 
oldest extant instruction for teaching maneuver warfare to Marine Officers.112     
Boyd in his work had indicated that these ideas were key to destroying an 
enemy’s cohesion and achieving his collapse, and Wyly now took them from ideas took 
and turned them into skills that Marines could develop and use to defeat an enemy.  For 
Marines to practice maneuver warfare these ideas needed to be more than just concepts, 
they needed development and elaboration into functional and implementable skills. 
Wyly chose the title “Fundamentals of Tactics” for the course because, as he 
explained, “it endeavors to ferret out and present in their simplest form those things that 
are most basic to the successful conduct of battle.”  According to Wyly, his lessons 
departed from the traditional method of teaching tactics because his course unlike others 
did not emphasize student knowledge of the vocabulary and symbology, such as the 
definitions and map symbols for a “line of departure” or “axis of advance,” what he 
called “the language of tactics.”  For Wyly, the consequence of approach was that it 
limited tactical options, and he “found it difficult to maneuver freely, to think creatively, 
and to do things that would be most destructive to the enemy.”113    
  According to Wyly, what was fundamental in tactics instruction was “that which 
dealt with defeating the enemy.  The answer to the question of what will work to undo the 
opposing force is what we must be searching for in tactics … what the student comes to 
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 grip with when he studies tactics.  All else is peripheral.”  The older form of instruction 
with its emphasis on vocabulary and symbology produced, “instead of soldiers, structured 
mechanics, who find it difficult to think without rules.”  According to Wyly, the “art of 
war has no traffic with rules.”  Wyly had observed that one consequence of the emphasis 
on format and terminology was that Marines would “reject their best tactical ideas” 
because they could not find a way to express them using the proper “format” they 
learned.   The language and format of tactics were subordinating and taking precedent 
over the tactics themselves.114 
 Each lesson consisted of two parts.  The first was a lecture detailing the historical 
background of the concept being taught. The second part was a tactical scenario designed 
to teach the student how to employ the concept taught during the lecture.  Surfaces and 
Gaps is based on German term called Flaechen und Luekentaktik (the tactics of surfaces 
and gaps), the infiltration tactics used by German storm troopers to breach Allied trench 
defenses during World War I.  This lesson taught students to avoid enemy strengths and 
attack his weaknesses by creating or locating vulnerabilities.  The point is to look actively 
for enemy weaknesses and to exploit them quickly.  Mission Tactics were based on the 
German concept of Auftstragstaktik.  Mission tactics is a contract between the 
commander and his subordinate.  The commander assigns a task, but he allows the 
subordinate the latitude to accomplish the task as that subordinate finds appropriate.  
What links the two is the commander’s intent.  The “Main Effort” is based on the 
German idea of Schwerpunkt (focal point).  In any operation, whether offensive or 
defensive, at any level of war, a commander designates one of his units, as the main 
effort.  All units of that command should conduct their operations of the main effort in 
mind, ensuring the whole unit is working towards a common goal.  The main effort does 
not need to remain constant throughout the operation, as conditions change, a commander 
can designate a different main effort.  Wyly defined Objective as the “physical end 
towards which our efforts are directed.”  The mistake of the past had been to focus on 
terrain features and physical location in an operation.  A commander should instead make 
decisions based on a physical result he wants to accomplish with his enemy.  In Wyly’s 
final lesson, “The Concept of the Reserve,” he taught his students to use the reserve as 
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 means of achieving a decision on the battlefield, i.e., to reinforce success and not 
failure.115 
Wyly conceived of his map lessons differently from others used in the Marine 
Corps.  One difference he highlighted was that the “problem exercises are without 
boundaries and lines of departure.  The time of attack is the student’s call.  He bases it on 
the enemy, what the enemy is doing now, not two hours ago when the order is given.  
The student can indicate what he would do off the edges of the map.  Does he know how 
the terrain is formed there?  No.  But will you always know in combat?  Not always.  It is 
up to the student to think about the possible terrain forms and, more importantly, enemy 
activities might hinder or help his execution of his operation.”  There was no right or 
wrong answer in this type of problem.  What mattered more to Wyly was that students 
learned to think through their decisions and be able to articulate clearly others the 
rationale for the courses of action they developed.116 
Wyly’s curricular initiatives at AWS were made possible because he enjoyed a 
high degree of freedom and latitude that would eventually disappear.  When the 1981-
1982 school year began, Wyly found himself with a chain of command that was less than 
supportive of his deviation from teaching standard doctrine.  General Trainor received a 
promotion and a new assignment and Colonel Vanous was no longer the head of AWS.  
According to Wyly, their respective replacements were hostile to maneuver warfare and 
wanted him to return to teaching the old doctrine.  By February 1982 Wyly’s friction with 
his chain of command deteriorated to the point that in he was removed from his position 
as head of the Tactics Department and reassigned to a mundane staff position, delivering 
briefings on the conduct of Marine amphibious operations to non-Marines.  Ironically the 
plan for these operations relied on the old outmoded attrition tactics which Wyly’s 
disapproval of led had him toward maneuver warfare.  Wyly managed to obtain a transfer 
to the Pentagon and continued his promotion of maneuver warfare in his subsequent 
assignments.  He commanded the University of Kansas’ Naval Reserve Officer Training 
Corps Unit from 1984-1987.  He periodically travelled to Fort Leavenworth at the 
invitation of Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, the head of the School for Advanced Military 
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 Studies and the principal author of FM 100-5, to deliver lectures on maneuver warfare 
and amphibious operations to the students at the Army’s Command and Staff College.  In 
addition to his educational activities, Wyly also continued to submit book reviews and 
articles to the Gazette.117 
Maneuver warfare remained in the curriculum at AWS.  Materials assigned for 
the 1982-1983 academic year included a programmed text, a form of self-study guide, for 
maneuver warfare entitled “Fundamentals of Common Sense Tactics (Maneuver 
Warfare)” by a graduate of the previous AWS class, Captain John Sweet.  What was 
substantially different was the style in which maneuver warfare was presented.  While 
Wyly had consciously avoided the traditional tactical terminology and references to 
doctrinal publications in his lessons and exercises, the Sweet text was full of references to 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, Fleet Marine Force Manuals, and Operational 
Handbooks.  Also missing from the Sweet text were the historical examples and 
references that Wyly used to teach his ideas.  The exercises at the end of Sweet’s text 
appeared to be a hybrid of Wyly’s exercises and traditional tactical problems.118 
It is unclear what else of Wyly’s instructional program for tactics remained in the 
1982-1983 academic year, but information exists from the following class year.  Captain 
Brendan Ryan, a 1984 graduate of AWS, wrote an article on his experiences as a student.  
Many of Wyly’s innovations as an instructor evidently remained in place after his 
departure: the study of battles and campaigns, a professional core reading program, free-
play exercises, TEWTs, and the Red/Green Exercises.  Students were also learning the 
ideas of John Boyd.  Ryan’s article also indicates that these methods were intended to 
teach students to act along maneuver warfare lines.119     
Indeed, Wyly himself commented favorably on the state of affairs in AWS in an 
article for the Gazette.  Following a visit to AWS in the summer of 1985, he concluded 
from his visit that “nothing equal to the quality of instruction and methodology now at 
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 AWS was in being before.  It is a different and far better school than the one in which I 
taught.  This summer I interviewed faculty and students and received the same picture 
from both groups.  The Marine Corps has moved ahead in professional education.”120 
 There appears to have been a change in hierarchal attitude towards maneuver 
warfare in the interim between Wyly’s reassignment in 1982, and Ryan’s experiences as 
a student in 1983-84 and Wyly’s visit in 1985.  One possibility is that official attitudes 
towards maneuver warfare had changed or that other unidentified factors led to an official 
Marine Corps reappraisal of its position.  A 1983 official Marine Corps report sent to the 
House Armed Services Committee stated that the “Marine Corps does not subscribe to 
any exclusive formula or recipe for warfare,” but “the concepts of maneuver warfare are 
evident throughout the Marine Corps.”  The Corps was working to “integrate further the 
concepts of maneuver warfare and amphibious warfare.”  The Sweet text’s explicit 
integration of preexisting doctrine publications with maneuver warfare with was 
congruent with the official position of this report.  This suggests the possibility that AWS 
and the Marine Corps hierarchy were willing to approve maneuver warfare, but it would 
be in a form it approved of and could control.121 
 This acceptance of maneuver warfare into the curriculum at AWS and the other 
changes that Wyly commented favorable on, were manifestations the Kuhinan paradigm 
change which was taking place in the Corps.  Maneuver warfare was moving from fringe 
positions to coexistence with the older paradigm in the Corps’ educational realm.   
Through Wyly’s work at AWS, maneuver warfare had made advances in the overall 
intellectual transformation of the Marine Corps.  The maneuverists had sufficiently 
defined the concept and associated teaching methods that it could be taught to a large 
number of Marines.  In addition to creating a program to teach maneuver warfare itself, 
the other changes Wyly introduced to the AWS curriculum also contributed to the 
process by changing how Marines thought in general.  Wyly was moving his students 
away from a reliance of solutions based solely on the texts of the manuals in their tactical 
thinking, that limited their ability to adapt on the battlefield.  He was also moving his 
students away from a focus on internal processes, the slavish following of checklists as 
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 the guide to actions, instead of using enemy behavior as the guide.  Marines were 
learning how to make decisions, to adapt to changing conditions, to focus their attentions 
outward towards the enemy and their actions.  This is an equally critical component of 
the intellectual transformation because in order to execute maneuver warfare Marines 
would need to think differently than they had in the past.    
   Wyly’s educational reforms were only one aspect of the larger move to a 
maneuver-based doctrine.  The Second Marine Division based at Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina also played a critical role by demonstrating that maneuver warfare was more 
than an idea debated in the pages of the Gazette and taught in the AWS classroom.  The 
actions of this division demonstrated that operational units within the Corps could in fact 
adopt, train with, and employ maneuver warfare on a large scale. 
There was a direct connection between the activities of the Second Marine 
Division, Wyly’s AWS classroom, the maneuver warfare seminar, and the Gazette 
debates.  According to William Woods, as graduation approached several students of 
Wyly’s 1980-1981 AWS class who were among the original participants of the maneuver 
warfare seminar, made an agreement with each other that they would spread the ideas of 
maneuver warfare in their future duty assignments in the Marine Corps.  Woods was 
assigned to Second Marine Division in the summer of 1981.  A close friend of Woods, 
Captain G.I. Wilson, who was also interested in maneuver warfare, was also assigned to 
the Second Marine Division.  Woods, Wilson and several fellow captains who had 
participated in the AWS maneuver warfare seminar with Woods agreed to establish a 
similar group at Camp Lejeune for the study and promotion of maneuver warfare.122   
Wilson and Woods both agreed that they would approach the division’s 
commanding general, Major General Alfred M. Gray, to tell them of their group’s 
activities and invite him to attend a meeting.  In the summer of 1981, after their first 
session, Woods and Wilson approached the General at the Camp Lejeune Officer’s Club 
and invited him to attend a dinner meeting of their maneuver warfare group.123 
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  Gray’s own career began in 1950 as an enlisted Marine in Korea, where he 
reached the rank of sergeant before obtaining a commission in 1952.  After his 
commissioning, he served as an artillery and infantry officer.  He saw service in Vietnam 
in 1965, 1967, and briefly in 1969.  In 1975, while commanding the 33d Marine 
Amphibious Unit, he oversaw the evacuation from South Vietnam as it fell to the North 
Vietnamese.  Gray commanded the Fourth Marine Amphibious Brigade from 1976 to 
1978.  From 1978 to 1981, he was the Deputy Director for Development and Director, 
Development Center for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, 
before assuming command of the Second Marine Division in 1981.124 
 When Wilson and Woods approached Gray to discuss maneuver warfare, he was 
already familiar with the term.  While commanding the Fourth Marine Amphibious 
Brigade, Gray had heard John Boyd deliver his “Patterns of Conflict” briefing.  
According to Wilson and Lind, Gray was also an avid reader of military history and was 
known for an open mind.  According to Lind, he was also rare among the senior 
leadership of the Marine Corps in that he was receptive to maneuver warfare.  Wilson 
suspects that this was because he naturally tended to think along maneuverist lines before 
a coherent doctrinal concept appeared.125    
At the dinner meeting, Wilson, Woods, and the other members of their group 
outlined their goals to the Gray.  The first goal was self-education of its members.  The 
second goal was to educate their fellow officers by inviting guest speakers to Camp 
Lejeune, as well as by having maneuver warfare classes, and discussion groups at the unit 
level.  They also wanted to produce a maneuver warfare handbook for the division to use 
during field exercises.  After hearing the group’s proposal, Gray announced to them their 
study group was now the division’s official Maneuver Warfare Board.  He also told them 
he would appoint a senior officer to head the board, since most of its initial members 
were relatively junior in grade.126 
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 In 1981, presumably following the board’s establishment, Gray sent the following 
letter to the Marines of his division: 
Realizing that many of our potential enemies could bring superior numbers of men and 
good equipment against us in a distant theater, it would be foolhardy to think about engaging them 
in firepower-attrition duals.  Historically, maneuver warfare has been the means by which smaller 
but more intelligently led forces have achieved victory.  It is, therefore, my intention to have us 
improve upon our understanding of the concepts behind maneuver warfare theory and to train our 
units in their application.127 
 
Under Gray’s sponsorship Second Marine Division Maneuver Warfare Board 
became another instrument though which the paradigm shift in the Marine Corps took 
place. The Maneuver Warfare Board served as a vehicle that demonstrated to the rest of 
the Marine Corps that operational units could adopt and employ maneuver warfare 
successfully.  In addition, the existence of the board allowed maneuver warfare to reach 
the entire division’s complement of officers and Marines. Gray’s actions in the summer 
of 1981 were of great significance because they made the Second Marine Division the 
largest unit to embrace maneuver warfare.  The adoption of maneuver warfare by the 
Second Marine Division coincided with other significant gains for maneuver warfare, the 
growing debate in the pages of the Gazette and Wyly’s development of a maneuver 
warfare curriculum at AWS.     
The establishment of the board received attention in the pages of the Marine 
Corps Gazette in its October 1981 issue.  According to the article, the Maneuver Warfare 
Board would serve as “a focal point for the tactical ideas now being emphasized 
throughout the division.”  The “approximate” membership of the board was fifteen 
officers spanning all ranks.  The bulk of the membership though would come from 
company and junior field-grade.  Heading the Board was Lieutenant Colonel Shawn W. 
Leach, the Commanding Officer, Second Reconnaissance Battalion.  Major General 
Gray, along with Major General K.A. Smith, Commanding General of the Second Marine 
                                                 
127 Major General Alfred M. Gray, untitled correspondence, date unknown, cited in Kevin R. 
Clover, Captain, USMC. "Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We Now?" Marine  Corps Gazette, (February 
1988): 54-59. 
 
 86
 Aircraft Wing, and Brigadier General, R.E. Moss served as a “steering committee that 
oversees the activity.”128   
According the Gazette, the board’s task was to “take the lead in collecting, 
receiving, and disseminating theoretical and practical information regarding maneuver 
warfare.  Its purpose is to improve upon the understanding of maneuver warfare concepts 
and encourage their refinement and test in field exercises.”  Specifically, the board’s 
duties were: 
Publish a reading list of books that provide the historical and theoretical basis for modern 
maneuver warfare thought. 
Distribute current articles dealing with maneuver warfare concepts and techniques. 
Publish terminology associated with maneuver warfare theory. 
Develop and present a series of lectures and seminars about maneuver warfare. 
Develop a maneuver warfare training guide. 
Publish a periodic newsletter to disseminate information on maneuver warfare theory and 
training.129 
 
 Over the course of the summer, Woods traveled to the staffs of the Second Marine 
Division’s sub-units to give presentations on maneuver warfare, and Gray promoted 
maneuver warfare at every possible opportunity.  The board also expanded to include 
officers from the Marine Corps combat arms other than the infantry to give them 
representation on the board.  The Maneuver Warfare Board also invited John Boyd and 
William Lind to Camp Lejeune to make presentations to the division’s officers.  
According to Woods, not all of their ideas were fully understood by their fellow officers, 
but maneuver warfare was gaining increased support throughout division.130 
Gray also directed the division staff to prepare for a Combined Arms Operations 
exercise later that year at Fort Pickett, Virginia that would be the centerpiece of Gray’s 
maneuver warfare training.  At Fort Pickett, the division would text the employment of 
maneuver warfare by a Marine Amphibious Brigade size force.  The CAO was also going 
to be a “free-play” type that maneuverists had advocated.  The first of the Fort Pickett 
Combined Arms Exercises that the division conducted under Gray’s command took place 
in the fall of 1981.  According to the Division Command Chronology for July to 
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 December 1981, this exercise was part of the Division’s “efforts to integrate and infuse 
maneuver style fighting into all major CPXs and FEXs” (Command Post Exercises and 
Field Exercises).  The chronology commented, “the common understanding of the basic 
principles" of maneuver warfare was "such that progress towards a higher and demanding 
plateau has commenced.”  According to the Gazette feature, the exercise began in early 
September with the forces “undergoing field training and refining a variety of maneuver 
warfare concepts.”  It culminated with a “three-day war” from October 13 through 15, 
1981 that involved the 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade conducting a command post 
exercise.  The 6th MAB exercise was superimposed over a ”free-wheeling regimental 
level exercise” by Regimental Landing Team 2 which  pitted  two infantry battalions and 
its supporting elements against a lone battalion and its support elements.  Among the 
specific maneuver warfare functions practiced were “bridging and river crossing 
operations and employment of a mobile combat service support detachment.”131     
There was also an exercise control group made up of umpires and observers, 
drawn from the membership of the Maneuver Warfare Board who reported their findings 
at the end of the exercise.  The exercise was heavily promoted as the first maneuver 
warfare exercise, attracting not only Marine observers but also representatives from 
government agencies and other branches of the armed forces.  The editor of the Gazette, 
John Greenwood, also traveled to Fort Pickett to observe the exercise.  According to 
Woods, the exercise was declared a success and served as a template for future training 
for the entire division.  He also commented that although the division would hold 
additional CAOs at Fort Pickett, none equaled the first “size, scope, or interest level.”132 
What the maneuvers at Fort Pickett demonstrated was that Marine formation 
could conduct operations employing maneuver warfare.  It showed that an operational 
unit within the Corps could employ the concepts of mission orders, surfaces and gaps, 
and focus of main effort.  Experiments with concepts that maneuverists had promoted in 
the pages of the Gazette, such as developing a mobile and flexible supply system capable 
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 of supporting rapidly moving combat units, were also attempted.  Since the CAO was 
also a free play exercise, it demonstrated that exercises did not have to be heavily scripted 
or scenario based, while still remaining an effective method for assessing combat 
effectiveness. 
While the exercise was pronounced a success, improvement was still needed.  
After the exercise, General Gray led an after-action critique of the entire operation.  
Leaders of all the units involved in the exercise from the battalion level down to the 
squad level participated in the critique, and there were instances where the observers and 
NCOs contradicted the perceptions of senior officers as to the events that had taken 
place.133 
  What Gray was trying to cultivate was a type of organization where subordinates 
could speak honestly to their superiors without fear of recrimination.  Commanders also 
had to learn that honest criticism was not a sign of disrespect.  The purpose of these 
critiques was not to embarrass specific individuals, nor to degenerate into finger pointing 
by participants, but to help teach and reinforce the concepts of maneuver warfare.  They 
were intended to improve the proficiency of units and to highlight the importance of 
having a common understanding at all levels of the chain of command.  Every leader had 
made mistakes made during these exercises, but what was important was that leaders of 
all ranks learned where they had occurred in order to improve their abilities.  For a force 
to fight in maneuver warfare style, the ability to speak honestly among all echelons at the 
chain of command was essential.  The ability to make frank criticism without 
repercussion and acknowledge that mistakes could be forgiven fostered common 
understanding and mutual implicit trust that were needed to conduct a style of war that 
stressed the initiative of subordinate commanders, mission tactics, and surfaces and 
gaps.134 
According to Woods, the Maneuver Warfare Board lasted until the summer of 
1982.  Maneuver warfare received less emphasis as the Division prepared for an 
impending deployment to Lebanon.  Most of the board received orders transferring its 
membership to other duty stations.  The board devoted its final months to producing a 
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 maneuver warfare handbook and it soon dissolved shortly after the handbook’s 
completion and adoption in the summer of 1982.135    
This handbook, or “Battle Book,” outlined specific tasks a force was required to 
execute, but along maneuver warfare lines.  This type of detailed work was essential for 
maneuver warfare to work in the division.  How did a maneuver warfare unit establish 
and maintain and establish communications with other units?  How did a maneuver 
warfare unit receive supplies?  What did operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
environment look like for a maneuver warfare unit?  By producing the Battle Book, the 
Second Marine Division Maneuver Warfare Board was able to answered questions 
dealing with maneuver warfare at the unit level of actual employment instead of the 
theoretical level that had been the focus of the debate at this point in other venues.136   
Although the life of the Second Marine Division Maneuver Warfare Board was 
brief, it played a critical role in transmitting the ideas of maneuver warfare to an entire 
division of Marines.  For as long as Gray was Commanding General of the Division, he 
continued to hold the Fort Pickett exercises on a semi-annual basis, and  to develop and 
refine the concepts of maneuver warfare.  
 The best summation of Gray’s ideas own on maneuver warfare in relation to his 
command of the Second Marine Division is in a published interview he conducted with 
John Scharfen for the Amphibious Warfare Review in 1984.  Gray acknowledged that as a 
division commander he was in a “position to exercise the theory in practice.”  Gray also 
pointed out that the “maneuver warfare initiatives have not been taken in isolation of the 
other components of the Second Marine Amphibious Force.”  It was a “coordinated 
effort” undertaken with the “concurrence” of the Second Marine Air Wing, the Second 
Force Service Support Group, and the Headquarters of the Second Marine Amphibious 
Force.137    
 Through his position as a division commander, Gray had some freedom to 
experiment with maneuver warfare.  It was his prerogative a commanding general to train 
his Marines as he saw fit.  Gray’s comments suggest that the action was undertaken at his 
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 own initiative, but in consultation with his fellow generals in the Second Marine 
Amphibious Force and his own higher headquarters.  What he omitted though was any 
indication of the degree to which there was approval from his peers, his superiors, or 
from Headquarters Marine Corps.   
Gray then pointed out that maneuver warfare was a “style that many Marines have 
employed over the years and that it was at the conceptual core of some of our most 
successful amphibious operations.”  He then discussed the definition of maneuver 
warfare, agreeing with Lind that he considered “maneuver warfare is as much a state of 
mind as it is theory.”138   Gray himself was unsure about the term maneuver warfare 
itself.   He was “not certain that it was the proper title” for the style of fighting it 
represented.  The term carried “a lot of questionable baggage” such as that it meant 
mechanization or was applicable only to ground operations.  Maneuver warfare
argued, “has applications across the spectrum of war from air to surface, from tactics to 
strategy, from operations to logistics.”  The problem with the “title” maneuver warfare 
was that it “has generated some semantic confusion and excessive debate over term
Gray also commented on the public debate over maneuver warfare.  It was gaining 
acceptance as a valid concept for the “training and organization of MAGTFs”
the requirements to fight a war against opponents with “superior raw combat power.”  It 
was not just the “fixation of the military intellectual.”
, he 
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Gray then directly addressed his own training initiatives and their relationship to 
the Marine Corps at large.  The Second Marine Division was the first Marine unit of 
significant size to adopt maneuver warfare.  However, before his division and its 
subordinate commands could employ maneuver warfare on an exercise, it would first 
need to ensure a common and uniform understanding of it to avoid confusion.  According 
to Gray his division devoted a great deal of time to “indoctrinating our officers and men 
in the dynamics of the battlefield to insure that we all have the same mindset—that they 
know what to expect of me and my staff and what I expect among them.”  The training 
taught his Marines the “attitude that the only thing certain on the battlefield will be the 
uncertain, the unexpected…. to expect to find no recipes or formulas which will 
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 guarantee success in battle.”  Gray then identified some of the specialized skills he tried 
to develop: logistics; Nuclear Biological Chemical training; air defense employment and 
suppression; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command, control and 
communications; electronic warfare; and counter-terrorism.140 
 Gray made it a point to tell Marines that adopting maneuver warfare in no way 
negated or invalidated any of their other training, or any of the Corps’ regular practices.  
Maneuver warfare was not: 
alien to the fundamental training, operations or administrative routines of the Marine Corps … 
The training and experience our Marines get in our depots, centers and schools equip them to 
participate in and contribute to the maneuver warfare objectives of this Division.”    
 
The training Marines had received was the starting point from which Gray hoped to build 
to “raise them to the next plateau of integrated tactical concepts in the operational 
environment.”141 
Many of Gray’s positions were first articulated in the pages of the Gazette by 
other maneuverists such as Lind, Wyly, Woods, and Wilson.  The difference though was 
that Gray was speaking with the authority of a commanding general of a division and a 
man with a distinguished professional record dating back to the Korean War.  During his 
command of the Second Marine Division, Gray consistently promoted maneuver warfare.  
His advocacy might be one of the reasons why outright criticism of maneuver warfare 
began to die down.  Also important was the language Gray used.  He was able to mitigate 
the concerns of some Marines who thought that maneuver warfare meant a drastic change 
for the Corps by arguing that a move to maneuver warfare did not mean a complete 
restructuring of the system, and that it could be built on top of the system that already 
existed.   
Gray use tangible operational success as evidence to validate his belief in 
maneuver warfare.  He pointed to the performance of Battalion Landing Team 2/8 made 
up of Second Marine Division Marines in Grenada, October 1983.  According to Gray, 
Grenada was a “real ‘come as you are operation’ that demanded the type of independent 
judgment and initiative without detailed prior planning that  is characteristic of what was 
expected in a maneuver war.”  According Gray:   
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 Maneuver warfare tactics demoralized the Cubans and the People’s Revolutionary Army.  One 
Cuban officer the BLT captured said that he surrendered to the Marines because they kept popping 
up in the most unexpected places and he figured further resistance was futile.  His comments 
speak volumes about the psychological impact of well-executed maneuver warfare operations.”142 
 
According to Wyly, Gray’s efforts at Camp Lejeune were mutually reinforcing 
with Wyly’s own warfare initiatives in Quantico. He recalled that Gray traveled to AWS 
to address the students, and one of the items the general discussed was maneuver 
warfare’s place in the Second Marine Division.  Gray communicated to the students that 
maneuver warfare was more than theoretical.  In his command they would be required 
know it and be able to execute it.  Wyly’s maneuver warfare curriculum assisted Gray by 
providing the Second Marine Division with recent AWS graduates who had already 
received instruction in maneuver warfare.143   
What happened in the Second Marine Division was critical for maneuver 
warfare’s eventual adoption.  In the first place, it demonstrated that maneuver warfare 
was more than a theory.  Gray would travel to Quantico to speak to Wyly’s tactics class 
students.  His presence signaled to students that Wyly’s maneuver warfare instruction 
was more than academic.  An AWS student who received assignment to the Second 
Marine Division would actually be required to employ maneuver warfare doctrine in the 
Fleet Marine Forces.  
The work done by Wyly at AWS and the Second Marine Division Maneuver 
Warfare Board and Gray at Camp Lejeune were both crucial to the intellectual 
transformation of the Marine Corps.  This work in was done in parallel to their publishing 
efforts in the Marine Corps Gazette  While the Gazette  made the ideas of maneuverists 
accessible to the Corps, this dealt with maneuver warfare as a theoretical abstraction.  
There is more involved with the adoption of a new idea than the acceptance of an 
intellectual premise.  Adoption of a new doctrine also involves practical details of 
educating personnel and conducting training to enable Marine to execute the doctrine 
under the condition of combat.  Gray, Wyly, Woods, and Wilson took maneuver warfare 
from a concept and made it reality.    
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 This functional and practical work was a crucial aspect of the overall paradigm 
shift taking in the Corps. In order for the collective thinking of the Corps to change, 
Marines would need some mechanism to learn the new model.  Classroom lectures, war 
games, reading lists, field exercises, and discussions were just as important as the Gazette 
articles in transforming the Marine Corps into a maneuver warfare organization.  
Training and education initiatives reinforced the arguments of the maneuverists in the 
pages of the Gazette.  This was facilitated by the fact that those who were actively 
involved in making maneuver warfare an operational reality in the Marine Corps were the 
very same individuals who were writing articles to promote and defend maneuver warfare 
in the pages of the Gazette.    
The paradigm shift was not complete however. On the theoretical level, the 
paradigm shift was incomplete, since maneuver warfare coexisted with attrition but had 
not replaced it.  On the practical level, the efforts to advance maneuver warfare in 
Quantico and Camp Lejeune were predominantly localized efforts. Unlike the scientific 
community, where ideas rise and fall through community acceptance and rejection, the 
Marine Corps was a hierarchal organization.   As this point, there was no systematic 
mechanism for the wholesale institutionalization of maneuver warfare.  Such an initiative 
could only be undertaken through the active direction of the highest echelons of the 
Marine Corps, specifically the office of Commandant of the Marine Corps.  This office 
was the sole agency capable of ensuring that maneuver warfare was thoroughly adopted 
by the organization because only the Commandant had the authority to direct all the 
commands to adopt maneuver warfare. 
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 CHAPTER 5 - Adoption   
On their own the public debate in the Gazette and the education and training 
initiatives of Wyly and Gray could not effect the adoption and institutionalization of 
maneuver warfare and complete the paradigm shift.  By mid-decade, it appears that the 
general momentum of the maneuver warfare movement in the Marine Corps had stalled 
when compared to the initial gains made in the early-1980s.  The goal of the 
maneuverists to transform the Marine Corps into a maneuver warfare organization 
ultimately required action from the top.  What maneuver warfare needed was a senior 
officer in the Corps who had the authority and the will to bring about the necessary 
changes. 
What enabled maneuver warfare to supplant attrition as the dominant paradigm 
was the use of institutional authority and the power associated with it. The ascent of 
Alfred M. Gray to the post of Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1987 was the 
fortuitous development that completed the process begun earlier in the decade.  In 
addition to the intellectual crisis of the old paradigm, there was a cultural crisis within the 
Corps as well.  Due to a combination of factors such as leadership and public scandals, 
Marines began to think the organization lacked focus and direction.  Gray saw in 
maneuver warfare a concept that could successfully address these concerns. Using the 
authority of his office, Gray made the case that the Corps as an organization needed a 
philosophy of war to unify the organization and provide it guidance.  The official 
acceptance by the Marine Corps completed the change in Marine thinking that had begun 
in the late-1970s.    
In July 1985, William Lind co-published an article with Jeffrey Record in the 
Washington Post that commented on the stalled momentum of reform in the Corps.  The 
article provided a brief summary of maneuver warfare’s progress to date, mentioning the 
seminar groups, the Gazette debates, the AWS curriculum changes, and the Second 
Marine Division's training experiments.  Lind and Record pointed to the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, General Paul X. Kelley, as the source of the stagnation.  According to 
the authors Kelley’s predecessor, General Robert H. Barrow who held the position from 
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 1979-1983, the years when maneuver warfare had made significant gains, had permitted 
the experimentation from below.  When Kelley assumed the post, there was some hope 
from maneuverists that he would “provide the leadership from above the movement 
would need to succeed fully.”  According to the authors, “Kelley had given many people 
inside and outside the Corps the impression that he was sympathetic to the need for 
change.  Many believed he would build on the ground work laid by his juniors.” 144    
According to Lind and Record, those hopes were not realized: “expectations have 
proved sadly misplaced.  Instead of being a time of reform and renewal, the last two years 
have seen a virtual counter-reformation.”  According to Lind and Record, Marine Schools 
were no longer teaching maneuver warfare.  The Corps “downplays it in the schools.”  
Kelley “in speeches to Marines has repeatedly denounced ‘little groups that meet in 
people’s basements in Washington,’ i.e. the groups of Marine officers that have sought to 
explore and spread the maneuver concept.”  The general in command at Quantico had 
also banned civilians from the base, including Lind, preventing them from speaking on 
maneuver warfare as they had in earlier years.  The authors also criticized the Marine 
Corps Schools for their “failure to move forward in reforming Marine education” and 
failing to initiate the administrative changes along the lines Lind had been advocating.145 
According to Lind and Record’s unnamed sources within the Corps, the  
underlying reason for what they dubbed Kelley’s “counter-reformation” was an 
atmosphere of  “’followership’” he was creating that  “’seems to come across as an ill-
camouflaged thrust for greater personal loyalty, conformity and blind obedience.’”146    
Lind’s observations of Marine Schools are inconsistent with Ryan’s from 1983-
1984 and Wyly’s from 1985.  One possibility may be that the curriculum had not changed 
enough to suit the extreme calls for change that Lind advanced in his article 1984 
“Preparing for Maneuver Warfare.”   Another possible reason is that maneuver warfare 
was indeed on the “backburner” because the schools had adopted the trappings of 
maneuver warfare, but substantively remained focused on attrition.  A final possibility 
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 came from the results of a 1983 official Marine Corps report sent to the House Armed 
Services Committee which stated that the “Marine Corps does not subscribe to any 
exclusive formula or recipe for warfare,” but “the concepts of maneuver warfare are 
evident throughout the Marine Corps.”  The Corps was working to “integrate further the 
concepts of maneuver warfare and amphibious warfare.”  Marine Captain Kevin Clover’s 
interpretation was that the “Marine Corps considers maneuver warfare to be one of many 
theories included in the repertoire of Marine commanders on both the tactical and 
strategic levels.”147   
 Clover published a February 1988 Gazette article, “Maneuver Warfare: Where 
Are We Now?” which summarized the results of 1986 survey conducted in the Second 
Marine Division.  The survey asked 375 Marines “to determine the level of dissemination 
of maneuver warfare concepts among these Marines and to appraise their attitudes about 
those concepts.”  The study selected the Second because “of its reputation as a leader in 
the area of maneuver warfare.”  Survey participants ranged in rank from sergeant through 
sergeant major and second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel.  Those selected came from 
combat arms military occupational specialties -- “infantrymen, artillerymen, tankers, 
assault amphibian vehicle (AAV) and light armored vehicle (LAV) crewmen, and 
reconnaissance Marines.”148 
 Clover drew several conclusions from the survey results.  First, that the Marine 
Corps needed “a considerable amount of educating to do throughout the ranks” regarding 
maneuver warfare.  There was not a uniform understanding of maneuver warfare and its 
terminology.  Second, in the Marine Corps there was confusion whether or not maneuver 
warfare was official doctrine.  Clover’s recommendation was to “reassert” that the 
Marine Corps “supports the use of maneuver warfare tactics.”  Maneuver warfare was 
only “one style of warfare the Marine Corps intends to keep in its repertoire.”  Another of 
Clover’s conclusions was that  “maneuver warfare advocates should be encouraged by 
what  “appears to be a doctrinal base within the 2d Marine Division that favors a 
maneuver warfare style of fighting” and that although many Marines were unfamiliar 
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 with the “terminology,” “a large percentage of Marines throughout the division are 
following the basic tenets of maneuver warfare theory.”  Clover then proposed a number 
of measures to ensure greater uniformity within the Corps regarding maneuver warfare: 
standardized training, greater emphasis on educating lower echelons commanders at the 
platoon level and below, increase education of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps 
schools, addition of the definitions of maneuver warfare terminology to publications149 
 What was necessary to complete the intellectual transformation of the Marine 
Corps was the elevation of a maneuverist to the position of Commandant of the Marine 
Corps.  Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that in 1985 the paradigm shift was not 
complete. Indeed, Lind and Record’s article suggests that outside of the most committed 
maneuverists, the perception in the Corps was that maneuver and attrition could coexist 
with each other.  The organizational changes advocated by Lind could have been seen as 
not necessary given the existing intellectual environment. The appointment of General 
Gray to the position of Commandant and his use of the institutional authority of the office 
was what finally completed the transformation. 
 In part, Gray’s selection to serve as the twenty-ninth Commandant of the Marine 
Corps was a reaction to Kelley’s tenure.  Although Kelley was directly responsible for 
none of them, three crises in particular produced a climate of low confidence in the 
highest echelons of Marine Corps leadership: the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks 
in Beirut, Oliver North’s invoking the Fifth Amendment during the Iran-Contra Hearings 
in his service uniform, and a scandal involving Marine Security Guards trading 
information for sex.  According to a Time Magazine article: 
Critics of the Corps say it suffers from a lack of leadership at the top.  The Marine commandant 
sets the tone, and Kelley, who was once perceived as a possible innovator, has been aloof and 
reclusive, almost solely interested in pursuing bigger budgets.  Military critic Edward Luttwak 
says the Corps is “wallowing in complacency.”  Some officers serving under Kelley at the 
Pentagon claim that the prevalent attitude is bureaucratic defensiveness.  “Semper Fi,” grouses an 
officer at Marine headquarters, “means don’t say anything critical because it’s going to reflect on 
Kelley.”  Self-criticism is precisely what the Corps needs, say some experts.  What they have 
instead, says one of Kelley’s subordinates, is a “lot of bumper-sticker bravado.150 
 
Secretary of the Navy James Webb understood that the “Marine Corps was really 
reeling” and in need of new leadership, someone who could restore its morale and regain 
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 its confidence. Webb also thought that part of the problem was Kelley’s leadership style.  
According to Webb, “After Beirut, P.X. Kelley basically killed off many of the real 
combat leaders of the Marine Corps,” because they had criticized his handling of the 
situation.  The men Kelley put in place around him “hadn’t made their reputations as 
combat leaders.” Webb also stated that that in the two years before he became Secretary 
of the Navy, nine Navy Cross and two Medal of Honor recipients were turned down for 
promotion to brigadier general, a reflection on the style of leadership Kelley valued.  
Kelley responded “I don’t know who he’s talking about.  I think that’s an outrageous 
statement.’” 151     
Webb described his search to find a successor for the retiring Kelley as “a real 
brawl” and a “battle for the ‘soul of the Marine Corps.’”  The two front-runners for the 
job were Lieutenant General Thomas R. Morgan, the Assistant Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, and Lieutenant General Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr.   Morgan was seen as the 
candidate Kelley preferred to succeed him, while Webb saw in Cheatham the “warrior 
image” he was looking for to take charge of the Corps.152     
The selection of Gray was seen as a compromise.  Webb had first become aware 
of Gray through Wyly, who was Webb’s company commander in Vietnam.  In 1984, 
when Gray was Commanding General, Marine Forces Atlantic and Webb was Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Veterans Affairs, Wyly for the two to meet in Norfolk. 
Coordinating with G.I. Wilson, who was serving at the time on Gray’s staff, Wyly 
arranged Webb’s transportation for the meeting.  According to Thomas Ricks, Webb met 
with Gray regularly during the winter of 1986-1987.  Webb saw in Gray someone who 
understood the nature of the problems the Marine Corps was facing and reached the 
conclusion that he was the candidate that could solve the Corps’ problems.153    
The adoption of maneuver warfare was only one of the many initiatives 
undertaken by Gray to revitalize the Marine Corps.  According to Wyly, Wilson, and 
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 Schmitt, the general perception in the Marine Corps was that the selection of Gray as 
Commandant was a victory for maneuver warfare.  During his Senate Armed Services 
Committee confirmation hearing, Gray listed as one of his “priority goals” to “improve 
our understanding of the art, as well as the science of war.  Maneuver and the thought 
process that go with the practice and execution of ‘winning through combinations of 
maneuver and firepower’ must be improved.”154 
Gray received his fourth star and assumed his post on July 1, 1987.  He 
immediately began to visit Marine commands to tell Marines his vision for the Corps’ 
future.  One need he identified was for “common operating procedures, common 
doctrine, common instructions covering warfighting … This is a must, and we are going 
to make it happen.”  Another need he identified was to “get far better than we are today at 
matters involving maneuvering warfare and firepower.  I happen to believe that you win 
by putting together combination of firepower and maneuver and want to be sure that 
everybody understands that.”155 
 With a Commandant openly embracing maneuver warfare and committed to 
providing the Corps a common operational focus, the concept gained new momentum.  
There was an intellectual “renaissance” atmosphere in Quantico that extended into the 
pages of the Gazette.  Lind published an article in January 1988 that advanced no new 
ideas, but did revisit many of the ideas discussed during the debate of the earlier part of 
the decade.156    
In April 1988, a Gazette article by R. Scott Moore echoed the Commandant’s 
statements for a “common doctrine” and “common instructions covering warfighting.” 
Moore identified that the Corps “lacks a concise battlefield philosophy.”  The Marine 
Corps had  a generally accepted ‘approach to combat’ … this amounts to little more than 
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 an inbred combat aggressiveness that has overcome disaster  … Perhaps in the 
assumption that this aggressiveness is sufficient to meet future challenges, Marines have 
singularly failed to codify a set of concepts upon which to build doctrine.”  Moore argued 
that the modern battlefield would be fast-paced and chaotic, Marines might not have the 
overwhelming superiority in firepower they typically held, and adversaries would have 
modern weaponry at their disposal as well.  Modern weapons “dictate a type of combat in 
which victory will be decided by the actions of small units acting independently.”  
Marine units could not rely on “extensive control systems.”  According the Moore, the 
“glue” “will be a common thought process, grounded in basic doctrinal principle that will 
enable them to conduct operations in a cohesive manner while remaining highly flexible 
in rapidly changing conditions.”  Moore identified five principles that considered 
essential to a “common sense battlefield philosophy”: 
Know the Commander’s Intent 
Focus on the Enemy 
Create a Dilemma 
 Maximize Combat Arms 
 Be Unpredictable. 157 
 
While Moore makes no mention of maneuver warfare, his calls for a philosophy 
echoed many of the earlier arguments of maneuverists that maneuver warfare offered a 
mindset that would allow Marines function effectively on the battlefield. Many of the  
principles had been preached by the maneuverists in the early part of the decade.  Either 
Moore was a maneuverist, or by this time maneuver warfare had reached a sufficiently 
wide audience that its terms and ideas now part of the common language of Marine 
officers. 
The month before Moore’s article, the Marine Corps had published Operational 
Handbook (OH) 6-1, Ground Operations.  Section 1303 listed principles of maneuver 
warfare: 
Focus on the enemy; not on terrain objectives 
Act more quickly that the enemy can react. 
Support maneuver by fire. 
Issue mission-type orders 
Avoid enemy strength and attack enemy weaknesses 
Exploit tactical opportunities developed or located by subordinate units. 
Always designate a main effort. 
Avoid set rules and patterns. 
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 Act boldly and decisively. 
Command from the front. 158 
 
An editorial comment in the Gazette that printed the excerpts of OH 6-1 relevant 
to maneuver warfare   noted that it “represents a major shift in emphasis and approach to 
warfare.”  OH 6-1 moved the Marine Corps closer to making maneuver warfare its 
warfighting philosophy.  As the title states, the purpose of OH 6-1 was to govern ground 
combat operations.  Earlier doctrinal publications in the 1980s did not adopt maneuver 
warfare to this extent scale. 159    
This publication with its explicit statement of maneuverist ideas would probably 
not have been possible under Kelley.  With Gray as Commandant who personally 
endorsed the new concept in speeches and interviews, the evidence suggests that 
maneuver warfare was gaining renewed momentum in the Corps.   So long as Gray was 
the Commandant, maneuver warfare would have at least a temporary ascendancy over 
attrition.  What was missing though was an official and outright adoption of maneuver 
and rejection of attrition. 
Wyly wrote a review of OH 6-1 where he identified what he considered the flaws 
in the document and made an explicit call for a formal maneuver warfare doctrinal 
manual.  He commented favorably on the brief section on maneuver warfare which 
“flows beautifully ... a description of the art of war that should be read and reread by 
everyone.”  Wyly echoed Moore in calling for a “book on the art of war for Marines.”  
He cited the Army’s FM 100-5, Operations as “the best example of the decade.”  What 
he called for was a Marine Corps equivalent which  
would be unique, designed to fight the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).  We need a book 
that recognizes that the MAGTF is not three forces—ground, air, and combat service support—but 
one force with many facets, all directed toward the same end, undoing the enemy.  OH 6-1, our 
rough draft, gives an uneven view of the ground side with a bit of combat service support thrown 
in.  Much work remains. 160 
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 The Commandant had also voiced his opinion that the Marine Corps needed a 
common single guidance for warfighting.  Gray wanted the Corps to have a capstone 
document similar to the Army’s FM 100-5 to provide this common organizational 
guidance.  The original capstone manual the Doctrine Division was preparing was 
supposed to be Fleet Marine Force Manual 2 a work dealing with the Marine Air Ground 
Task Force.  However, the document failed to meet Gray’s intent, because he did not 
want the capstone document to focus on the MAGTF.  What the Commandant wanted 
instead was a philosophical document that guided the actions of the entire Marine Corps.  
Gray’s criteria for the manual specified that  
It had to be short to the point, and highly readable—in a different style from the usual manual.  He 
wanted a “keystone” document, a general statement of commander’s guidance that would  
reflect combat and leadership philosophy and serve as a foundation for other,  more detailed  
doctrinal publications—and ultimately  as a guidebook for all Marine Corps endeavors.  
   
Gray also wanted his keystone manual to receive the designation Fleet Marine Force 
Manual 1 to indicate its position at the apex of Marine doctrine. 161 
 The captain from the Doctrine Division selected for the task, John F. Schmitt, 
was in many respects an excellent candidate to draft the Gray’s manual.  He had served 
under Gray’s command in the Second Marine Division as a platoon commander and a 
participant of the Fort Pickett Exercises.  Schmitt was an avid student of military history 
and theory, as well as possessing a background in journalism.  He was also a maneuverist 
and did his best to read the available materials on maneuver warfare.  Schmitt also had 
written OH 6-1, and the generally favorable reviews it had been receiving probably led to 
his assignment to the project.  The readability and simplicity of the final text came from 
Schmitt’s position as an “everyman.”  He was a Marine writing for other Marines, trying 
to convey to them a philosophy of war.162 
 Schmitt wrote a manual fundamentally different from OH 6-1 because from the 
beginning it was conceived as maneuver warfare manual.  Schmitt had been writing OH 
6-1 before word circulated that Gray would be the next Commandant.  The passages on 
maneuver warfare in OH 6-1 were not part of the originally intended final draft.  Schmitt 
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 had tried to insert passages on maneuver warfare before, but his supervisor had told 
Schmitt to remove them.  When it became clear that Gray would become the next 
Commandant, his supervisor told Schmitt to include maneuver warfare material in the 
text just as the publication was going to press.  As a result, the maneuver warfare 
passages appear out of place within the text of OH 6-1 as a whole.163    
 By the time he received the FMFM-1 assignment, Schmitt had a new supervisor, 
Colonel Mastrion, who took Schmitt to Major General Michael Sullivan, Commanding 
General of the Warfighting Center.  Sullivan told Schmitt that he was working directly 
for General Gray.    Schmitt talked to Gray on only a handful of occasions about   the 
project.  In each of those meetings, the Commandant did not give Schmitt any specific 
instructions about what to write, the phrasing, the terminology, or how to write.  Schmitt 
suspects that Gray was being consistent with maneuver warfare principles.  This was his 
way of making it known that he was giving Schmitt a great deal of latitude to write the 
manuals.  
 For several months, Schmitt immersed himself in the works of military theorists 
such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.  In addition to the works of these earlier military 
thinkers, Schmitt also cited John Boyd’s work as a significant influence.  During the 
writing process, Schmitt primarily consulted three individuals for advice and suggestion: 
Colonel Paul Van Riper, the director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 
Michael Wyly, and William Lind.  Even though he consulted others for advice, Schmitt 
wrote the text in its entirety.164 
By March 1989, Schmitt had completed a draft for Gray’s approval.  He drove to 
the Commandant’s home at the Marine Barracks located at Eighth and I streets 
Washington, D.C.  Gray looked at the page proofs, made no changes and signed the 
document, and approved it for distribution to the rest of the Marine Corps 
Gray’s endorsement of maneuver warfare carried considerable weight within the 
Corps.  OH 6-1 was rewritten because of his known preference for maneuver warfare. On 
the other hand, his actions could not have been possible without the prevailing conditions 
within the Corps.  Flagging organizational morale under his predecessor, combined with 
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 Gray’s own personal reputation within the Corps, gave him a mandate to make changes, 
which he used to maximum effect.  He observed that what the Corps lacked was a 
common organizational focus and direction.  The coexistence of attrition alongside with 
maneuver was just a symptom of this lack of overall focus.  It is clear that developments 
in the Army influenced the publication of Warfighting.  Since 1982, FM 100-5, 
Operations had provided the Army a common organizational focus and direction.  Gray 
saw the organizational benefits of such a document and believed that the Corps a similar.   
While Gray used an officer from the Doctrine Center to draft the new manual, 
curiously he did not use the full apparatus of the Center to develop it. The Marine Corps 
organized the Center precisely to serve as the lead organization for the development of 
doctrinal concepts.  Given the significance of the type of manual the Commandant 
wanted, one with an organizational impact on the scale of FM 100-5, the Center and the 
full resources available to it would have appeared the most likely agency to undertake the 
project.  According to the Schmitt, Warfighting was not “staffed,” that is the text was not 
vetted by the hierarchy of the Doctrine Center, which Schmitt was allowed to bypass so 
that he contacted the Commandant directly.   
    Using the apparatus of the Doctrine Center risked the possibility of miring the 
new doctrinal publication in conflicts by reviewers and contributors over wording and 
content.  Schmitt recalled that such wrangling factored heavily into the originally 
intended capstone document FMFM-2. Also, during the draft stages of OH 6-1 his 
supervisors had originally excluded any material related to maneuver warfare, and only 
included it at a relatively late stage when the news began to circulate that a maneuverist 
was going to become Commandant. 
  Given the intentions for the document to serve as the capstone doctrinal manual 
for the entire Marine Corps, it is likely that using the bureaucratic process of the Doctrine 
Center would have produced considerable discussion and debate over phrasing of 
sentences, content, and terminology as drafts circulated for review and comment.  The 
Gazette presented two critiques of Warfighting which provide some indication of the 
criticism and scrutiny which Schmitt’s text would have been subjected too had it been 
subjected to the normal doctrinal creation process.  One critic, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey 
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 C. Lloyd, USMC, praised the text for its “succinct, readable style, which is all too rare in 
official prose.”  What Lloyd found “most disagreeable” with Warfighting was:   
its penchant for depicting maneuver warfare as one of but two options in a maneuver warrior 
(good guy) versus attrition (bad guy) debate.  To the extent that it supports this fiction of two 
camps, it ill serves its readers. 
 
Another critic, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Robeson IV, provided a detailed analysis 
where he outlined what he determined to be flaws of specific lines and passages in the 
text.  Robeson saw the criticism of attrition as an “attack” on Marine Corps history as 
well as an over simplification: “The past giants of the Corps might not agree that all 
warfare can simply be dumped into one of two piles, i.e., that is either “attrition style” or 
“maneuver style,”  and that they belong in the first pile.”165 
The statements of Lloyd and Robeson demonstrate that Marines by 1989, even as 
it was adopting a maneuver doctrine, had not come to full agreement that a distinct 
dichotomy existed between a maneuver approach and attrition approach to warfare. There 
were still elements in the Corps that still perceived maneuver warfare as a way of acting, 
but not as the way of thinking that informed these actions.  The compromise situation that 
viewed maneuver and attrition in terms of actions and not the underlying ways of 
thinking behind them required a person with sufficient organizational authority to 
implement maneuver warfare as the organizational philosophy that would guide Marine 
thinking. 
As the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gray sat at the apex of the Corps 
organizational hierarchy.  He was determined to give the Corps a common organizational 
focus.  His endorsement of Schmitt’s text demonstrated that he saw the maneuver warfare 
way of thinking as the best option for an organizational philosophy of the Corps.   The 
fact that no one besides Gray had the opportunity to review the document before it 
became official, probably caused a considerable shock and reaction among Marine 
officers.  In some respects, maneuver warfare became official doctrine through Gray’s 
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 personal fiat.  According to Lloyd, Gray delivered the document with the “force of a 
papal bull” that sent “heretics diving for cover.”166    
  It was Gray’s authority as Commandant that enabled maneuver warfare to become 
the basis of organizational orthodoxy  in the Marine Corps, completing the process that 
first began in 1979 and gained momentum in the early years of the 1980s.  The 
maneuverists had made the case for maneuver warfare and had developed the methods 
for its education and training.  Now that the doctrine was official and paramount in the 
Marine Corps, the challenge was to begin the process of institutionalization throughout 
the Marine Corps, taking the ideas and methods of the maneuverists and instilling them 
throughout the organization.   
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions  
This study examined how the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare by 
examining the actions of the maneuverists.  This study has argued that the maneuverists 
achieved a fundamental paradigm change in Marine Corps thought through a campaign of 
innovative development and promotion of a new concept that involved three critical 
mechanisms. The theoretical component consisted of the debate in the pages of the 
Marine Corps Gazette. The practical aspect involved a new educational curriculum and 
training methods.  While the institutional component that used the formal authority of the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Examining this process has produced several 
conclusions regarding intellectual reform and military organizations. 
Much of maneuver warfare’s success owes to the circumstances under which it 
appeared and developed.  For the lack of a more elegant phrase, it was the right idea at 
the right time for the Marine Corps. While it did take a decade, the Corps adopted 
maneuver warfare as the solution to perceived problems within the organization.  The 
Marine Corps of the late-1970s was eager for a new doctrine that would enable it to 
remain amphibious, yet capable of participating in a continental campaign against 
mechanized forces.  Other Marines were motivated by a desire to devise a better way of 
fighting because of their personal experiences on the battlefield.  The Marine Corps of 
the late-1980s needed a common organizational focus.  There were greater organizational 
forces at work that moved the Corps towards maneuver warfare and this suggests that the 
reception of new ideas is connected to the context prevailing when they appear. These 
organizational trends were manifestations of a general intellectual crisis in the Marine. 
The older paradigm had proven inadequate to resolving the doubts developing among 
Marines.  Maneuver warfare provided an alternative intellectual model that satisfied the 
needs of Marines. In satisfying those intellectual needs, maneuver warfare was also able 
to capitalize on broader, internal organizational trends. 
This does not mean that the individual personalities and actions do not matter. 
The maneuver warfare study group that formed out of AWS was a direct consequence of 
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 Wyly’s attempts to revitalize the curriculum.  The Maneuver Warfare Board might not 
have received official status had someone other than Gray been the division commander. 
Under a different editor with a different editorial philosophy, maneuver warfare articles 
may have not seen the light of day.  While the conditions were favorable for new ideas to 
develop and spread in the Marine Corps, the adoption of maneuver warfare still required 
the actions of individuals at critical junctures. Maneuverists happened to be in positions, 
or gained the support of Marines who were, that were conducive to reform.  Good timing 
alone is insufficient, the proper personal need to be present and capable of interacting 
with each other.  
The ability of the maneuverists to work together in pursuit of their common goal 
was also crucial to the movement’s success.  Maneuver warfare was defined in the 
Marine Corps by a small group of individuals who met and discussed their ideas with 
each other. They used each other as sounding boards for ideas, and they were aware of 
the work being done by their fellow maneuverists.  Their published work and their 
training and educational initiatives were remarkably consistent and reinforced each other. 
The fact that maneuver warfare was spread through multiple venues in the early 
1980s was also crucial.  Maneuver warfare was a regular topic of discussion in a monthly 
professional journal, the basis for a program of instruction at a professional school, and 
the official doctrine for an entire division of Marines.  No one venue was the center of 
maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps, yet all three worked in close conjunction with 
each other.  Under these circumstances maneuver warfare was able to grow as a 
movement beyond the half-dozen to dozen individuals who were its earliest adopters.  
Wyly had students, the maneuverists had the Gazette readership, Gray, Wilson, and Wyly 
had an entire division of Marines.  It is impossible to determine what percentage of these 
audiences adopted maneuver warfare.  However, it is unlikely that maneuverists made 
contact with such a large body of people without gaining additional supporters and from 
this we can infer that at least some of the readers adopted maneuver warfare.  
 Maneuver warfare began as a grass-roots movement with only a small, but 
dedicated, number of supporters.  The maneuver warfare example demonstrates that not 
all paths to reform are necessarily initiated from the “top-down.”   Support from more 
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 powerful quarters eventually emerged over time, but nonetheless this study suggests that 
bottom-up movements can succeed.   
In this particular instance, what was crucial to the success of this initially small 
movement was having forums for their ideas, such as the Gazette, Amphibious Warfare 
School, and the Second Marine Division. One cannot ignore however, the ability of 
individual to permit or deny that access.  The willingness of individuals such as John 
Greenwood allowing maneuverists to reach a wide audience by allowing them to publish 
in the Gazette or General Trainor permitting Wyly to innovate his own curriculum cannot 
be underestimated. 
 Also crucial to the success of maneuver warfare as a grass-roots movement was 
an organizational vacuum for innovative thinking.  New doctrine in a military need not 
come from the highest levels or as a product of a formalized, bureaucratic process.  
Unlike the United State Army and AirLand Battle, maneuver warfare was developed 
entirely outside the bureaucracy of the Marine Corps. Maneuver warfare did not arise 
from the Marine Corps’s organizational apparatus, but instead initially emerged from the 
labors of individual Marines who were its earliest adopters.  The administration of 
Marine Corps did not initiate the development of maneuver warfare or exert absolute 
control over intellectual work that maneuverists were doing.  Even when their work with 
maneuver warfare placed them in professional disfavor, maneuverists such as Wyly 
continued to promote the concept when possible. The final act of writing Warfighting 
itself also occurred through a non-bureaucratic process. With the coming of official 
adoption, the administration of the Marine Corps took ownership of the concept. Even so, 
much of the work of developing maneuver warfare as a concept occurred outside of 
official organizational sponsorship    
That is not to say that rank and position did not matter to maneuver warfare’s 
success, had Gray not become Commandant the course of events would have been 
remarkably different.  What did happen though is that the new ideas were developed and 
debated for the most part in a forum where rank was secondary and ideas were developed 
free from the pressure of being vetted by immediate superiors.  There was no chain of 
command to exert a positive or negative influence on the development of ideas.  In a 
sense, once the first articles on maneuver warfare appeared in the Gazette, it was the 
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 Marine Corps at large that became the audience and had to be convinced to adopt 
maneuver warfare.  
 The maneuver warfare example also highlights the value of a healthy intellectual 
climate in a military organization.  Even maneuver warfare’s harshest critics would not 
advocate an intellectually stagnant officer corps.  Marine officers were studying military 
history, seriously discussing and thinking about how they could improve their skills as 
professional military officers.  In reading about, writing, and discussing maneuver 
warfare, Marines, regardless of their perspective, were thinking seriously about the state 
of the Corps and their profession. 
 Maneuver warfare was the last major intellectual change, the last paradigm shift 
that the Corps underwent. The publication of Warfighting in 1989 ensured that  maneuver 
warfare would guide the future of the Marine Corps into the next decade and it remains to 
the present day the organizational guiding concept that Gray had envisioned it would be.  
Marine operations in 1990-1991 Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom were maneuver 
warfare operations. The wartime actions of Marines in those years cannot be understood 
without examining the peacetime actions of the Marines of the 1980s.     
 Just as maneuver replaced attrition, the replacement for maneuver will eventually 
manifest itself.  Indeed, there are probably Marines today who are dissatisfied with 
maneuver warfare and its ability to address the needs of the battlefield. There will be 
Marines with questions about the Corps and its future. Marines will grow dissatisfied 
with the dominant intellectual paradigm and another Kuhnian-type crisis will emerge. A 
new model may emerge outside of the formal bureaucracy or it may emerge from within. 
What is certain is that a new idea will emerge, and another paradigm shift will take place. 
Marines will find ways to increase awareness of this new idea.  Criticisms will inevitably 
arise.  Marines will experiment with new educational curricula and new ways of training.  
The new idea will eventually gain the acceptance of the official hierarchy, and the Corps 
will then institutionalize the new doctrine and employ it until the cycle begins anew. 
 There is still much work left to be done on maneuver warfare and the Marine 
Corps, the relationship between developments within the Corps and its sister services, 
and how events in the Corps related to other major trends of this period in American 
history.  The Corps is only one military service among four, and it is clear that the Army, 
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 the Navy, and Air Force underwent significant transitions of their own after Vietnam.   
Identifying the shared features of these transitions and as well as understanding how the 
differing organizational contexts of these services created differences would make for a 
fascinating study.  Such as study would increase our knowledge of how and why those 
organizations propose and adopt revision to their organizational doctrine.  The 
relationship between the dominant political, social, economic, and cultural trends of the 
time with the significant changes taking place in the American military is also worth 
further consideration.    
 The emergence and adoption of new ideas is an inevitable aspect of history.  The 
story of maneuver warfare is just one attempt to understand this process within the 
context of an American military organization.  Ideas are as much the product of the times 
as they are of the individual personalities involved.  New ideas challenge the old and, if 
they are successful, supplant them until the time eventually comes when they themselves 
are challenged and replaced.  This study was a limited attempt to show that examining 
military organizations can contribute to our understanding of this process.    
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